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ABSTRACT 
I argue that each of the five American authors in my study of the antebellum era in 
American literature had dissident responses to Shakespeare’s perverse sexual 
energies. These reader responses took the following forms, with significant 
consequences for American history:  
 
1. Conversion As Perversion. This strategy, demonstrated by Emerson and 
Whitman, employs the structure of perversion by affirming, in Emerson, the 
healthy imagination, in Whitman, healthy sexuality. In doing so, it commits 
itself to a confident rhetoric of health that evades and so magnifies anxiety 
about perverse sexual disease. It attempts to “convert” the reader to its view 
of the healthy imagination as a way to ward off the perversion it sees 
everywhere.  
 
2. Perversion As Conversion. This strategy, employed by Hawthorne and Melville, 
initiates a descent into the terrors of the perverse imagination as a means of 
exorcising it and reconciling the individual to the consolations of the hearth 
and home of middle-class American society.  
 
3. Perversion As Subversion. This is the strategy employed by Dickinson in her 
tense, dramatic lyrics. It employs Augustinian non-being in order to subvert 
progressive American projections of meaning into the future through a form 
that I call “perverse reading.” It eschews all identities, and remains 
menacing, dangerous, and, in my view, profoundly ethical.   
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AMERICA AND THE PERVERSE SHAKESPEAREAN 
IMAGINATION 
 
 
THE SHADOW OF SHAKESPEARE 
 
The shadow of Shakespeare looms large over the American literary landscape. It is 
the shadow of a mythic figure, first forged in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, in the American cultural imagination – and it became one of the central, 
defining symbols of American national identity.  
Another Shakespeare exists, though: furtive, dangerous, strange, diseased, 
and menacing: this figure and its conservative double are captured in the literature 
produced by America’s first great generation of writers. These two versions of 
Shakespeare, like Freud’s symbolic father of the Law and the perverse father of the 
“primal horde,” lived uneasily side-by-side in the American imagination.1  But  
Freud’s myth offers too simple a dichotomy. A Shakespearean example is more 
apposite. For it is more true that Shakespeare exists as the ghost of King Hamlet and 
Claudius in the American imagination. Just as the ghost of King Hamlet and 
Claudius are not always easily and neatly separable, so the two Shakespeares, like 
twin brothers, are sometimes bewilderingly entangled with one another. The 
Shakespeare who is the symbolic founder of the American nation can suddenly 
reveal a volatile and disturbing interior and the perverse Shakespeare can prove to 
be profoundly ethical and humane.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Sigmund Freud, Totem And Taboo, Resemblances Betwen the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics 
(New York: Barnes & Noble, 2005), especially chapter 4, pp. 124-142.  
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Since F. O. Matthiessen’s founding book of American Studies, The American 
Renaissance, the scope and depth of Shakespeare’s influence on the major American 
literary figures of the mid-19th century, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Walt Whitman, 
Herman Melville, and Nathaniel Hawthorne, has been clear. Emily Dickinson 
followed shortly after. Shakespeare’s influence on American literature is still a lively 
and constantly evolving topic.  A new anthology entitled Shakespeare In America, edited 
by James Shapiro, published for the four hundred fiftieth anniversary of 
Shakespeare’s birthday, reveals Shakespeare’s influence on literature, poetry, short-
fiction, satire, and historical documents, from 1776 to the present day. Its forward, 
by former American president Bill Clinton, places the volume squarely in the history 
of Shakespeare’s relationship to American national identity.2 
The Shakespearean scholar Julian Markels anticipates my own work with his 
full-length reading of Moby-Dick and King Lear in Melville And The Politics Of Identity, 
From King Lear to Moby-Dick. Markels traces the split between Shakespeare, as the 
symbol of American national identity, and what he calls the “demonic” Shakespeare 
that awakened Melville’s creative powers. Where Markels sees these two 
Shakespeares as a confrontation between competing political philosophies, Locke’s 
and Hobbes’, I regard the Shakespearean underbelly as pathologically sexual, in 
ways that were reflected in emerging American discourses about sexuality and that 
exceeded these. I also find the struggle between the perverse Shakespeare and the 
Shakespeare of cultural mythology in five major American writers: Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, Walt Whitman, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Herman Melville and Emily 
Dickinson.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 James Shapiro and Bill Clinton, Shakespeare in America: An Anthology from the Revolution to Now 
(New York: Library of America, 2014).  
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The term “struggle,” though, is misleading; for the perverse cannot be 
completely personalized in the way that the word “struggle” implies. It is my 
contention that the perverse is itself a structuring force in American history. It was an 
available tool in the formation of American identity; one derived, in part, from 
American millennialism, most significantly the Second Great Awakening in the 
early to mid nineteenth century. America’s messianic drive, which embodied a 
teleological view of history rooted, in part, in Augustinian and Thomistic theology, 
was translated readily into the unprecedented fervor of social reform movements 
across American society. This impulse towards reform included the construction of a 
psychiatric apparatus, with a newly professionalized psychiatric profession and 
asylums, intended for the humane treatment of the insane, in almost every major 
American city; it inspired sexual purity reform; it was evoked in the rhetoric of racial 
purity, rationalized by a Lamarckian theory of eugenics; and it was even evoked in 
the pseudo-science of phrenology and the free love movement. In order to articulate 
their response to perverse Shakespeare, American writers had a tapestry of available 
discourses. As I shall argue, Shakespearean perversity also exceeded all of these 
discourses, and produced an anarchic and dissident counter-discourse of its own, 
most clearly, through Emily Dickinson.  
I have ordered my study both according to the psychological strategy with 
which each author attempts to structure perverse Shakespeare and according to the 
degree to which the perverse Shakespearean imagination acts as a de-structuring 
and undermining force against the American myth.  
To summarize, I find three kinds of attempts to structure the American perverse:  
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1. Conversion As Perversion. This strategy, demonstrated by Emerson and 
Whitman, employs the structure of perversion by affirming, in Emerson, 
the healthy imagination, in Whitman, healthy sexuality. In doing so, it 
commits itself to a confident rhetoric of health that evades and so 
magnifies anxiety about perverse sexual disease. It attempts to “convert” 
the reader to its view of the healthy imagination as a way to ward off the 
perversion it sees everywhere.  
 
2. Perversion As Conversion. This strategy, employed by Hawthorne and 
Melville, initiates a descent into the terrors of the perverse imagination as 
a means of exorcising it and reconciling the individual to the consolations 
of the hearth and home of middle-class American society.  
 
3. Perversion As Subversion. This is the strategy employed by Dickinson in her 
tense, dramatic lyrics. It employs Augustinian non-being in order to 
subvert masculine projections of meaning into the future. It eschews all 
identities, and remains menacing, dangerous, and, in my view, 
profoundly ethical.  
 
I also order my chapters according to the degree of perverse infiltration:   
 
1. In Emerson and Whitman, Shakespeare as the symbol of American national 
identity is dominant, though the ferocious and unruly Shakespeare exhibits 
an unmistakable presence. 
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2.  In Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter, the attempt to use Shakespeare’s Macbeth to 
create a vision of America’s fortunate destiny backfires when the ghost from 
Hamlet haunts Dimmesdale’s disturbingly incestuous fantasies about his 
daughter, Pearl.  
 
3. In Melville’s Moby-Dick, the perverse de-structuring force of non-being in 
Macbeth becomes an all-consuming presence that irreconcilably splits the 
protagonist, Ishmael. This is only barely contained by Melville’s duplicitous 
device of displacing Ishmael’s perversity onto Ahab. Melville’s great work, 
though, struggles to evade the very structuring force of the perverse that it 
uses to exorcise its demons. I theorize that an inconsistent and self-divided 
Ishmael establishes a dramatic relationship with the reader that foreshadows 
Dickinson’s fertile negativity.  
 
4. In Dickinson, the perverse becomes a fully articulated anarchic and 
subversive force that I call “perverse reading”: it explodes the identity 
categories upon which progressive American culture is built.3 
 
This sequence of chapters reflects the complex tension between Shakespeare, the 
symbol and cultural myth, and the perverse and dangerous Shakespeare. It is 
important, though, to shed light on Shakespeare’s role in developing American 
national identity in the Jacksonian period and the cultural history of the perverse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 During the time that I developed my theory of “perverse reading,” I had numerous 
informal conversations with Professor Ewan Fernie that were extremely helpful. I have also 
been strongly influenced by his book, The Demonic: Literature and Experience, particularly 
chapter 1, “Dark night of the soul,” chapter 4, “DEMONIC MACBETH,” and chapter 16, 
“ANGELO,” and chapter 17, “CLAGGART.”   
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itself in order to understand how these two forces interact with such fertility and 
volatility.4 
It is crucial also for me to acknowledge here my own unique role in 
relationship to the very forces that shape my project. I am an American completing 
a PhD thesis in Stratford-upon-Avon, the birthplace of Shakespeare and home of 
the Royal Shakespeare Company. I not only attend the Shakespeare Institute, but 
the apartment in which this thesis was composed is within twenty yards of Trinity 
Church, the very church in which Shakespeare is buried. The church steeple rises 
above my courtyard fence, and is clearly visible from every window in my 
apartment, except the one facing towards the Parish Office. The psychological 
implications of being in Shakespeare’s fatherly presence – and the, by turns, comic 
and threatening phallic connotation of the church steeple – is not lost upon me. My 
thesis is inevitably partly driven by an attempt to understand the forces that brought 
me here to Stratford-upon-Avon to live and write in this apartment under the 
shadow of Shakespeare.   
 
 
SHAKESPEARE AS A NATIONAL SYMBOL  
 
Kim Sturgess has demonstrated the way that the myth of Shakespeare, along with 
the story of American Independence and the Mayflower, helped to consolidate 
America’s national identity. This extended, in the Jacksonian period, to every aspect 
of America’s national project. The legend of the volume of Shakespeare as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Throughout this thesis, I use “Jacksonian” and “antebellum” interchangeably. 
“Antebellum” generally suggests the period prior to the American Civil War, but 
“Jacksonian” captures the individualism so prevalent in the literature of this study.	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central book, along with the bible, accompanying the pioneer on the American 
frontier was not only part of the national iconography, it was a historical fact. At  
the “coonskin library” in Athens, Ohio, which emerged from the trading of wagon-
loads of coonskins for books, Shakespeare’s works were one of the very first 
acquisitions.5  
Shakespeare existed as a ghostly presence in the very geography; he was 
honoured, according to Jennifer Lee Carrell, by  prospectors who gave mines names 
like “Shakespeare,” “Ophelia,” “Cordelia,” “Desdemona,” and “Timon of Athens.” 
A Montana rancher, Philip Ashton Rollins reported that a cowhand, after listening 
to the ‘dogs of war’ speech in Julius Caesar, exclaimed, “Shakespeare could sure spill 
the real stuff. He’s the only poet I ever seen was fed on raw meat.”6 In 1863 Jim 
Bridger, described as a “mountain man” and “Indian fighter,” traded a “yoke of 
cattle, then worth about $125, or almost a month’s wages,” for a copy of 
Shakespeare, from a passing wagon on its way west.7 He did this in spite of the fact 
that he couldn’t read.  
Shakespeare’s Jubilee, a festival organized by David Garrick in Stratford-
upon-Avon on September 6-8, 1769, celebrated the bicentenary of Shakespeare’s 
birth (despite the fact that it missed the real date by five years). Garrick adapted the 
festival into a play, which premiered on October 14, 1769 at London’s Drury Lane 
theater and later was performed around the world.8 The play, known as Garrick’s 
Jubilee, became, a decade later, an important symbol of America’s growing 
bardolatry. It was produced in New York in 1788, in Charleston in 1793, and later 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Julian Markels, Melville and the Politics of Identity: From King Lear to Moby-Dick (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1993). 
6 Quoted in, Kim C. Sturgess, Shakespeare and the American Nation (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pg. 90.  
7 Sturgess, pg. 89.  
8 Vanessa Cunningham, Shakespeare and Garrick (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), pg. 114. 
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in Philadelphia in 1814.9 Starting just before Emerson’s birth, through his formative 
period, between 1800 and 1835, twenty one Shakespeare plays were produced: 
Richard III sixty times, Hamlet forty-three times, Macbeth forty-two times, and Romeo 
and Juliet, Othello, King Lear, and The Merchant of Venice almost as frequently.10 During 
the antebellum period, competing productions of Hamlet could open up on the same 
night in New York; Macbeth could be seen in three different theaters; ten different 
Hamlets were produced between 1857-1858. Lawrence Levine has established the 
intimate relationship between these Shakespearean theatrical productions and 
American popular culture.11 
Shakespeare’s works were abundantly pillaged and bowdlerized for primary 
school books on elocution, including John Walker’s Elements of Elocution, published in 
nine American cities in 1810. Children’s primers, including the most prominent, 
McGuffey’s, were packed with quotations from Shakespeare.12 Almost sixty-four 
American editions of Shakespeare’s plays were published between 1781 and 1865; 
Shakespeare criticism, ranging from Dr. Johnson (excerpted in Melville’s copy of 
Shakespeare) to Schlegel, Goethe, Madam de Stael, and Coleridge, was read by 
almost every American intellectual of the period.13 Charles Knight, for example, the 
editor of Emily Dickinson’s volume of Shakespeare, quotes Coleridge and Goethe, 
at length.14 
Sturgess reveals the way that a Shakespearean mythology, extrapolated from 
Shakespeare’s abundant cultural presence, was used by proponents of American 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Markels, pg. 39. 
10 Ibid, pg. 39-40. 
11 Lawrence W. Levine, Highbrow/lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural Hierarchy in America 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).  
12 Markels, pg. 40.  
13 Ibid, pg. 41.  14	  William Shakespeare, The Comedies, Histories, Tragedies, and Poems of William Shakespeare with 
a Biography and Studies of his Works, ed. Charles Knight (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 
1853). 	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racial superiority, to claim an idiomatic allegiance to Shakespeare. Ultimately, these 
proponents of America’s superiority went further, skipping over America’s British 
inheritance and affirming a common Anglo-Saxon culture with Shakespeare, which 
they felt was only fully realized in America.15 This Anglo-Saxon creed is present 
everywhere in Emerson’s references to Shakespeare (“the union of Saxon precision 
and oriental soaring, of which Shakespeare is the perfect example”).16 Sturgess 
quotes a passage from a sermon from the American Home Missionary Society in 
1851 which conveys the affinity with Shakespeare claimed by these advocates of 
American superiority:  
Europe is but a congregation of Nations of different languages, habits and 
religions. But power, as it passes into our hands, comes to one people, 
speaking the same language, the language of Milton, Shakespeare, and the 
English Bible, having one literature, and one common soul.17 
 
As I have observed, Shakespeare’s emergence as a powerful cultural force that 
shaped American identity coincided with the messianic fervor of the Second Great 
Awakening, in the early to mid nineteenth century. As Richard Niebuhr and Martin 
Marty show, this period involved a transition from the project of converting the 
American multitude to forging America into a society that would redeem the Old 
World of Europe.18 Shakespeare was regarded as a prophet of the New World who 
would achieve moral perfection in the crucible of American poetry.19 Emerson 
voiced a popular opinion when he denigrated Shakespeare “the player” and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See also, Henry Cabot Lodge, Shakespeare’s Americanisms in, Shapiro, pp. 254-265.  
16 Quoted in, Ralph Waldo Emerson and Joel Porte, Essays & Lectures (New York: Literary 
Classics of the U.S., 1983), pg. 895.	  
17 Sturgess, pg. 114.  
18 H. Richard Niebuhr, The Kingdom of God in America (New York: Harper, 1959).  
19 Despite the fact that Shakespeare could symbolize the threat of the Old World, the writers 
in this study regarded their engagement with Shakespeare not as a betrayal of America 
through an allegiance to the Old World, but as quintessentially American and even 
patriotic. Even Whitman, who, as we shall discover, argued that Shakespeare’s 
entrenchment in the caste system of the Old World was precisely what American poetry 
had to reject, was an enthusiastic and unselfconscious connoisseur of Shakespearean theater.  
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asserted that Shakespeare’s creative genius still required the moral regeneration of 
American Protestantism: 
. . . the world still wants its poet-priest, a reconciler, who shall not trifle with 
Shakespeare the player, nor shall grope in graves with Swedenborg the 
mourner, but who shall see, speak, and act, with equal inspiration. 20  
 
Michael Bristol charts, in meticulous detail, the American establishment of 
institutions in the twentieth century to answer Emerson’s call for a “poet-priest,” 
and to continue the Jacksonian project of the consolidation of American identity 
through Shakespeare.21 Failing to find the American poet who would fully answer 
this calling, America responded, according to Bristol, by constructing an elaborate 
institutional edifice of textual editing, libraries, academic scholarship and pedagogy. 
The Folger Shakespeare library, founded by Henry and Emily Folger, is the greatest 
symbol of this national project. Not only does it house eighty two of Shakespeare’s 
First Folios, approximately one third of the world’s two hundred twenty eight 
copies, but the handsome building is situated in close proximity to the Washington 
Monument, the Lincoln Memorial, and the Houses of Congress. The symbolic 
meaning of this location of the library is unmistakable. William Slade, the library’s 
first director, explains:  
A line drawn from the site of the Folger Shakespeare Memorial through the 
Capital building and extended onward, will all but touch the monument to 
Washington and the memorial to Lincoln – the two Americans whose light 
also spreads across the world. The amount of deviation of the extended line 
will, in fact, be only great enough to indicate the alteration from the older 
order which finds its summation in the name of Washington, for more than 
half his lifetime an English subject, albeit an English colonial, and which 
again finds its summation in the name of Lincoln. 22  
 
The Shakespeare Library permanently enshrined at the heart of America’s capital 
what was already a popular conviction in Jacksonian America. Bristol finds 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Representative Men, in Essays and Lectures, pg. 726.  21	  Michael D. Bristol, Shakespeare's America, America's Shakespeare (London: Routledge, 1990), 
pp. 13-91.	  	  
22 Ibid., pg. 76.  
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America’s Shakespearean heart of darkness in its excessive focus on the preservation 
of a stable and authoritative Shakespearean text (what he calls the “Deuteronomic 
Shakespeare”) at the expense of the subversive and anarchic energies of theatrical 
production.23 I find the division is deeper, within Shakespeare’s texts themselves, in 
the historical structuring force of the perverse and its violent conflict within the 
American imagination.  
 
 
THE PERVERSE AMERICAN JEREMIAD  
 
As Sacvan Bercovitch has described it, American identity is predicated upon the first 
American literary art-form, the jeremiad. A jeremiad is a sermon lamenting society’s 
imminent downfall. It is intended, paradoxically, not so much as a harbinger of the 
demise of society, but as a rebuke whose purpose is to renew the ideals upon which 
society has been founded. In The American Jeremiad, Bercovitch methodically traces 
the structure of the jeremiad in the sermons of America’s Puritans through its 
metamorphosis into the concept of American democracy as the “last best hope” for 
humanity, in perpetual peril of becoming depraved and perverted.  While the 
jeremiad is an invective rebuking society for its backsliding from its founding 
principles, it also contains a powerful and sincere element of dissent. This dissent, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 “The historical success of textuality and of the powerful institutional apparatus that 
supports it coincides with the virtual collapse of theatre as a strong, independent center of 
cultural authority. In the case of the canonical, that is to say, the Deuteronomic 
Shakespeare, the power of the text has been used against the theater, disabling its capacity 
as a site of cultural and social institution making, and cancelling its function in the creation 
of an alternative agential space.” Ibid., pg. 97.  
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however, is viciously circular: it cannot envision a solution to America’s problems 
other than the idea of America itself.24  
In addition to being neatly self-referential, American ideology is also 
teleological. Like the New Testament that has was written to fulfil the Old 
Testament, America is associated with “futurity itself.” American progress can never 
be fulfilled by anything as concrete and self-limiting as Manifest Destiny. It must 
always be moving towards a promise that can only be realized in a perpetual future. 
Such a teleological view of history produces perverts: those, in every generation, 
who assume the symbolic role of the murderers of America’s future. As Lee 
Edelman has understood (though without explicitly building on Bercovitch’s 
research), it is for this reason that the Queer in America has taken on the symbolic 
function of the Death Drive. Following Leo Bersani’s dictum that “the value of 
sexuality itself is to demean the seriousness of every attempt to redeem it,” Edelman 
argues that it is the burden of the Queer to take on the role of the Death Drive.25  
Edelman uses a Lacanian root, “sinthome,” combined with “homosexual,” to create 
the original coinage: “sinthomosexual,” to describe this figure. By evoking this 
figure, Edelman attempts to avoid the identity politics of the word “homosexual,” 
and the consequent trap of splitting, displacement, and scapegoating that Bersani 
finds in the liberationist project he calls the “redemptive reinvention of sex.”26 
Rather than using “sinthomosexual,” I prefer simply to use the word “pervert,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Bercovitch describes this process as taking place not from above, but from below: 
“through long-nourished rites of assent in which charges of social abuse took the form of 
appeals to social ideals;” Sacvan Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1978), pg. xviii. 
25 Leo Bersani, "Is The Rectum A Grave?," AIDS: Cultural Analysis / Cultural Activism 43 
(Winter 1987): pg. 222. 
26 Ibid, pg. 215, 222.  
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which evokes not the Lacanian Death Drive, but Augustinian non-being. 27 The 
Queer critic, for Edelman, does not assume a positive role, but a role that is best 
characterized by the ironic negation that I find in Emily Dickinson, who seems free 
of the identity politics that makes 19th century male American writers dewy-eyed. 
However, “irony” is too conceptually pure to describe fully Dickinson’s dangerously 
dramatic engagement with her readers. I prefer the active, amoral, perhaps 
aggressively voyeuristic and complicit “perverse reading.”  
A confident assertion of the American ideology may sound passé at a time 
when critics dismiss concepts of American identity as part of the old “consensus 
history”28 superseded by a criticism based upon an enlarged notion of American 
history which attempts to dispel the provincial myth of cohesive national identity 
with an analysis of America’s diverse tradition and transnational affiliations.29 30 I 
disagree with Bercovitch’s critics, though. It seems to me, on the contrary, that the 
politics of the American self was profoundly important in the Jacksonian era and it is 
even more important today. This may be because the American political system is 
structurally conservative, consisting as it does of only two political parties. It is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2004), pg. 58. 
28 David Harlan offers a spirited critique of Bercovitch’s critical project, arguing that 
Bercovitch’s notion of cultural hegemony “blights whatever it touches,” that “for all the 
brilliance of his exegetical readings,” Bercovitch “reduces classic works to historical 
documents;” his reading “homogenizes them,” . . . “makes complex texts univocal, single-
layered, one-dimensional.” David Harlan, "A People Blinded from Birth: American History 
According to Sacvan Bercovitch," The Journal of American History 78, no. 3 (December 1991), 
pg. 965.  
29 For examples of the transnational approach to American literary studies, see Sandra M. 
Gustafson, "The Cosmopolitan Origins of the American Self," Early American Literature 47 
(November 2, 2012); Paul Giles, Antipodean America: Australasia and the Constitution of U. S. 
Literature; William C. Spengemann, A New World of Words: Redefining Leonard Tennenhouse, 
The Importance of Feeling English: American Literature and the British Diaspora, 1750-1850 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007),  Early American Literature (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1994).  
30 Of course, despite my adherence to Bercovitch, my own interest in the influence of 
Shakespeare on American literature can arguably be seen in this tradition of transational 
criticism.  
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tasked with the job of uniting a diverse country around a core set of principles, and 
these principles invariably reproduce, on the left, the dogma that seeks to rejuvenate 
America by appealing to a lost “American dream”; and on the right, a return to a 
version of the Puritan work-ethic, laissez faire capitalism, and Christian values that 
Tea Party Republicans regard as the true America of our founding fathers. In this 
circumscribed national dialogue, there is only room for a debate about the meaning 
of “freedom,” narrowly defined by neoliberalism. 
Transnational American criticism implicitly evades Bercovitch’s challenge, 
thus making it susceptible to being coopted into the very feel-good politics of 
American progress that Bercovitch warns against. There is no opportunity to discuss 
what Slavoj Žižek calls the articulation of our “unfreedom.”31 In this climate, the 
ethical burden of the critic is not to attempt to rediscover the renewed promise of 
American freedom – and certainly not once again on the back of Shakespeare - but 
what Ahab calls the “mask” or the “wall” of our ideological prison.  
To understand the role of the perverse in American history is to know how 
America’s attempt to renew its identity through narratives of redemption takes place 
at the cost of the displacement of disease, death, and perversity upon a shadowy 
figure that has been invented for just that purpose.32 
This is not, as Edelman implies, with his Lacanian framework, a 
transhistorical process. It is one rooted in the specific history of the rise of psychiatry 
and the building of asylums; it is also rooted in American social movements, as 
seemingly different as the free love movement and the sexual purity movement; it is 
in the translation of Lamarck’s theory of soft inheritance into crude eugenic rhetoric 
advocating for physical and sexual health to insure pure offspring; and, most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Quoted in: Bercovitch, pg. xi. Original citation is unavailable.  
32 For a lucid discussion of Girard’s concept of the “scapegoat,” see Chris Fleming, René 
Girard: Violence and Mimesis (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), pp. 41-69.  
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importantly for this study, it is rooted in the developing concept of the pathological 
imagination and the evolution of America’s first sexual deviant: the masturbator. 
Emerson’s project to convert the diseased imagination into a healthy one; 
Whitman’s more ambitious project to convert sexuality itself into a form of what the 
publisher of Leaves of Grass, Orson Fowler called “mental hygiene,” (which Fowler 
explicitly extended to include sexual hygiene in his book, Sexual Science, 1870); 
Hawthorne’s haunting by Shakespearean incest in Hamlet; Melville’s riven struggle 
to overcome the perverse Macbeth; and Dickinson’s fertile, negative identification 
with Iago, are all associated with that specific American history.  
Yet Edelman’s adherence to the word “Queer,” in his subtitle, “Queer 
Theory and the Death Drive,” in my view, is too comfortably academic. In 
contemporary literary criticism, the word, “Queer,” threatens to become so 
amorphous and all-encompassing that it can come dangerously close to meaning 
nothing at all. “Perverse,” a word burdened with the weight of theological and 
sexological history is, in my view, less liable to risk becoming so unanchored. In my 
opinion Jonathan Dollimore was right to insist on this word, in Sexual Dissidence. 33 
The perverse does its invisible work within the most feared cultural taboos in the past 
and present, and it is only through history that a confrontation and 
contextualization of these taboos can take place. Complimenting this historical 
matrix is the dramatic, dangerously open, existentially engaged “perverse reading” 
of Shakespeare. Both work in a productive dialectic that is sometimes an overt 
struggle for mastery by the perverse jeremiad, as in Emerson and Whitman; at other 
times, a richly disquieting  interpenetration between the two modes, as in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Jonathan Dollimore, Sexual Dissidence: Augustine to Wilde, Freud to Foucault (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995).  
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Hawthorne and Melville; in Dickinson, perverse reading is at its purest, most 
gnomically resistant to history, and, as a result, its most menacing.   
  
 
SEXUAL DISSIDENCE  
 
As I have indicated above, the concept of “the perverse” has a long and rich history. 
In this section, I would like first to examine the meanings of the term that I will 
employ in this project. The Oxford English Dictionary finds a host of related meanings 
suggested by the classical Latin “pervertere,” all hinging on the root “vertere,” “to 
turn” which echo in seemingly divergent definitions. The various definitions of the 
word build a conceptual space that relates a seemingly innocuous concept “turning 
aside” to subversion and destruction. For example, the first definition given by the 
OED is “to turn aside (a process, action, text, etc.) from a correct state, course, or 
aim.” The second definition, however, shows how this concept can be taken and 
used to mean something far more radical; it suggests not merely “turning aside,” but 
destruction: “to turn upside down, overturn, or upset; to change for the worse; to 
subvert, ruin, or destroy.”34 This process of subversion extends with definition three 
into an attack on religious belief: “To turn (a person) away from a religious belief 
regarded as true, to one held to be false.” Here not only is to “pervert” the direct 
opposite of to “convert,” but perversion becomes the mechanism by which belief is 
lost. 35    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 "pervert, v.". OED Online. March 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/141685?rskey=CmDhBU&result=3 (accessed May 08, 
2015). 
35 “Although they are all distinct, each of the historical definitions of ‘perversion’ rests upon 
essentialist assumptions about what is correct and incorrect, natural and unnatural, as well 
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Why would a seemingly harmless divergence of direction lead to “disaster” 
and “ruin”? For Dollimore, the answer is that the movement of “turning” away 
from the straight and narrow is the “original (if unintended) act of 
demystification.”36 Turning is dangerous because it reveals that the path dictated by 
a religious, psychiatric, or political authority is not natural, but human-made, 
contingent and historical. Such a turning consequently constitutes a form of 
forbidden knowledge about the underlying social structure that is disturbed by the 
act of demystification. Dollimore views this as a “violent, sometimes murderous 
hierarchy between dominant and subordinate cultures, groups, and identities.”37 
What Dollimore calls “sexual dissidence” then indicates resistance that unsettles the 
opposition between the dominant and subordinate relationship. The act of 
demystification, whether intended or not, destabilizes the distinction between 
dominant and subordinate terms and this often provokes violent retribution from 
those whose authority depends upon the distinction between “the straight and 
narrow” and the perverse remaining unchallenged.38 
 Throughout this thesis, I will rely upon the conceptual space established by 
Dollimore. I will also extend this to analyse the interrelated meanings of the perverse 
in 1) Augustinian and Thomistic theology, including the opposition between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
as on ethical or theological notions of right and wrong behaviour. Similarly, every 
pathological construction depends on a norm against which it can be defined.” Anna 
Katharina Schaffner, Modernism and Perversion (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 
3-4. 
36 I cite Jonathan Dollimore on Augustine not for his expertise in theology, but because his 
work is foundational in the history of sexuality and the study of Shakespeare. Ibid., pg. 106.  
37 Dollimore, Sexual Dissidence, pg. 21.  
38 It is important to point out that Dollimore is not referring to “a straightforward 
opposition between unchanging, internally undifferentiated versions of the dominant and 
subordinate”; he is referring to a complex dynamic between “social process and 
representation” evolving over time in which “there emerge different conceptions of 
domination and dissidence.” Dollimore, Sexual Dissidence, pg. 27.  
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“conversion” and “perversion”; 2) 19th century medicine and psychiatry; 3) 
“perverse reading,” an application of the perverse to reader response theory.   
 
 
THE THEOLOGICAL PERVERSE 
 
The tradition of “the perverse” that Shakespeare inherited is predominantly 
Augustinian – informed by the theological notion of “privative evil.”39 It also 
includes a profound generalized suspicion of “wayward movement” – associating it 
with as diverse notions as the “wandering wombs” of women, the danger of 
“masterless men,” and the subversive deviousness of figurative language.40 At its 
heart, though, was a metaphysical tradition unique to Western civilization - whose 
origin, as M. H. Abrams has shown, was deep within the unique structure of the 
biblical narrative itself.41 
In order to understand the scope and depth of the perverse in Shakespeare’s 
tradition, it is important to begin with Jonathan Dollimore’s important chapter 
entitled “Augustine” in Sexual Dissidence. In that chapter, Dollimore discovers the key 
to what makes the perverse such a dynamic and volatile concept. For the perverse, 
as Dollimore shows, was originally a theological resolution to one of the most 
fundamental questions of all: “what is the origin of evil”? Augustine’s solution to that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 On the ontology “privative evil,” see also: G. R. Evans, Augustine on Evil (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Terry Eagleton, On Evil (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2010); and Ewan Fernie, The Demonic: Literature and Experience (London: Routledge, 
2013), pp. 11-17.  
40 Dollimore, pg. 119.  
41 I cite Abrams on biblical history in this chapter because his work offers a view of biblical 
history, as seen through the lens of British Romanticism, which heavily influenced 
America’s literary reception of Shakespeare. M. H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism; Tradition 
and Revolution in Romantic Literature (New York: Norton, 1971).  
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question, though, was far from being a matter of pure metaphysical inquiry. It was 
the response to a specific historical threat to the early church. That threat played a 
fundamental role in shaping the history of Western civilization.  
The threat that Augustine felt it his duty to answer was none other than the 
Manichean heresy. According to the Manicheans, evil is “coeternal and equal in 
force with the good,” “antagonistic to God,” and “fundamentally independent of 
him as well.” Augustine here quotes the Manichean view:  
. .  . that God was compelled to the creation of the vast structure of this 
universe by the utter necessity of repelling the evil which fought against him, 
that he had to mingle the nature of his creating, which was good, with the 
evil, which is to be suppressed and overcome, and that this good nature was 
thus so foully polluted, so savagely taken captive and oppressed that it was 
only with the greatest toil that he could cleanse it and set it free. And even 
then he cannot rescue all of it and the part which cannot be purified from 
that defilement is to serve as the prison to enclose the Enemy after his 
overthrow. (City of God, XI. 22 [454]; cf. XI. 13 [446])42  
 
If God cannot prevent evil, then he is – as David Hume later argued, “impotent.” If 
he is “able, but not willing,” then he is “malevolent.” If he is “both able and willing” 
to prevent evil, “whence then is evil”?43 As Hume makes clear, this is a devastating 
indictment, and - as Augustine well knew – if the early church did not credibly 
answer it, its authority would have been profoundly compromised.  
Augustine’s answer was essentially to beg the question. He denied that evil 
had any positive existence:  
And I asked what wickedness was, and I found that it was no substance, but 
a perversity of the will, which turns aside from Thee, O God, the supreme 
substance, to desire the lowest, flinging away its inner treasure and boasting 
itself an outcast. (VII. xvi. trans. Bigg)44  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 All quotes from Augustine in Dollimore, Ibid, pg. 134.  
43 Ibid, pp. 134-5.  
44 Ibid, pg. 133.  
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Thus, the “privative” theory of evil was born. Evil, according to Augustine, is 
“essentially a defect, and its defectiveness lies in a freely chosen act of defection.”45  
That defection is perversely to “abandon God,” the origin of absolute Being, and to 
“come nearer to nothingness (XIV. 13 [572]).” With that move, Augustine deftly 
shifts the “burden of proof” from the “accused” to the “accuser.” He drives this 
home by elaborating upon his theory of “original sin” – which, it turns out, is based 
upon a mistranslation of a key biblical passage.46 God’s omnipotence and grandeur 
are preserved at the cost of making human beings themselves – with their 
vindictiveness and  ingratitude – responsible for the wickedness in the world. 
As Dollimore makes clear, the Augustinian view is predicated upon an 
understanding of human nature that is, at its core, a virtual carte blanche for the 
scapegoating and persecution of minorities. As Dollimore writes:  
Here is the beginning of a theory which will feed the violence of history: 
‘essentially’, perversion becomes a negative agency within, at the heart of, 
[privative evil] . . . Augustine inaugurates a punitive metaphysic which 
remains influential to this day.47  
 
Augustine engineers a worldview that claims that “corruption” is hidden in our 
midst – perhaps where we least expect it. Like Angelo in Measure for Measure, 
everyone is potentially an “angel on the outward side” (III. ii. 260) and a pervert 
within. Shakespearean critic Arthur Lindley disagrees with Dollimore, arguing that 
the Augustinian doctrine that “licenses coercive rule over an irremediably corrupt 
humanity also licenses dissent against a government that must share those vices it 
corrects.”48 The perverse jeremiad, however, as I will explain, is a structuring force 
that promotes a dominant group in American history, the middle class. “Perverse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ibid, pg. 136. 
46 Ibid, pg. 147.  
47 Ibid, pg. 140.  
48 Arthur Lindley, Hyperion and the Hobbyhorse: Studies in Carnivalesque Subversion (Newark, DE: 
University of Delaware Press, 1996), pp. 36-7.  
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reading” involves perverse identifications that are, by definition, excluded and often 
regarded as abject: the masturbator, the homosexual, the hysterical madwoman in 
the attic. These are figures isolated by the pathologies that have grown up around 
them, ostensibly in the service of “health.” These categories also, though, possess a 
metaphysical lineage rooted in the theological perverse. Although a volatile negative 
energy is released through perverse reading, it seems to me dissident, menacing and 
isolated, like the figure of Iago at the end of Othello – rather than displaying the 
authority of those who possess an equal share of power.  
Augustine’s explanation for the origin of evil was not only well understood 
by the Elizabethans as theology, it was also retold as poetic mythology by Edmund 
Spenser. In the famous Mutability Cantos of Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, the goddess 
Mutability is a clear precursor of Milton’s Eve who tempts Adam, thus bringing 
“death into the world and all our woe, With loss of Eden” (Par. Lost, I. 1-3). In her 
aspiration for “rule and dominion,” the goddess “pervert”[s] the “meet order” of 
“Nature” and the “world’s faire frame”:  
 
V 
     
 For she the face of earthly things so changed,  
 That all which Nature had establisht first  
 In good estate, and in meet order ranged,  
 She did pervert, and all their statutes burst:  
 And all the worlds faire frame (which none yet durst 
 Of gods or men to alter or misguide)  
 She alter’d quite, and made them all accurst  
 That God had blessed, and did at first provide 
 In that still happy state for ever to abide.  
 
     VI  
 
 Ne shee the lawes of Nature onely brake,  
 But eke of Justice, and of Policie;  
 And wrong of right, and bad of good did make,  
 And death for life exchanged foolishlie:  
 Since which, all living wights have learn’d to die,  
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 And all this world is woxen daily worse.  
 O pittious worke of Mutabilitie!  
 By which we all are subject to that curse,  
And death, in stead of life, have sucked from our nurse.  
(italics added, Mutability, VI, v.-vi)49 
 
In Milton’s epic, it is Satan who, “in the serpent, perverted Eve” (Book 10, 3), 50 but 
here in one of the most famous poems of Shakespeare’s era, it is Mutability that 
“pervert”[s] . . . “that which Nature had establisht first/ In good estate.” Spenser 
adds to Augustinian theology the Elizabethan preoccupation with “wayward 
movement” that could, as I observed earlier, evoke such diverse ideas as the 
potential for subversion in literary language and the suspicion of “masterless men.”  
In Twelfth Night, for example, Sebastian’s suspect status as a man wandering 
the world without direction is evoked with his line, “my determinate voyage is mere 
extravagancy” (II. i. 9-10) – “extravagancy” meaning to “diverge.” Roderigo calls 
Othello an “extravagant and wheeling stranger” (I. i. 37).51  
In a more religious vein, Elizabethan writers like Thomas Browne, in Religio 
Medici, worried about the “errors” his “extravagant and irregular head” is prone to: 
52   
I perceive every man’s own reason is his best Oedipus and will, upon a 
reasonable truce, find a way to loose those bonds where – with the subtleties of 
error have enchained our more flexible and tender judgments . . . In 
philosophy, where truth seems double-faced, there is no man more 
paradoxical than myself, but in divinity I love to keep the road . . .  
(Book I, sect. 6) 
 
Yet, Browne’s account makes it clear the kind of corruption that the “perverse” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Edmund Spenser, Thomas P. Roche, and C. Patrick. O'Donnell, The Faerie Queene 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978).   
50 John Milton et al., The Complete Poetry and Essential Prose of John Milton (New York: Modern 
Library, 2007).  
51 All Shakespeare references throughout this thesis will be in, Shakespeare, William, 
Stanley Wells, and Gary Taylor. The Complete Oxford Shakespeare. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987. 
52 Thomas Browne and William Alexander Greenhill, Sir Thomas Browne's Religio Medici Letter 
to a Friend, &c., and Christian Morals (London: Macmillan, 1904) 
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entails: 
. . . these opinions, though condemned by lawful councils, were not heresies 
in me, but bare errors, and single lapses of my understanding without a joint 
depravity of my will . . .  
(italics added, Book I, sect. 7)  
 
It is “depravity of will” that distinguishes “the perverse” from mere “error” – which 
is simply a result of human kind’s exile in a fallen world. Here Browne observes:  
The bad construction and perverse comment on these pair of second causes, 
or visible hands of God, have perverted the devotion of many unto atheism; who, 
forgetting the honest advisoes of faith, have listened unto the conspiracy of 
passion and reason . . .  
(italics added, Book I, sect. 19)  
 
And here he warns:  
I confess every country hath its Machiavel, every age its Lucian, whereof 
common heads must not hear, nor more advanced judgments too rashly 
venture on. It is the rhetorick of Satan; and may pervert a loose or prejudicate 
belief.”  
(italics added, Book I, sect. 20)    
 
The “perverse” is not merely a result of human error, but requires a “depraved 
will.” Yet it can be actively employed to pervert the orthodox with heresy. How, 
though, one might ask, is “the will” protected from similitude between orthodox and 
heretical?  
In the Geneva Bible, the word “perverse” is used by the translators to 
designate a seemingly absolute (though actually relative) Other – one who explicitly 
“turns aside” from a metaphysical order of the “straight waies of the Lord”:53  
O full of all subtiltie and mischiefe, the childe of the deuill, and enemie of all 
righteousnesse, wilt thou not cease to peruert the straight waies of the Lord? 54 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 In the instance I cite, the Vulgate uses the unambiguous “subvertio,” to destroy or 
overthrow, rather than, “perverti,” to turn upside down, overturn, overthrow. “Pervertio” 
gives room for ambiguity, whereas “subvertio” does not. See “Latin Vulgate. Com : 
Helping You Understand Difficult Verses*,” Latin Vulgate Bible with Douay-Rheims and 
King James Version Side-by-Side+Complete Sayings of Jesus Christ, accessed March 08, 
2014, http://www.latinvulgate.com/. "Latin Dictionary and Grammar Aid," Latin 
Dictionary and Grammar Aid, section goes here, accessed March 1, 2014, 
http://archives.nd.edu/latgramm.htm. 
54 Morison, Stanley. The Geneva Bible. London School of Print. and Graphic Arts, 1955. 
	   28	  
(italics added, Acts, 13, 9-13)  
 
The use of “the perverse” culminates in Galatians 1, when Paul rebukes backsliders 
for heresy, “peruert”[ing] the “Gospel of Christ”:  
I maruiele that ye are so remoued away unto another Gospel, from him that 
had called you into the grace of Christ, Which is not another Gospel, saue 
that there be some which trouble you, and intend to peruert the Gospel of 
Christ.55  
(Galatians 1, 6-7)   
 
But, even within the Geneva Bible, the paradoxes of the “perverse” render its 
meaning unstable – and ultimately threaten it with incoherence. For, it is perhaps, 
shocking to discover that, in Luke 23, Christ himself is accused of being a “pervert”:  
Then the whole multitude of them arose, and led him unto Pilate. And they 
began to accuse him, saying, We haue found this man peruerting the nation, 
and forbidding to pay tribute to Caesar, saying, That he is Christ a King. 
And Pilate asked him, saying, Art thou the King of the Iewes? And hee 
answered him, and sayd, Thou sayest it. Then sayd Pilate to the hie Priests, 
and to the people, I find no fault in this man. But they were more fierce, 
saying He moueth the people, teaching throughout all Iudea, beginning at 
Galile, euen to this place . . . 56 
(Luke 23, 1-6)  
 
If the sacred and the perverse are so intimately connected, how is it possible to 
discern the difference between them? Is the sacred really so self-evident that one 
would be certain to recognize it, or is it contingent upon the point of view? Is the 
one who is accused of “perverting the nation,” corrupting the “nation” from within, 
worthy of execution? Or is he the living Christ? The term “perverse” is partly used, 
to stave off a crisis of identity with absolute authority, but it subtly provokes precisely 
the crisis that it attempts to ward off.  
M. H. Abrams has argued that the biblical narrative is finite, right-angled, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Here, the Vulgate uses “convertere,” which retains the two sided religious connotation of 
“pervert,” meaning to “adopt the monastic life” or, presumably, its antithesis, to commit 
heresy.   
56 Once again, the Vulgate uses the much more unambiguous, “subvertentem,” to “destroy 
or overthrow.”  
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sequential, and symmetrical.57 It begins spectacularly – by “divine fiat” (“Let there 
be light”); it progresses towards the catastrophe of the Fall in the Garden of Eden. 
At its lowest point, the crucifixion of Christ, there is a sudden reversal of humanity’s 
fortune – which leads to the Armageddon and the establishment, at the end of time, 
of a “new heaven and new earth” and the redemption of those who are saved. As 
Abrams writes:  
While the main line of change in the prominent classical patterns of history, 
whether primitivist or cyclical, is continuous and gradual, the line of change 
in Christian history (and this difference is pregnant with consequences) is 
right-angled: the key events are abrupt, cataclysmic, and make a drastic, 
even an absolute difference.58   
 
This is why the perverse turn away from God in Augustine has such catastrophic 
moral consequences. The perverse “turn” towards “error” and non-being is 
associated not merely with estrangement from God, but with a departure from a 
linear path that is also an analogy for cosmic history itself. More, as Abrams shows, 
the Christian scheme of history is built upon symmetries, oppositions, and reversals. 
This is why “perversion” so easily becomes the antithesis of “conversion”: the  
“pervert” is “one that is turned from good to evil,” “to pervert” becomes to corrupt 
another - and a convert” is “the contrary.”  
More importantly for the later violent history of the perverse, the biblical 
exile of the Jews is traditionally figured as an illicit sexual encounter. As Augustine 
writes, “the soul is guilty of fornication when she turns from You” to seek what she 
will nowhere find “unless she returns to You” (II. vi.).59 So that, infused in the 
climax of sacred world history, the nuptial “joining” of the Church with Christ is 
already the excluded perverse Other: the sin of “fornication” with the “whore of 
Babylon.” Since marriage between man and wife, the soul and God, the Church 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Abrams, pg. 35.  
58 Abrams, pg. 36.  
59 Augustine quoted in Abrams, pg. 166.  
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and Christ, is cast in this imagery of “joining” together, the “perverse” is invariably 
associated with “unjoining” or “misjoining,” as in Macbeth’s murder and figurative 
rape of Duncan; Claudius and Gertrude’s incestuous marriage; Bottom’s cross-
species liaison with Titania; Caliban’s potential cross-species rape of Miranda; and 
Othello’s interracial marriage with Desdemona, mediated, for the audience, by 
Iago’s perverse fantasies.60 Though “the perverse” in Shakespeare’s era is by no 
means exclusively associated with sexual transgression, what Abrams reveals is that 
the biblical structure over-determines it from the start to conduct powerful currents 
of sexual dissidence.  
 
AGAINST NATURE 
 
The Medieval Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas provides the most profoundly 
influential account of the perverse after Augustine. Taking Augustine’s metaphysics 
of privative evil as self-evident, Aquinas develops an idea that would influence the 
development of the perverse into our own time: that of “natural law.” He then uses 
his concept of natural law to develop a taxonomy of sexual sin.  
Although he conceives of sin according to the ontological categories 
established by Augustine, which prescribe that the “perverse will” sinfully “turns 
away” from God (“the good” or “Being”), Aquinas emphasizes the Aristotelian 
notion of “teleology” in his account of good and evil. Thus, the decision to “avoid 
“the good” is a violation not only of the efficient cause of one’s “nature,” but an 
insult to the “final cause,” God.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 For a detailed discussion of the concept of “joining” in Shakespeare see Patricia A. 
Parker, Literary Fat Ladies: Rhetoric, Gender, Property (London: Methuen, 1987), pp. 97-103.  
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Before we proceed, it is important to note that Aquinas’s style of reasoning 
runs squarely into a philosophical point that is still hotly debated. This point must 
be clarified in order to place Aquinas’s natural law in context. The problem is what 
British philosopher David Hume calls the “fact / value” distinction. Queer theorists 
use this argument to debunk the central unexamined premise of heterosexual 
authority, its “appeal to nature.” Hume argues that conclusions about what “ought 
to be done” cannot be inferred from premises concerning what “is the case.” In 
other words, it is absurd to argue that “nature” has a necessary claim to moral 
authority simply because it is “what is,” so it is invalid to derive moral principles 
from “nature.” Hume calls this the “naturalistic fallacy.” As Edward Feser argues, 
though, this line of reasoning would have been irrelevant to Aquinas.61 If a Christian 
God exists, “what is” must be inherently good, and, as such, there can be no moral 
distinction between what “should be” and “what is.” It is only with a secular 
understanding of nature that the fact / value distinction has any meaning. As we 
will discover, though, even with the rise of science in the 18th and 19th centuries, 
Aquinas’s teleological view of nature was still immensely influential.  
In an Augustinian vein, Aquinas writes: “this is the first precept of law, that 
“good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided ” (I-II, Q. 94, Art. 2, Obj. 
3). Yet he elaborates it into the teleological framework of “natural law”:  
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, the nature of a contrary, 
hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are 
naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects 
of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, objects of avoidance. Wherefore 
according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of 
the natural law.62  
(italics added, I-II, Q. 94, Art. 2, Obj. 3)  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Edward Feser, Aquinas: A Beginner’s Guide (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009), pg. 175. 
62 Thomas, Summa Theologica First Complete American Edition (New York: Benziger Bros., 1947). 
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While the natural law has its ultimate origin in God, it does not, according to 
Aquinas, require any special knowledge of God or scripture. It is a self-evident truth 
that “nature has taught to all animals” (I-II, Q. 94, Art. 2, Reply Obj. 2). So, for 
example, Aquinas writes that the first precept of the “natural law” is the 
preservation of life:  
. . . inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, 
according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a 
means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to 
the natural law.  
(I-II, Q. 94, Art. 2, Obj. 3)  
 
If the “preservation of life” is a self-evident “good,” reasons Aquinas, an even greater 
good, is the preservation of the “species” – through the process of procreation. So, 
just, as Hamlet laments, the “Everlasting” has “fixed” his “canon 'gainst self-
slaughter” (Ham. I. ii. 131-2), it is an even deeper sin to violate the injunctions that 
govern the perpetuation of the species. Arnold Davidson summarizes:  
wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it be taken in due 
manner and order, as required for the welfare of the body, so also the use of 
venereal acts can be without sin, provided they are performed in due 
manner and order, in keeping with the end of human procreation.63 
 
There are two such principles, therefore, upon which lawful sexual intercourse is 
based: one is the proper “manner;” and the other is the proper object determined by 
the “natural order” for the end of procreation. Deviance from the “natural manner” 
of copulation is a less heinous sin than violating the “natural order.” So, for 
example, “adultery, rape of a virgin, incest, etc.” are less serious than masturbation, 
sodomy, and bestiality because the former merely violate the proper “manner” of 
copulation while still observing its proper end, whereas the latter are “contrary to 
nature.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Arnold I. Davidson, The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of 
Concepts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), pg. 99.  
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Aquinas here not only converts Augustine’s metaphysics into a hierarchy of 
sexual sins, but each type of sexual sin is categorized specifically according to its 
deviance from the natural order. As such, Aquinas is able to argue that sins 
“contrary to the natural order” constitute an affront to God himself:  
. . . just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from men, so the order of 
nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins contrary to nature, whereby 
the very order of nature is violated, an injury is done to God, the Author of 
nature.64 
 
Aquinas’s reasoning moves elegantly here from the most general principle of life as 
“self-preservation” to a law that governs the most private and minute details of 
sexual intercourse. Even more importantly, Aquinas’s argument is structured in such 
a way that non-procreative sex is turned into a direct “injury” to God himself. While 
Aquinas’s argument will have a powerful impact on Shakespeare’s plays – most 
significantly Macbeth – it is in the 18th century with its increasing scientific interest in 
“function” that Aquinas’s more naturalistic style of reasoning will come to have a 
profound impact. This will have a specific influence on the 18th and 19th century 
“masturbation panic” and the budding psychiatric industry in America, which I will 
discuss later in my chapter on Hawthorne.   
The perverse is a tradition that not only builds from Augustine to Aquinas, 
but has two distinct lineages. Aquinas’s tradition describes specific types of sexual 
deviance according to the degree to which they “turn away” from God, whereas the 
Augustinian tradition defines sin as itself a form of sexual deviance. The Augustinian 
tradition emphasizes the ontological dilemma of the soul “turning away” from Being 
towards Non-Being – or as Antipholus of Syracuse might put it, turning from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Arnold I. Davidson, The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of 
Concepts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), pg. 100.  
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substance to “wander in illusion” (IV. iii. 43). Its imagery is derived from the soul’s 
journey into “error” or exile and the promise of its ultimate “union” with God.  
Aquinas’s minute taxonomy of sexual transgression coupled with his 
teleological notion of sexual “purpose” is invariably associated with the specific 
problems of particular types of sexual transgression. Aquinas describes the sexual 
perverse not as a form of straying, but a form of rebellion not only against the 
principle of life, but against the species. For this reason, although a play like Macbeth 
has no explicit sexual transgression, Macbeth’s murder of his king and guest, 
Duncan, is a precise enactment of Aquinas’s view of the ungrateful and vindictive 
nature of sexual perversion. Macbeth, for example, cries:  
 But let the frame of things disjoint, both the worlds suffer 
 Ere we will eat our meal in fear, and sleep  
 In the affliction of these terrible dreams  
 That shake us nightly; (III. ii. 17-19)  
 
It is the impulse to “let the frame of things disjoint” that Aquinas would regard as the 
motive behind perverse sexual transgression.  
Even more pertinently, Macbeth thunders: “though the treasure / Of nature’s 
germens tumble all together / Even till destruction sicken” (Mac IV. i. 57-9).  Here, 
Macbeth demands knowledge from the witches at the risk of destroying the very 
archetypal forms upon which nature is framed. As Aquinas argues, he would rather 
destroy his  “species” than cede his fragile hold on power. That is the Faustian 
bargain that Aquinas establishes when he elaborates “natural law.” For Aquinas, the 
sexual deviant is an agent of what Freud would later call the Death Drive – but, he is 
a specific kind of figure who wants, as Lee Edelman describes the “sinthomosexual,” 
to murder the future.  
Aquinas’s teleological view of the “perverse” will also ghost the Romantic 
concept of the “imagination,” strongly influenced by such Shakespeare plays as 
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Macbeth and The Tempest in the 18th and 19th centuries and it will subtly inform 
Krafft-Ebing’s invention of “the sexual instinct” in the late 19th century.  
Of course, Macbeth is deeply indebted to Christopher Marlowe’s Dr Faustus. 
Dr Faustus also has a profound impact on the American tradition, best exemplified in 
Melville’s depiction of Captain Ahab and Hawthorne’s depiction of Young 
Goodman Brown’s perverse communion with the witches in the dark forest. Arthur 
Lindley writes eloquently about Augustinian non-being in Dr Faustus in his chapter, 
“The Unbeing Of The Overreacher,” in Hyperion And The Hobbyhorse. While Dr 
Faustus has an important mythical presence in American literature, what most 
captured the anxieties of the antebellum period was Macbeth with its sustained 
atmosphere of dread and desire. My thesis will, therefore, focus primarily on Macbeth 
– though I do allude to the important mythic presence of Dr Faustus as well.  
 The Shakespearean perverse as a form of “joining,” “unjoining,” and 
“misjoining,” exemplified, as I have argued, in Macbeth, The Tempest, Othello, A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream, and Hamlet, is also an active notion in the America’s 
Shakespearean perverse. It compliments the Shakespearean perverse I have 
described in Macbeth.  
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PERVERSION IN SEXOLOGY  
 
In the late 19th century, the sexologist Krafft-Ebing coined the term “sexual instinct” 
to link deviant sexual desire to personality. In the view of Arnold Davidson, this 
historical moment constituted the invention of “sexuality.” As Ebing writes:  
 
These anomalies are very important elementary disturbances, since upon the 
nature of sexual sensibility the mental individuality in greater part depends.65  
 
Ebing’s intentions could not have been more different from Aquinas’s. He was a 
humanitarian who did not want to demonize deviant sexual behaviour, but to 
understand it in a dispassionate, objective scientific manner. In fact, Ebing was at 
pains to separate the “perverse” legacy inherited from Augustine and Aquinas from 
that of his own project. For Ebing, “perversion” would have had a “functional” 
definition. It would, according to the Robley Duglinson’s Medical Lexicon refer to: 
“one of the four modifications of function in disease; the three others being 
augmentation, diminution, and abolition.”66  
Yet, Ebing could not adequately describe perversion without inventing a 
new concept: he called this the “sexual instinct”:  
Perversion of the sexual instinct . . . is not to be confounded with perversity in 
the sexual act; since the latter may be induced by conditions other than 
psychopathology. The concrete perverse act, monstrous as it may be, is 
clinically not decisive. In order to differentiate between disease (perversion) 
and vice (perversity), one must investigate the whole personality of the 
individual and the original motive leading to the perverse act. Therein will 
be found the key to the diagnosis.67 
 
For Foucauldian scholars like Davidson, of course, it is immediately obvious what is 
happening here. One regime of power and knowledge, the juridical (with its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Quoted in, Davidson, pg. 21.  
66 Quoted in Davidson, pg. 14.  
67 Davidson, pg. 23.  
	   37	  
theological rationale), is being usurped by another: the scientific. Rather than 
controlling behavior by merely criminalizing perversity, Ebing’s humanitarian 
efforts to understand the perverse as a disease opens up the “whole personality” to 
investigation. Thus, we have the Foucauldian paradox: the humanitarian pursuit of 
scientific understanding in the service of life actually becomes the agent of a far 
more invasive form of power than had ever existed previously.  
Or does it?  
A qualification immediately springs to mind. Ebing does not concern himself 
with the “final cause” of procreation: glorifying God’s designed world. He is merely 
concerned with the elemental mechanism by which an organism survives and 
perpetuates its species. However, Ebing’s notion of the “sexual instinct” is 
inextricably associated with Aquinas’s “natural law” because it uses precisely 
Aquinas’s terms, “survival” and “perpetuation of the species” (which are also, 
coincidentally adopted by Darwin). These terms mean that the “sexual instinct” will 
be defined not just by its “function,” but on its “purpose.”68 At the same time, 
Ebing’s description of the “sexual instinct” is Augustinian – unintentionally evoking 
the logic of privative evil:  
The sexual instinct is a psychological phenomenon in every normal being 
endowed with life. It is a need of a general order and in consequence it is 
useless to look for its localization, as one has done, in any particular part 
whatever of the organism. Its seat is everywhere and nowhere . . . This instinct is 
therefore independent of the structure itself of the external genital organs, 
which are only instruments in the service of a function, as the stomach is an 
instrument in the service of the general function of nutrition.69  
(italics added)  
 
Here embedded within an ostensibly scientific description is a “psychological 
function” that is explicitly metaphysical (“it is useless to look for its localization”). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 I do not mean to argue that Darwin was, in any sense, Augustinian or Thomistic. Quite 
the contrary. What I am pointing out is that, despite his intentions, a trace of Augustinian 
and Thomistic ideas inheres within the language that he uses. 
69 Davidson, pg. 13.  
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The supposedly objective hunt for the origin of the “pervert” within the personality, 
then, becomes a search for an object that is “everywhere and nowhere.” At the 
heart of a supposed scientific inquiry, one has here a pursuit for an entity that is as 
mysterious and potentially threatening as the demon Christ cast out – who cried, 
“My name is Legion, for we are many.” (KJ, Mark 5:9).   
Although Davidson makes an extremely persuasive case that we ignore the 
genuine innovation of the sexologists – and, hence miss the “invention of sexuality” 
– when we imagine that “perversion” was merely a continuation of “perversity,” it is 
my view that Davidson overstates his case. As Richard Sha has wittily observed, 
Davidson’s rigid distinction between Victorian era sexology and the tradition that 
came before it “makes Romantic sex mere foreplay to the real thing.”70 While it is 
clear that a “search for the origins” of a concept can be misguided, it is also possible 
to err on the side of an inquiry that is too self-contained, and, therefore, fails to see 
connections across various historic periods.  
By presupposing, for example, a strong hard line between the late Victorian 
era and the prior history of the “perverse,” Davidson ignores not only Sha’s later 
point – which is that the scientific origins of the “perverse” as “deviation from 
function” go back as early as 1750, but that the theological form of the perverse 
never disappears  - but retains a ghostly presence ‘within’ the sexological perverse. 
In other words, what Foucault would call the “disciplinary” regime did not just 
displace the “juridical” regime. They operated alongside one another – and they did 
so for well over a hundred years prior to the time that Davidson assigns to the 
perverse.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Richard C. Sha, Perverse Romanticism: Aesthetics and Sexuality in Britain, 1750-1832 (Baltimore: 
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PERVERSION IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA  
 
My study of American literature in the 19th century suggests that there is no clean 
line between the theological perverse and the emerging psychiatric form of the 
perverse. The Augustinian perverse and the Thomistic teleological view of sexual sin 
were an animating presence alongside the rise of antebellum American capitalism 
and what Foucault calls “bio-power,” the life-affirming discourses of rationalist 
American psychiatry. These theological ideas manifested themselves in forms as 
diverse as the conservative Lockean psychology of Hawthorne, the Lamarckian 
eugenic theories of Whitman, and the phrenological “sexual science” of Orson 
Fowler.  
As I have argued, the concept of America during the antebellum period was 
also profoundly rooted in a teleology structured by the Bible. In the antebellum 
period, as today, America was viewed as the fulfilment of the promise of Old World, 
most exemplified by Shakespeare. As such, works of art, structured to consolidate an 
emerging American identity, were unified by the same powerful theological forces 
that informed 19th century views of sexuality.  
As in Renaissance England, the view of the individual body was quite readily 
displaced upon social body and vice versa. As we will discover in Emerson and 
Whitman, the health of the individual sexual body was regarded, quite literally, as 
essential to insuring that America fulfil its destiny. Emerson and Whitman structure 
this politics of the healthy imagination through a utopian interpretation of 
Shakespeare’s The Tempest.  
In Hawthorne and Melville, perversion of the sexual body is regarded more 
actively as a murderous assault directly on America’s future. Shakespeare’s Macbeth 
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is the play primarily enlisted for this dramatic enactment, but Hamlet, King Lear, The 
Tempest, and Othello also play an important role. I regard Emily Dickinson as the sole 
dissenter in America’s mad perverse jeremiad. She dissents through an exultant 
identification with Iago and Augustinian non-being itself, undermining progressive 
identity politics from within. Dickinson exemplifies the return of Augustinian non-
being as a positive, transfiguring force.71  
 
 
THE PERVERSE IMAGINATION: A LICENTIOUS AND 
VAGRANT FACULTY  
 
The budding of psychiatry beginning in the 17th and 18th centuries was an 
Enlightenment attempt to divorce mental illness from the theological view that held 
it was a form of demonic possession and to anchor it to a rational and humane 
treatment of the insane. Yet, the history of perversion demonstrates the persistence 
of metaphysical categories within ostensibly medical ones. For it was by using the 
eminently rational principles set out by John Locke that 18th century psychiatrists 
recreated the perverse in the image of the Enlightenment.  
The imagination, first described by John Locke, in An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, as the mind’s organizing principle for secondary ideas, carried to it 
through the nervous system, quickly came to be regarded as the skeleton key that 
would unlock the secrets of mental illness. As Thomas Laqueur writes, the 
imagination was, in the late 17th through the early nineteenth century:  
the central guiding principle of the continuity of the person which allowed us 
to connect our pasts, presents, and futures; the link between reason and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Fernie, pp. 3-33.  
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senses or between the body and the mind; the foundation of art and of 
economic desire; the core concern of a new branch of philosophy –
aesthetics; the key to how ideas were understood to be connected in 
associationist or perhaps any empiricist psychology, among much else.72  
 
It also became the kinder, gentler face of a medical discourse through which the old 
theological terrors and paradoxes of the perverse would be revisited.  
While Locke dedicates only a few pages in the Essay to the diseased 
imagination, this became the cornerstone for thinking about mental illness for 
almost two hundred years. For Locke, madness is not primarily based upon a 
problem with the reasoning faculty. Madmen reason coherently, but their reasoning 
is based upon false premises. The entertainment of false premises is the result of a 
negative feedback loop that is caused either by an overactive imagination or a fault 
in the nerves (or both) which carry simple ideas to the brain. What ensues is a 
“violence of the imagination” that sets up an independent realm that takes “fancies 
for realities”:  
Thus you shall find a distracted man fancying himself a king, with a right 
inference require suitable attendance, respect, and obedience: others, who 
have thought themselves made of glass, have used caution necessary to 
preserve such brittle bodies. Hence it comes to pass, that a man, who is very 
sober, and of a right understanding in all other things, may, in one 
particular, be as frantic as any in Bedlam;73  
(Ch. 11, sect. 13) 
 
Madmen, then, like Macbeth, usurp a kingdom to which they are not entitled. A 
“distracted man” might “fancy himself a king,” but his kingdom is based upon an 
insubstantial void. As George S. Rousseau writes:  
[The Enlightenment] arrogated powers to the diseased imagination in its 
influence on the body that earlier had been reserved for the Deity himself; 
imagination, in obstructed and consequently diseased forms in the female or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Thomas Walter. Laqueur, Solitary Sex: A Cultural History of Masturbation (New York: Zone 
Books, 2003), pg. 319.  
73 John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding; with Notes and Illustrations, and an 
Analysis of Mr. Locke's Doctrine of Ideas. 25th. Ed. with the Author's Last Additions and Corrections 
(London: T. Tegg, 1925), pg. 94.  
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male, could destroy the seed of life, the foetus at any stage of conception or 
gestation.74  
 
If the imagination could take on power reserved for the Deity, it could also become 
associated with his nemesis, Satan. For the false epistemology associated with 
insanity would also come to be a central part of the indictment of masturbation. 
Consider, for example, this crucial passage in the Onania:  
For fornication and adultery itself, tho’ heinous sins, we have frailty and 
nature to plead; but self-pollution is a sin, not only against nature, but a sin 
that perverts and extinguishes nature, and he who is guilty of it, is labouring 
at the destruction of his kind, and in a manner strikes at the Creation itself.75  
 
The masturbator is also, like Lucifer, a usurper of pleasure that doesn’t rightly 
belong to him. He creates the object of his unnatural desire, thus eschewing the 
social obligations that sexuality demands in favour of the boundless and 
insubstantial kingdom of the imagination.  
It is not surprising, then, that Samuel Johnson, for example, calls the 
imagination a “licentious and vagrant faculty, unsusceptible of limitations, and 
impatient of restraint”76 (chapter 44). The “licentious” and subversive potential of 
the imagination is there right from the beginning when Locke gives it a false 
epistemology.  
The Lockean view of the imagination by the medical establishment was, 
throughout the Romantic period – and well beyond the mid-19th century in 
America – untouched by Kant’s “Copernican revolution in reverse” which placed 
the subject at the centre of the “phenomenal” universe. It remained staunchly 
rooted in the empiricist, associationist tradition of Locke. Though it was Kant’s 
move to make “nature” an extension of the individual mind rather than an external 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 G. S. Rousseau, Nervous Acts: Essays on Literature, Culture, and Sensibility (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pg. 94.  
75 A Supplement to the Onania, or the Heinous Sin of Self Pollution (London, 1724), pg. 10. 
76 Samuel Johnson and Warren Fleischauer, The History of Rasselas, Prince of Abyssinia (Great 
Neck, NY: Barron's Educational Series, 1962).  
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standard to imitate – and it was precisely Kant’s shift that allowed for the 
Shakespearean imagination to become democratized by the German organicists – 
the rise of science and the burgeoning psychiatric tradition had a strong influence on 
critics like Coleridge. As Richard Sha observes:  
Coleridge, for example, read, owned, or had access to [a vast collection of 
books on science]. He not only often attended medical lectures (Coffman 
and Harris), but also wrote an essay on physiology called Hints towards the 
Formation of a More Comprehensive Theory of Life. Romantic culture’s emphasis on 
feeling and on a mind-body reciprocity led scientists and poets to explore 
human sexuality in unprecedented ways. They asked what sexuality could 
tell us about the interaction between the body and mind, especially because 
many believed as did Coleridge that the “plastic life or the power of the 
Germ [seed] . . . is the manifestation of distinct essence in the all-common 
Matter.” 77 
 
Coleridge delivered his lectures on Shakespeare in 1818. By 1822, the British 
doctor, John Mason Good, used the character of Hamlet as a template for his 
discussion of "melancholy attonita." He called Shakespeare "the highest authority in 
everything relating to the human mind and its affections." 78This was followed up by 
the more systematic 1833 work of George Farren, 'Essays on the Varieties of Mania, 
Exhibited by the Characters of Hamlet, Ophelia, Lear, and Edgar."79 
Given this eclectic atmosphere, it is understandable that we find Coleridge, 
in his Lectures on Shakespeare, offering what is essentially a medical diagnosis of a 
“mutilated” and “diseased” Hamlet emphasizing a typical psychiatric opinion of the 
time that madness was based upon an over-excited imagination and the loss of the 
“due balance between the real and imaginary worlds”:  
In Hamlet [Shakespeare] seems to have wished to exemplify the moral 
necessity of a due balance between our attention to the objects of our senses, and our 
meditation on the workings of our minds, – an equilibrium between the real 
and the imaginary worlds. In Hamlet, this balance is disturbed: his thoughts, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Sha, pg. 24.  
78 Quoted in: Benjamin Reiss, Theaters of Madness: Insane Asylums and Nineteenth-century American 
Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), pp. 83-84.	  
79 George Farren, Essays on the Varieties in Mania, Exhibited by the Characters of Hamlet, Ophelia, 
Lear, and Edgar (New York: AMS Press, 1975).  
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and the images of his fancy, are far more vivid than his actual perceptions, and his very 
perceptions, instantly passing through the 'medium' of his contemplations, 
acquire, as they pass, a form and colour not naturally their own. Here we see 
a great, an almost enormous, intellectual activity, and a proportionate 
aversion to real action, consequent upon it, with all its symptoms and 
accompanying qualities.80  
(italics added)  
 
For Coleridge, Shakespeare is not only “nature humanized,” but he is 
capable of inventing characters with imaginations that can be pathologized. If the 
imagination possesses the “very powers of growth and production,”81 “the images of 
fancy” can also become diseased through unnatural activity. It is the very 
“unconscious purposefulness” of the imagination that gives it scope for defection 
from “real action,” allowing it to set up an unhealthy world of its own that upsets 
the “due balance between our attention to objects and our senses.” Hamlet becomes 
a portrait of the artist whose “enormous intellectual activity” destroys his 
“equilibrium.” If Shakespeare’s imagination was freely available for the artist, then it 
was also the carrier of a disease that psychiatrists were only then beginning to 
diagnose.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Samuel T. Coleridge, Coleridge's Lectures on Shakespeare and Other Poets and Dramatists (London: 
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EMERSON’S ENCHANTED ISLAND: AMERICA 
WITHOUT CALIBAN 
 
There are people who read Shakspear [sic] for his obscenity as the glaucous gull is said to 
follow the walrus for his excrement.82 
 
 
OVERVIEW 
 
Ralph Waldo Emerson’s debt to Shakespeare is one of the largest in this study. I first 
chart this profound influence, which extends from Emerson’s most casual register to 
his moments of deepest distress and vulnerability. Shakespeare is also a sometimes 
hidden presence in Emerson’s most characteristic passages. While, as I argue, 
Emerson generally eschewed the wide variety of identifications with Shakespearean 
persona typical of Hawthorne, Melville, and Dickinson, he consolidated his identity 
as the foremost American critic through an identification with Prospero.   
Emerson became, in the romantic tradition, a champion of the deified 
imagination that Locke had originally pathologized both as a sign of mental illness 
and, implicitly, as a perverse usurpation by “fancy” of reality. Emerson, however, 
skips over the Faustian implications of the romantic imagination, by identifying with 
Prospero, who, in Emerson’s mythology, is the benign lord of an enchanted 
American island, bleached of the presence of Caliban and his perverse menace. 
Emerson’s Protestant background, though, forced him to qualify this deification of 
the imagination by emphasizing the distinction between the “healthy” and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Ralph Waldo Emerson and Lawrence Alan Rosenwald, Selected Journals, 1820-1842 (New 
York, NY: Library of America, 2010), pg. 312. 
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“diseased” imaginations. Hamlet came to represent, for Emerson, the diseased and 
potentially perverse imagination that would stand in the way of America realizing its 
destiny.  
 
 
SPIRITUAL FATHER OF AMERICA’S SHAKESPEARE 
 
Emerson is, according to Michael Bristol, the great forebear of the Shakespeare of 
the American academy.83 Certainly, Emerson’s peculiar brand of transcendentalist 
Bardolatry was the wellspring of inspiration that drove the couple, Henry and Emily 
Folger, to amass over forty years one of the most impressive collections of 
Shakespeareana in history. It also drove them to establish jointly the Folger 
Shakespeare library at the heart of the US capital in 1932. In fact, Bardolatry in the 
style of Emerson, could justly be said to have fuelled Henry and Emily’s courtship 
and later their entire marriage.84  
The journalist James Waldo Fawcett, who worked closely with Mrs. Folger 
in the last years of her life, observed that Mr. Folger had only a “slight advantage” 
over his wife in his knowledge of Shakespeare, but after their marriage, Emily soon 
“adjusted the balance” by achieving an M. A. degree in Shakespeare under the 
tuition of one of the most eminent Shakespeare scholars of his day, Dr. Horace 
Howard Furness. Mrs. Folger “was [Mr. Folger’s] librarian, clerk, and amanuensis,” 
but more than that, after his sudden death in June 11, 1930, she assumed the full 
responsibility of the unfinished library. She “was thrust into the position of making 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 See especially Bristol’s chapter five, “Shakespeare In The American Cultural 
Imagination,” in, Shakespeare's America, America's Shakespeare (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 
123-143.  
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all major decisions about the final library design, staffing, and financing.”85 She also 
donated, out of her own savings, the additional funds needed to open the library.  
While Emily certainly possessed equal if not greater knowledge of 
Shakespeare, it was Henry’s job as president of Standard Oil, the company founded 
by John D. Rockefeller, that made the couple’s devotion to collecting 
Shakespeareana possible. The connection between Emerson and Shakespeare was 
established early for Henry. In Christmas of 1875, when Henry returned home from 
Amherst College for Christmas vacation, he received from his younger brother 
Stephen Lane Folger, a single volume edition of Shakespeare’s Complete Works. 
Folger filled the title page and blank pages with quotes from various authors about 
Shakespeare. By far the most generous selection of quotes came from Emerson, 
specifically passages from “Shakespeare; or the Poet” from Representative Men 
(1850).86 As Emily Folger later recollected, Henry’s already substantial enthusiasm 
was kindled when he attended a lecture by the man whose writing about 
Shakespeare he most idolized, Emerson. On  March 19, 1879 at Amherst College 
Hall, Emerson gave a lecture not, as luck would have it, on the topic of Shakespeare, 
but on “The Superlative or Mental Temperance.” Nonetheless, the chance to listen 
to the elderly Emerson lecture transformed Henry. According to Stephen H Grant, 
“Emerson packed so much thought and beauty into condensed sentences that 
Henry considered them to sound Shakespearean.”87   
After his death, Emily described the influence of Shakespeare on Henry:  
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Henry Folger’s original interest in Shakespeare was instinctive. It was a 
natural expression of his own spiritual character. The inner light of his mind 
was reflected in the age-dimmed but still bright mirror of the poet’s work. 
Science affords no satisfying explanation of such phenomena. Certain souls 
respond to certain other souls, but no theory yet evolved is competent to 
furnish a complete analysis of the relation.88  
 
The notion of an ahistorical relationship with Shakespeare that is purely 
“instinctive,” based upon a “natural expression of [Henry’s] spiritual character” is 
richly Emersonian – as is typical of both Henry and Emily’s remarks about 
Shakespeare. Speaking about her husband’s passion for Shakespeare in 1932 at the 
Meridian Club in New York, Emily showed how this transcendental Shakespeare 
could be wedded with a vision of America’s cultural origin and its unique destiny:  
[Mr. Folger] visioned [ibid] the cultural value, the ethical and social value of 
the beauty and idealism of Shakespeare. The poet is one of our best sources, 
one of the wells from which we Americans draw our national thought, our 
faith and our hope . . .89  
 
As in Emerson, a personal and ahistorical Shakespeare blends with an “idealism” 
that establishes America’s cultural authority. Emerson was the figure, above all 
others, who forged this connection for the Folgers. It is certainly no accident, then, 
that the Folgers spent decades attempting to acquire Emerson’s own personal copy 
of Shakespeare’s Complete Works. Emily finally succeeded in obtaining, on indefinite 
loan from the Emerson Memorial Association, one of Emerson’s four copies of 
Shakespeare, one of only two with Emerson’s signature. It was the copy that 
Emerson kept “in his bedroom, and from certain annotations it is obviously the one 
which he let his children take to school and use in their studies.” For several months 
in 1934, this copy was displayed in the central case in the exhibition hall of the 
Folger Library.90 
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Who can blame the Folgers for being inspired by Emerson’s contagious 
enthusiasm about Shakespeare – which it is almost impossible to overstate? In his 
seminal essay in Representative Men, entitled, “Shakespeare; Or, The Poet,” Emerson 
writes, in a typical vein, in which he compares Shakespeare to Christianity itself:  
It was not until the nineteenth century, whose speculative genius is a sort of 
living Hamlet, that the tragedy of Hamlet could find such wondering 
readers. Now, literature, philosophy and thought are Shakespearized. His 
mind is the horizon beyond which, at present, we do not see. Our ears are 
educated to music by his rhythm. Coleridge and Goethe are the only critics 
who have expressed our convictions with any adequate fidelity: but there is 
in all cultivated minds a silent appreciation of his superlative power and 
beauty, which, like Christianity, qualifies the period.91 
 
In a manner consistent with contemporary critics, Emerson comes just short of 
deifying Shakespeare, but he also hails his own age as the one most suited to 
understand the great tragic protagonist, Hamlet. Emerson also demonstrates the 
range of Shakespeare criticism that American intellectuals had ready access to: from 
Goethe to Coleridge. However, Emerson was also well read in the entire European 
critical canon, which included, among others, Johnson, Hazlitt, Keats, the Schlegels, 
and Madame de Staël. He maintained a lifelong correspondence with Thomas 
Carlyle, who also published a book comparable to Emerson’s own Representative Men: 
On Heroes, Hero-Worship, And The Heroic In History. Carlyle included a chapter on 
Shakespeare and Dante, analogous to Emerson’s own chapter on Shakespeare, 
“The Hero As Poet: Dante: Shakespeare,” which was equally fervent in its praise of 
Shakespeare.  
Yet, despite Emerson’s well-known Bardolatry, the extent and depth of his 
assimilation of Shakespeare has only been hinted at. Melville may have been the 
most overt Shakespearean among Jacksonian writers, but his extensive 
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Shakespearean allusions and language-experiments only extend to Moby-Dick (1851) 
and Pierre; or, The Ambiguities (1852). Emerson imbibed Shakespeare as a kind of 
second self. If Emerson’s contemporary Shakespeare critic, Jones Very, could make 
the Keatsian claim that Shakespeare “may be said to have been most truly himself 
in being others,” Emerson might be said to have been most truly himself when he 
was Shakespeare.92 Emerson’s very throw-away expressions are often quarried, 
sometimes unconsciously, from Shakespeare’s plays. In Emerson’s Selected Journals, 
during his formative period, from 1820-1842, Lawrence Rosenwald has indexed one 
hundred twenty-two separate allusions to Shakespeare. This, however, only 
scratches the surface. For, the undoubtedly conscientious Rosenwald only counts 
deliberate allusions to Shakespeare or his plays. He understandably overlooks the 
way that the very texture of Emerson’s language is interwoven with Shakespeare 
allusions.  
The word “pudder,” for example, occurs only once in all of Shakespeare – in  
King Lear, in Act III, scene ii of King Lear – when Lear is on the heath:  
     Let the great gods 
That keep this dreadful pudder o'er our heads 
Find out their enemies now.  
(italics added, III. ii. 49-51)  
 
Emerson remembers it in a passing remark in his journal:  
 
Great pudder make my philanthropic friends about the children. I should be 
glad to be convinced they have taught one child one thing.93  
 
Another word, “dislimn” occurs only once in Shakespeare –in Antony and Cleopatra, 
Act IV, scene xiv – in Antony’s soliloquy after he is defeated near Actium. 
Describing the clouds, Antony exclaims:  
That which is now a horse, even with a thought 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Quoted in, Julian Markels, Melville and the Politics of Identity: From King Lear to Moby-Dick 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), pg.44. 
93 Emerson, Journals, pg. 438.  
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The rack dislimns, and makes it indistinct, 
As water is in water.  
(IV. xix. 9-11)  
 
Emerson remembers the word – and uses it in recollecting an observation by his 
brother, Charles:  
Charles remarks upon the nimbleness & buoyancy which the conversation of 
the spiritualist awakens; the world begins to dislimn.”   
 
During a long sea voyage in which he felt in peril of his life, Emerson recited 
Milton’s, “Lycidas,” to comfort him, but he describes the event echoing Clarence’s 
famous speech from Richard III:  
O Lord! Methought what pain it was to drown! 
What dreadful noise of waters in mine ears! 
What sights of ugly death within mine eyes! 
Methoughts I saw a thousand fearful wracks; 
A thousand men that fishes gnawed upon; 
Wedges of gold, great anchors, heaps of pearl, 
Inestimable stones, unvalued jewels, 
All scattered in the bottom of the sea.  
(I. iv. 21-28)  
 
Here is Emerson in his journal:  
A long storm from the second morn of our departure consigned all the five 
passengers to the irremediable chagrins of the stateroom, to wit, nausea, 
darkness, unrest, uncleanness, harpy appetite & harpy feeding, the ugly sound 
of water in mine ears, anticipations of going to the bottom, & the treasures of the memory. I 
remembered up nearly the whole of Lycidas, clause by clause, here a verse & 
there a word, as Isis in the fable the broken body of Osiris. –94   
(italics added)  
 
Even the most quintessentially Emersonian passages are often larded with concealed 
pearls stolen from the Bard:   
The great and crescive self, rooted in absolute nature, supplants all relative 
existence, and ruins the kingdom of mortal friendship and love.95 
 
Again, “crescive” is a word used only once in Shakespeare. Compare this passage 
from Henry V:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Ibid., pg. 217.  
95 Emerson, Essays, pg. 487. 
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And so the Prince obscur’d in his contemplation 
Under the veil of wildness, which ( no doubt)  
Grew like the summer grass, fasted by night,  
Unseen, yet crescive in his faculty.  
(I, i. 63-6)  
 
For the man who claims in “Self-Reliance,” that “imitation is suicide,” or in his 
essay on Shakespeare, “Shakespeare will never be made by the study of 
Shakespeare,” did not mean that precisely. What he meant was that the original 
energy that Shakespeare tapped was now available for the individual. The American 
“poet-priest” could annex not only Shakespeare’s life force, but his cultural 
authority to the self. Although Emerson had no inkling of the Shakespeare 
establishment that would develop in the twentieth century, his project foreshadowed 
it.  
With the exception of Emerson’s usurpation of the role of Prospero, his 
borrowings from Shakespeare almost never involve the dramatic identifications that 
we will find in Hawthorne, Melville, and Dickinson. They are passed through the 
sieve of a mind that was enamored by the expressive power of Shakespeare’s 
language and, most importantly, thrilled by its power. The Faustian strain is, of 
course, concealed within Shakespeare’s wizard, Prospero, who seems to have 
realized Faust’s dream of acquiring power over all nature, without having to sell his 
soul to the devil. It is everywhere in Emerson’s mystical concept of the Oversoul, 
which bestows upon the poetic imagination an occult relationship with nature, 
equivalent to that of Prospero, though it is Protestant American capitalism that does 
the magic rather than Ariel. To understand Emerson’s identification with Prospero, 
though, we must first explore his relationship to the Lockean tradition outlined in 
the preceding chapter. Having done that, it will be important to recognize that, far 
from being untroubled, as he wanted to be viewed, Emerson’s imagination became 
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implicitly pathologized by a discourse of health and sickness, with anxieties that are 
voiced through Hamlet.  
Following Coleridge in the high romantic tradition, Emerson deified the 
imagination – though not unconditionally. He deified what he considered to be the 
healthy imagination – and, consequently, he internalized Augustinian non-being and 
the psychiatric categories of the healthy and diseased imagination that sexual 
reformers like Sylvester Graham, empowered by the Lockean American psychiatric 
establishment, endorsed.96 In doing so, he actually advanced the process by which 
the perverse imagination was internalized much further than American psychiatrists 
could have ever have envisaged.  
However, we must first address Emerson’s legitimate differences from 
America’s Lockean psychiatrists. Emerson follows Kant and Coleridge in the 
traditional romantic move of annexing God’s powers to the imagination. Consider, 
for example, how America’s Lockean psychiatrists would have regarded this passage 
from Emerson’s most famous essay, “Self-Reliance,” evoking the opening scene of 
Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew:  
The popular fable of the sot who was picked up dead drunk in the street, 
carried to the duke’s house, washed and dressed and laid in the duke’s bed, 
and, on his waking, treated with all obsequious ceremony like the duke, and 
assured that he had been insane, owes its popularity to the fact, that it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 The word, “psychiatry,” (and its derivatives) was, according to the OED, first used in the 
North American Review in 1828. This term was not used routinely, though, in the early 
years of the profession. Generally, the term “psychology” is used. Also popular in the 
Jacksonian period, in place of our contemporary word, “psychiatrist,” was the word 
“alienist.” This word handily evokes the Lockean notion that the diseased imagination is 
estranged, operating in a factitious reality independent from the real world. I use 
“psychiatry,” however, to emphasize the fact that the Asylum Superintendents were 
generally medical doctors who pioneered the psychiatric establishment we recognize today. 
"psychiatry, n.". OED Online. March 2014. Oxford University Press. 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/153856?redirectedFrom=psychiatry> (accessed 
January 9, 2014). 	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symbolizes so well the state of man, who is in the world a sort of sot, but now 
and then wakes up, exercises his reason, and finds himself a true prince.97   
 
As we have seen, Locke uses a parallel example in order to describe the disordered 
ideas of an insane man. Emerson, on the other hand, can be positively ecstatic about 
the prospects of what, in a passage often quoted by American psychiatrists, Johnson 
would call in Rasselas the “realm of fancy.”  
The reason why the solution that Emerson and Coleridge found in German 
Romanticism didn’t have any purchase in American psychiatry is that it evaded the 
intricate link between the mind and body, upon which the entire system of 
psychiatry was founded. By asserting a radical monism (“idealism saith: matter is a 
phenomenon, and no substance”), Emerson skips over the problem of the link 
between the mind and body entirely, allowing the mind not only to usurp the body, 
but all of nature as well.98 
This move led to two accusations on the part of Emerson’s literary enemies. 
First, he was accused of narcissism. This charge is most notably levelled by 
Hawthorne in a striking passage in his short story, “Monsieur du Miroir” – which 
we will revisit later:  
Thus do mortals deify, as it were, a mere shadow of themselves, a spectre of 
human reason, and ask of that to unveil the mysteries, which Divine 
Intelligence has revealed so far as needful to our guidance, and hid the rest.99 
 
This should hardly be surprising when Emerson utters such untroubled lines as this, 
in “The American Scholar”: “The world, — this shadow of the soul, or other me, 
lies wide around;” or this from Nature: “In the tranquil landscape, and especially in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Emerson, Essays, pg. 268.  
98 Ibid. pg. 40.	  
99 Nathaniel Hawthorne and James McIntosh, Nathaniel Hawthorne's Tales: Authoritative Texts, 
Backgrounds, Criticism (New York: Norton, 1987), pg. 405.  
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the distant line of the horizon, man beholds somewhat as beautiful as his own 
nature.”100  
The second implicit accusation came from Melville. It is no accident that he 
turned the Faustian hero of Moby-Dick, captain Ahab, into a transcendentalist whose 
grim “sultanic” grandiosity  is undercut by intimations of “naught beyond” at the 
heart of nature. Consider, for example, this passage by Captain Ahab:  
Talk not to me of blasphemy, man; I'd strike the sun if it insulted me. For 
could the sun do that, then could I do the other; since there is ever a sort of 
fair play herein, jealousy presiding over all creations. But not my master, 
man, is even that fair play. Who's over me? Truth hath no confines.101  
  
Now compare Emerson in the chapter, “Spirit,” in Nature:  
Who can set bounds to the possibilities of man? Once inhale the upper air, 
being admitted to behold the absolute natures of justice and truth, and we 
learn that man has access to the entire mind of the Creator, is himself the 
creator in the finite.102 
 
Hidden in Melville’s accusation of Emerson is the Presbyterian concern that 
Emerson was too naïve to recognize the way that the depraved will could 
manipulate his theory for its own ends. Indeed, Melville suggests that the perverse 
will was already operating unseen within Emerson’s theory. As Harold Bloom 
observes, Emerson’s progressive legacy was inherited by the educational reformer, 
John Dewey, but his legacy as the “primary theoretician of power” was inherited by 
auto tycoon Henry Ford.103 
Although Emerson seems blissfully unaware (at least until his darker book 
The Conduct of Life, with its chapters, “Wealth” and “Power”) of the potential for his 
ideas to be perverted by the acquisitive impulse that American psychiatrists 
inveighed against as “money-mania,” it is no accident that he deliberately evades 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Emerson, Essays, pg. 60, pg. 10.  
101 Herman Melville et al., Moby-Dick (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967), pg.140.  
102 Emerson, Essays, pg. 41.  
103 Harold Bloom, Emerson's Essays (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 2006), pg. 5.	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this accusation by countering the Marlovian tradition of Dr Faustus and the 
Shakespearean tradition of Macbeth by identifying his poet-sage with Prospero, the 
beneficent wizard ruling an American island in which Caliban is conspicuously 
absent.  
In fact, a close reading of Emerson reveals that in his pivotal book, Nature, he 
makes an intricate argument to solder his utopian claims for the soul to 
Shakespeare’s Prospero, thus muffling the rebuke of Faustian tradition, which holds 
that the aspiration for infinite power is based upon Augustinian non-being. Before 
we examine this, it is worth considering that Emerson was aware that his assertion 
that the simple affirmation that the conversion of nature into “soul” produced 
“Being”: “the vast affirmative, excluding negation” and that “Nothing, Falsehood” .  
. . “cannot work any harm,” was open to criticism.104 For, even in his most ecstatic 
mood in his essay, “Circles,” he recognizes the “blindness” that Melville calls a 
“defect in the region of the heart.” He notifies the reader that he  has arrived at a 
“fine Pyrrhonism, or the equivalence and indifferency of all actions,” . . . which 
asserts that “our crimes may be lively stones out of which we shall construct the 
temple of the true God!” This is merely an aside, though, which Emerson excuses by 
asserting, “I simply experiment, an endless seeker, with no Past at my back.”105 
More persistently, Emerson ignores the perverse implications of his theory of 
the imagination by using the mythic power of Shakespeare’s Prospero implicitly to 
affirm the innate goodness of his poet / sage whose aim was nothing less than to 
democratize Shakespeare’s poetic power and redeem American history. This led 
him away from the Lockean model that distrusted the diseased imagination as 
rooted in Augustinian non-being, and towards an affirmative view of the healthy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Emerson, Essays, pg. 299.  
105 Ibid., pg. 411-12.	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imagination that was even more threatened by perverse pathology than American 
psychiatrists could have imagined.  
 
 
THE AMERICAN PROSPERO  
 
Emerson regarded his book Nature as making, for the first time, accessible to the 
individual a power that had been concealed within Elizabethan verse generally (he 
cites, among others, George Herbert) – and Shakespeare’s verse, in particular.106 
Yet, Emerson and his contemporaries also believed he was liberating a power that 
he and his circle felt already resided in the American idiom – an idiom they felt 
corrupted by the polished rhetoric of polite speech. As his friend, Bronson Alcott 
observed:  
I remember hearing the same words, and was indeed accustomed to use 
them, in my boyhood and native village, into which the refinements of the 
brisk town had not found the way . . . They spoke the speech of Shakespeare 
and Beaumont and Ben Jonson. But now, if I would enjoy that pleasure of 
hearing my native tongue in its riancy and exuberance I must listen to the 
boys about our school-houses, or cast my eyes along the columns of the 
dictionary, there to recover the animal spirit which once sparkled and 
pranked itself forth in the buxomness and proud motions of our mother-
tongue. What we have gained in elegance we have lost in thought and 
expression.107 
 
If Emerson’s project was to cast off the yoke of the “courtly muses of Europe,” he 
was also equally interested in arguing that the very same “nature” that inspired 
Shakespeare’s plays already resided in the speech of every-day Americans. All that 
this idiom needed was a poet able to capture its music.108 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 F. O. Matthiessen, American Renaissance (New York: Oxford Univ., 1966), pp. 100-114. 
107 Matthiessen, pp. 36-37.  
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Emerson regarded himself as a Prospero who gave the secret of his magic to 
American poets. It is no surprise, then, that in Bronson Alcott’s celebration of 
Emerson’s achievements, he evoked him as a Prospero with a “wand of Power” and 
a muse “Ariel-wise” that eschewed “argument” and “syllogism” in favour of 
enchantment:  
His rhetoric dazzles by its circuits, contrasts, antitheses; imagination, as in all 
sprightly minds, being his wand of Power. He comes along his own paths, 
too, and always in his own fashion. What though he builds his piers 
downwards from the firmament to the tumbling tides, and so throw his 
radiant span across the fissures of his argument, and himself pass over the 
frolic arches – Ariel-wise, - is the skill less admirable, the masonry the less 
secure for its singularity?109  
 
Emerson deliberately cultivated this image of himself – both in his first book, Nature, 
and in his later essay, “Experience.” In Nature, he explicitly links his own view that 
the poet possesses an occult knowledge of the radical correspondence between 
nature and the soul by evoking Shakespeare as a kind of wizard of language:  
Shakespeare possesses the power of subordinating nature for the purposes of 
expression, beyond all poets. His imperial muse tosses the creation like a 
bauble from hand to hand, and uses it to embody any caprice of thought 
that is upper-most in his mind. The remotest spaces of nature are visited, 
and the farthest sundered things are brought together, by a subtle spiritual 
connection. We are made aware that the magnitude of material things is 
relative, and all objects shrink and expand to serve the passion of the poet.110  
 
Emerson then specifically cites The Tempest in order to further elaborate his vision of 
Shakespeare as himself a Prospero whose secret Emerson has made available to the 
American poet:  
I have before me the Tempest, and will cite only these few lines.  
 
  The strong based promontory 
  Have I made shake, and by the spurs plucked up  
  The pine and cedar.  
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Again;  
 
   The charm dissolves apace,  
 And, as the morning steals upon the night,  
 Melting the darkness, so their rising senses 
 Begin to chase the ignorant fumes that mantle 
 Their clearer reason.  
   Their understanding  
 Begins to swell: and the approaching tide 
 Will shortly fill the reasonable shores 
 That now lie foul and muddy.  
 
. . . The perception of real affinities between events, (that is to say, of ideal 
affinities, for those only are real,) enables the poet thus to make free with the 
most imposing forms and phenomena of the world, and to assert the 
predominance of the soul.111  
 
Emerson chooses Shakespeare’s Prospero specifically to illuminate his theory of 
language’s occult relationship to nature. In this way, he preserves the mystery of this 
relationship while, at the same time, freeing it by transmitting its principle.  
In his masterful essay, “Experience,” Emerson departs from his prior claim 
in Nature that the imagination is not merely subjective, but shares an absolute being 
with God himself. He instead asserts that subjectivity may simply be a “train of 
moods like a string of beads” . . . “many colored lenses which paint the world their 
own hue.” 112 Perhaps recognizing that such an assertion makes him vulnerable to 
the Lockean criticism that the poetic imagination establishes merely a “reign of 
fancy,” with no epistemological validity, he evokes the authority of Prospero, again:  
Bear with these distractions, with this coetaneous growth of the parts: they will 
one day be members, and obey one will. On that one will, on that secret cause, 
they nail our attention and hope. Life is hereby melted into an expectation or 
a religion. Underneath the inharmonious and trivial particulars, is a musical 
perfection, the Ideal journeying always with us, the heaven without rent or 
seam . . . as if the clouds that covered it parted intervals, and showed the 
approaching traveller the inland mountains, with the tranquil eternal 
meadows spread at their base;113  
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112 Emerson, pg. 473.  
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Of course, Prospero’s “rough magic” does not give any final access to “nature,” 
which is merely an “insubstantial pageant” (IV. i. 155), but, Emerson’s rhetorical 
appeal to Prospero’s authority gives the imagination an implicit grandeur, dignity, 
and authority. Even in the absence of God, Emerson still has Shakespeare.  
More persistently, though, Emerson’s vision of the democratized 
imagination was haunted not by the prospect that the poetic imagination lacked 
epistemological validity, which was the widespread opinion of psychiatrists, but that 
the imagination itself could become unhealthy. 
For to annex the powers of “nature” to the self is also to make the most 
private recesses of one’s identity an expression of the cultural ideas associated with 
the concept of nature. On the one hand, the organic metaphor could become an 
image associated with freedom and nonconformity. It could also potentially measure 
every impulse based upon a language of health and disease generally attributed to 
the flourishing of living organisms.  
 
CONVERSION AS PERVERSION 
 
Civilization was considered by leading medical authorities, during Emerson’s time, 
to be a primary cause of mental illness. American psychiatrists widely accepted the 
dictum, “insanity is a disease of civilization, and the number of the insane is in direct 
proportion to its progress.”114 Tocqueville located this insanity in the cycle of “boom 
and slump” specifically in “democratic psychology”:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Quoted in, G. J. Barker-Benfield, The Horrors of the Half-known Life: Male Attitudes toward 
Women and Sexuality in Nineteenth-century America (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), pg. 48.  
	   61	  
the return of these commercial panics is an endemic disease of…democratic 
nations… it cannot be cured, because it does not originate in accidental 
circumstances, but in the temperament of these nations.115  
 
To display the robustness of one’s private life might be an unruly “barbaric yawp,” 
but it could equally be a kind of sterilized double of Hawthorne’s “scarlet letter”: a 
letter from a doctor giving notice to the world of an individual’s “mental hygiene” 
(to use a phrase coined by William Sweetser, and later, employed by Isaac Ray, one 
of the founders of the American Psychiatric Association).   
Though Emerson disparaged the most notable proponent of the sexual 
purity movement, Sylvester Graham, as “the prophet of bran bread and pumpkins” 
(for his strict dietary recommendations), his own vocation was shaped by the very 
social forces that inspired that movement – and those related to it: the temperance 
movement, the women’s rights movement, and the abolitionist movement. 116 
Emerson has traditionally been seen as the “sage of Concord” – a role that, 
as we have seen, he himself fashioned, in part, through a Shakespearean persona. 
This role of poet / sage seems far removed from the turbulent populist social 
movements of his day. This view, however, has been substantially revised in the last 
two decades by a new tradition of criticism, called by Lawrence Buell, the “de-
transcendentalizing” of Emerson – which “consists of stressing the material motives 
underpinning Emerson’s writing and thus situates his transcendentalism within 
critical agendas that emphasize contextual and social issues.”117 This tradition 
cannot be explored in depth here. Suffice it to say, though, that in the 1830’s, the 
specific social and economic changes in East Coast states like Massachusetts and 
New York that led to unprecedented anxiety about sexuality – also produced the 	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opportunity for Emerson to become a cultural hero of the age.  
With the destruction of the single-family as an economic unity, the 
disintegration of the apprentice-system, an influx of immigrants, the shift to a 
Jacksonian “boom and bust” economy, and an urban population explosion – mostly 
of uneducated young men – a powerful wedge was driven between the generations. 
The older generation lamented the loss of the traditional values of the family and 
the problem of educating and socializing the youth became paramount.  It is no 
accident that Emerson’s generation of writers – perhaps more than any previous 
generation in American – spoke directly to America’s youth.118 
On the surface, Emerson was staunchly aligned against the conservative 
values that Graham represented. Emerson found his own ministry even in Boston’s 
liberal Unitarian Church too restrictive for his conscience. Emerson’s 1839 
“Divinity School Address” to the graduating class of Harvard Divinity School 
scandalized the establishment church. Many of Emerson’s contemporaries  
denounced him as an “atheist” – and, in short order, Andrew Norton, of Harvard, 
delivered a rebuttal to Emerson’s speech for the Cambridge Theological School 
entitled, “A Discourse on the Latest Form of Infidelity.” In that speech, Norton 
writes of Emerson’s teachings:  
The latest form of infidelity [Transcendentalism] is distinguished by 
assuming the Christian name, while it strikes directly at the root of faith in 
Christianity, and indirectly of all religion.119 
Norton aims at the issue at the heart of Emerson’s early teaching: that the subject 
possesses access to a divine power, “nature,” that makes the miracles of Christ seem 
inconsequential. Emerson doesn’t so much dwell on a skeptical view of Christ’s 	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miracles as render them irrelevant:  
And thus by his holy thoughts, Jesus serves us, and thus only. To aim to 
convert a man by miracles, is a profanation of the soul. A true conversion, a 
true Christ, is now, as always, to be made, by the reception of beautiful 
sentiments . . . The time is coming when all men will see, that the gift of God 
to the soul is not a vaunting, overpowering, excluding sanctity, but a sweet, 
natural goodness, a goodness like thine and mine, and that so invites thine 
and mine to be and to grow.120 
(italics added)  
 
Four times in Norton’s lecture, Emerson’s teachings are denounced as “perverting” 
the gospel. Yet as admittedly unorthodox as Emerson’s views were, the difference, 
for Emerson, is that the individual needs to make those same conservative principles 
“his or her own” – by making “nature” his or her own. This is why, paradoxically, 
Emerson could persuasively argue against the threatening influence of external 
models such as the traditional Unitarian church while affirming the principle of 
“sweet, natural goodness” which evokes core middle class Christian values.  
According to Bercovitch, the authority of  Emersonian “self-reliance” was, 
ultimately, “circumscribed” by what “America stood for”: “an ‘economic system’ – 
as well as a moral, religious, and political way of life – that had ‘all of nature behind 
it.’”121 Emerson, according to Bercovitch, converts middle class “rites of assent”122 
into a statement that gives the individual a seemingly radical authority. The limits of 
this individualism, though, were speedily qualified. In “Self-Reliance,” for example, 
Emerson asserts a curiously comfortable middle class vision of radical 
individualism.123 
Bercovitch is also skeptical of the claim that Emerson’s individualism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Emerson, pg. 82.  
121 Bercovitch, 184.  
122 Ibid., xviii.  
123 “Emerson’s radical individualism (1836-1841) invests the self with the boundlessness of 
free enterprise capitalism in an apparently open, empty, and endlessly malleable New 
World.” Sacvan Bercovitch, The Office of the Scarlet Letter (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1991), pg. 148.  
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constitutes a politically radical stance:  
Far from pressing the conflict between the individual and society, Emerson 
obviated all conflict whatever by defining inward revolt and social revolution 
in identical terms . . . His vision of the good society invited the individual to 
deny every secular distinction between himself and others and so to make 
individuation an endless process of incorporation. His call to self-
transcendence closed all options to middle-class norms.124 
Smith-Rosenberg concurs, and further argues that the “individualism” exemplified 
by Emerson and the return to “old values,” represented by Graham, are 
“quintessential statements of the male Jacksonian mind.”125 They represent opposite 
views, but they are forged by the same climate. Emerson’s democratized vision of 
the American poet and intellectual both harnessed the public ferment created by the 
groups advocating social reform and also attempted to unify them all under a vision 
of the self-reliant American individual.  
Russ Castronovo argues that whereas figures like Graham were intimately 
concerned with the diseased social body, Emerson’s vision of the self-reliant 
American individual is intimately connected to a “privatized body”:  
What matters most is that the body standing alone furnishes an anti-
institutional register promising not only that the social critics can resist 
institutions, but also that the social critic need not think about institutions at 
all.126 
 
Yet, the self-reliant body that Emerson describes is also the “body politic.” As we 
will discover, Emerson’s confident assertions about the “health” of this body and its 
appeal to an authority from “nature” concealed a preoccupation with disease – with 
specific hints of the disease of sexual perversion – that would, in a more explicit 
form, obsess Graham.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Bercovitch, pg. 184.  
125 Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, "Sex as Symbol in Victorian Purity: An Ethnohistorical 
Analysis of Jacksonian America," American Journal of Sociology 84 (1978): pp. 213-214.  
126 Russ Castronovo, "Enslaving Passions, White Male Sexuality and the Evasions of Race," 
in The Puritan Origins of American Sex: Religion, Sexuality, and National Identity in American Literature, 
by Tracy Fessenden, Nicholas F. Radel, and Magdalena J. Zaborowska (New York: 
Routledge, 2001), pg. 153.  
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It should not be surprising, then, that a theme that is generally equated with 
the sexual purity movements of the antebellum period should crop up in Emerson’s 
great “declaration of American intellectual independence.” In “The American 
Scholar,” the exemplar of the failed poet is too effeminate and introspective to meet 
the demands of the new American poetry:  
Our age is bewailed as the age of Introversion. Must that needs be evil? We, 
it seems, are critical; we are embarrassed with second thoughts; we cannot 
enjoy any thing for hankering to know whereof the pleasure consists; we are 
lined with eyes; we see with our feet; the time is infected with Hamlet's 
unhappiness, — 
"Sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought."127 
Later in “The American Scholar,” Emerson alludes to Goethe’s famous 
observations about Hamlet in Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship:  
Of course, he who has put forth his total strength in fit actions, has the 
richest return of wisdom. I will not shut myself out of this globe of action, 
and transplant an oak into a flower-pot, there to hunger and pine . . .128 
 
In Emerson’s image – derived from Goethe – Hamlet’s own nature is a delicate 
“flower-pot,” incapable of supporting a heroic and masculine “oak” tree destiny. In 
Goethe, the flower-pot shatters, but in Emerson, the oak becomes sickly. It 
“hunger”[s] and “pine”[s]. Emerson is, here, attempting to displace the effeminate, 
dissipated Hamlet – perhaps deathly ill with tuberculosis (as his first wife and two 
brothers would become) with an image of health and wholeness.  
That image of an effeminate Hamlet "Sicklied o'er” with the disease of 
“Introversion” was one that lingered with Emerson. While elsewhere Emerson 
associates this image of the poet with the Calvinistic preoccupation with original sin 
and predestination, what ghosts these particular lines is an evocation of Hamlet as 
an effeminate sexual deviant – perhaps turned in on himself with solipsistic self-	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regard. At the time, tuberculosis was regarded as one of the symptoms of excessive 
masturbation.  
Emerson was much impressed by the scene with the ghost in Hamlet – and he 
makes numerous references to it:  
I remember, I went once to see the Hamlet of a famed performer, the pride 
of the English stage; and all I heard, and all I now remember, of the 
tragedian, was that in which the tragedian had no part; simply, Hamlet’s 
question to the ghost, -  
 
 ‘What may this mean, 
 That thou, dead corse, again in complete steel 
 Revisit’st thus the glimpses of the moon?  
(I. iv. 51-53)129 
In “Compensation,” Emerson aligns the scene with the ghost in Hamlet quite 
explicitly with his ethical system:  
All infractions of love and equity in our social relations are speedily 
punished. They are punished by fear . . . 
 
Fear is an instructor of great sagacity, and the herald of all revolutions. One 
thing he teaches, that there is rottenness where he appears. He is a carrion 
crow, and though you see not well what he hovers for, there is death 
somewhere . . . Fear for ages has boded and mowed and gibbered over 
government and property. That obscene bird is not there for nothing.130  
 
The “rottenness” evokes “something rotten in the state of Denmark” (I. iv. 90): 
Hamlet’s world as threatened by disease. The other echo here is from Horatio’s 
speech which just precedes the entrance of the ghost: “The graves stood tenantless 
and the sheeted dead / Did squeak and gibber in the Roman streets” (I. i. 115-116).  
Emerson briefly envisions the “obscene bird” as a “carrion crow” that 
presides over a society ruined by a principle of private acquisition turned into 
bottomless, amoral greed. Here, Emerson establishes a kind of social law that is 
directly opposed to his own concept of the “self-reliant” individual. For Emerson’s 
own principle of the self-reliant individual is based upon a notion of a natural power 	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“without limits” annexed to the individual, a power intimately connected to 
boundless capitalist acquisition. Emerson’s description of “rottenness” haunts the 
very individualism that he advocates. Sexual reformers explicitly linked such 
“rottenness” to a particular disease of sexual excess: masturbation.  
As I mentioned above, Emerson’s first wife and two of his brothers, Edward 
and Charles, died of tuberculosis. Emerson also had two brothers, Edward and 
Robert, committed to the McLean Asylum and, as Reiss observes, he sometimes 
wondered whether the family’s “constitutional malady” might affect him as well.131 
In Emerson’s journal entries concerning Charles we find a disarming and 
inadvertent echo of Hamlet:  
Yesterday I read many of C. C. E.’s letters to E. H. I find them noble but 
sad. Their effect is painful. I withdrew myself from the influence. So much 
contrition, so much questioning, so little hope, so much sorrow, harrowed me. I 
could not stay to see my noble brother tortured even by himself. No good or 
useful air goes out of such scriptures, but cramp & incapacity only.132 
 
It is a single phrase, but it is typical of Emerson to echo Shakespeare in times of 
distress. The phrase “harrows me” recalls the words of the Ghost in Hamlet: “I could 
a tale unfold whose lightest word / Would harrow up thy soul, freeze thy young 
blood” (I. v. 15-16).  
What “harrows” Emerson about his brother’s letters is their self-torture: “So 
much contrition, so much questioning, so little hope, so much sorrow.” Ironically, 
what Emerson objects to is precisely the kind of hand-wringing and gnashing of 
teeth that would exercise Sylvester Graham – which he refers to as “cramp and 
incapacity.” However, rather than emphasizing the infiltration of the healthy body 
by disease – as the sexual reformers would - Emerson does the opposite. He 
displaces disease with a vow to affirm only health:  “I shall never believe that any 	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book is so good to read as that which sets the reader into a working mood, makes 
him feel his strength, & inspires hilarity.” The contrast between “hilarity” and 
“harrow” is an extremely unusual lapse in tone for Emerson – and is psychologically 
revealing. It hints that Emerson possesses a vulnerable awareness that his confident 
assertion of healthy is merely a rhetorical spell to avoid the far deeper anxiety that 
he too will succumb to the family disease.  
Emerson’s prescription is the “self-reliant” individual – whose body is a 
sanctuary for imbibing unmediated “nature.” For, as he writes:  
But never can any advantage be taken of nature by a trick. The spirit of the 
world, the great calm presence of the creator, comes not forth to the 
sorceries of opium or of wine. The sublime vision comes to the pure and 
simple soul in a clean and chaste body . . . If thou fill thy brain with Boston 
and New York, with fashion and covetousness, and wilt stimulate thy jaded 
senses with wine and French coffee, thou shalt find no radiance of wisdom in 
the lonely waste of the pinewoods.133 
 
Or, Emerson adds:  
So the poet’s habit of living should be set on a key so low and plain, that the 
common influences should delight him. His cheerfulness should be the gift of 
the sunlight; the air should suffice for his inspiration, and he should be tipsy 
with water.134 
 
Although Emerson is espousing a far more liberal agenda, his regime of temperance 
is far from alien to Graham’s – which, recommended a vegetarian diet to counteract 
the insurrection of perverse impulses within the body. Rather than preaching a 
sermon on chastity, Emerson’s very notion of the self-reliant individual depended on 
a strength from a “nature” unperverted by sexual and alcoholic excess. So, while 
Emerson’s language seems utterly untroubled by the dark preoccupations of a figure 
like Graham, his repeated appeal to “nature” and “health” mean that the specter of 
perverse sexuality is “everywhere and nowhere” in Emerson.  
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WHITMAN: CALIBAN’S CURSE 
 
 
OVERVIEW  
 
 
I first trace the populist and threatening Shakespeare Walt Whitman discovered, as 
a young man and a journalist, in Manhattan’s subversive Bowery Theater milieu. 
This is most characterized by Whitman’s favourite Shakespearean actor, Junius 
Brutus Booth, whose dangerous and experimental acting was a formative influence 
on the life of his son, John Wilkes, also a strong Shakespearean actor, and may have 
contributed to the theatrical-style assassination of Abraham Lincoln. As a poet, 
though, Whitman regarded Shakespeare as a rival for the heart and soul of 
America. He dismissed him as the purveyor of elite aristocratic values that America 
had, supposedly, come on earth to “destroy.”  
Nonetheless, it is the radical and experimental Shakespeare that may have 
influenced Whitman’s poetic persona in Leaves of Grass and it may also have 
influenced the reception of Whitman, among contemporary reviewers, as the 
Caliban to Emerson’s Prospero. I analyse a neglected notebook passage in which 
Whitman himself experiments with the persona of Caliban, as the leader of an 
African slave insurrection.  
I further theorize that Whitman continues Emerson’s project to sanitize the 
unhealthy imagination, but extends this project to the “prurient” sexuality he finds 
in Shakespeare. I connect Whitman’s liberationist position against Shakespearean 
perversity with the later American tradition of sexual identity politics. Far from 
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being the American Caliban, Whitman attempted even more thoroughly to 
vanquish Caliban from American poetry: but that attempt came to haunt him when, 
later in the century, the very identity politics he helped to engineer was used to label 
him a homosexual.    
 
“I ACT AS THE TONGUE OF YOU”: WHITMAN’S BOWERY 
SHAKESPEARE 
 
In order to understand the way that perverse Shakespearean energies operate in 
Whitman’s poetry, it will first be necessary to explore Whitman’s genuinely radical 
poetic program, which was deeply influenced by the populist theater culture of New 
York City, specifically the Bowery Theater in the borough of Manhattan, best 
known for its spirited and, sometimes, anarchic Shakespearean performances of 
Junius Brutus Booth, father of the notorious assassin of Abraham Lincoln, John 
Wilkes Booth.135 	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Fine Arts, Birmingham, Birmingham, January 26, 2014). I follow closely the narrative arc 
established by David Reynolds, especially pp. 154-66, in the chapter, “American 
Performances: Theater, Oratory, Music.” David S. Reynolds, Walt Whitman’s America: A 
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Walt Whitman, November Boughs (Philadelphia: David McKay, 1888), pp. 87-92.  For a 
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This brief departure into American theater culture will help us to understand 
not only Whitman’s unique debt to Shakespeare, but also the reason why 
Whitman’s highbrow New England contemporaries were so quick to label him, after 
the publication of Leaves of Grass in 1855, as the “Caliban” to Emerson’s “Prospero.” 
I will reveal that Whitman himself embraced the role of Caliban, whom he 
imagined as an African slave revolting against his white overlords. While the role of 
Caliban assigned to Whitman by his contemporaries gets at part of the truth, it is my 
contention that it is also profoundly misleading. For the virulent power of the 
perverse acts in ways that inhere within the very progressive sexual politics that 
Whitman pioneered.  
As I have already observed, Michael Bristol, writing in the tradition of 
Lawrence Levine, finds a sharp division between the fluid, experimental, populist 
Jacksonian theatrical culture and the post-Civil War period, in which an 
authoritative, textually stable Shakespeare, supported by imposing institutions such 
as the Folger Shakespeare Library and the burgeoning academic publishing 
industry, consolidated Shakespeare and American identity. Bristol also argues, as I 
do, that there is a profound continuity between early American Shakespeare critics 
like Emerson and Jones Very and the national agenda that would become formally 
institutionalized.136 With the partial blindness of hindsight, it is easy to make the 
error of confusing the nationalistic aspirations voiced by Whitman’s contemporaries 
in their Shakespeare criticism with the culture itself. Lawrence Levine’s close 
analysis of theatrical culture in the Jacksonian period disabuses us of this potentially 
misleading assumption. The New York Shakespearean theater culture that 
Whitman encountered when he came of age was, at times, rowdy, dangerously 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 See especially, chapter 5, “Shakespeare In the American Cultural Imagination,” pp. 123-
143, in Michael D. Bristol, Shakespeare's America, America's Shakespeare (London: Routledge, 
1990).  
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experimental, and populist. It was the spirit of this theater culture that made 
Whitman’s blend of populism and high culture second nature. 137 
To get a flavor for this, consider the “Bowery b’hoys,” who were among the 
working class men who idolized Whitman. Many of these men were butchers who 
spent their spare time running fire-engines; yet they also lived and breathed the high 
culture of Manhattan Shakespearean theater and claimed it as their own. 138 
Whitman gives a pungent anecdote of one of these b’hoys:  
Whilst he puffs the smoke of a remarkably bad segar directly underneath 
your nostrils, he will discourse most learnedly about the classical 
performances in the Chatham Theatre, and swear by some heathen god or 
goddess that “[James Hudson] Kirby was one of ‘em, and no mistake.”139 
 
This was the class of people that Melville would also exalt in Captain Ahab, when 
he wrote: “Ahab's been in colleges, as well as 'mong the cannibals.”140 
Not only was the theater milieu mixed, the theater itself featured high 
spirited populist entertainment that had a kinship with Shakespeare’s own theater: 
religious proselytizers, newly enlivened by the Second Awakening, preached with 
theatrical intensity; minstrels performed in black face; the “screamer,” an affable 
villain from frontier folklore, popularized by the widely read Crockett’s Almanac (1835-
1856), performed before raucous audiences unafraid of berating villains or booing 
poor actors off the stage. 141 Whitman vividly describes the theater audience, “no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Levine’s distinction between the Shakespearean theater culture in the Jacksonian and the 
post Civil War America is an important one, but it begins to break down when it is applied 
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well before Emerson published Nature (1836).  
138 David S. Reynolds, Walt Whitman's America: A Cultural Biography (New York: Knopf, 1995), 
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139 Quoted in: Reynolds, pg. 104.  
140 Herman Melville et al., Moby-Dick (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967), pg. 78.  
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dainty kid-glove business, but electric force and muscle from perhaps 2000 full-
sinew’d men.”142 
In this atmosphere, two schools of British acting competed for American 
audiences. The Teapot school of acting, epitomized by Charles Kemble faced off 
against the blustery and impassioned Cooke-Kean school of acting.  
As nationalistic and anti-British sentiment rose in 1847, the conflict between these 
two schools turned into the conflagration of the Astor Place Riot. Edwin Forrest rose 
to prominence as an actor with the turbulent, impassioned style that audiences 
identified as distinctly American. William Macready, a British actor touring the 
United States, who subscribed to the more decorous school of acting, emphasizing 
subtlety, became regarded by American audiences as the rival of Forrest, and the 
animosity spread to the two men.143 Whitman weighed into the debate raging over 
the two actors: “After Booth was Forrest – a masterly man.” By contrast, Whitman 
had little good to say of Macready, “I could never enter into the enthusiasm over 
him – never. He never seemed to address himself to me.”144 
Macready had already, on several occasions, been pelted with eggs and 
booed off the stage; but on May 7, 1849, Macready and Forrest appeared in rival 
performances of Macbeth, Macready at the elite Astor Place Opera House and 
Forrest at the more populist Broadway Theater. A citizen militia was mobilized to 
protect Macready from the rowdy mobs that gathered in front of the Astor Place 
Opera House that night, amidst shouts of “Burn the damned den of aristocracy!”145  
The militia fired warning shots into the air, and, in desperation, shot into the crowd. 
Twenty-two people were killed in the melee. Whitman inscribed a record of his 	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143 For a contemporary account of the rivalry between Forrest and Macready, see also 
Shapiro, pp. 65-69. 	  
144 Quoted in Reynolds, pg. 163-4.  
145 Ibid. pg. 165. 
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whereabouts and occupation during the incident, along with the date – in a way 
reminiscent of accounts of the Kennedy assassination or the 9/11 attack on the 
Twin Towers.  
A particularly extreme adherent of the Cooke-Kean school of acting, 
exemplified by Forrest, was Junius Booth. Above all Shakespearean actors, it was 
Booth whom Whitman admired most. He not only incorporated the tempestuous 
style, but he directly challenged the division between art and life. He made a famous 
appearance at a Cincinnati church dressed as Cardinal Richelieu; in sword fights, 
he frequently caused real wounds; on one occasion, as Richard III, he pursued a 
terrified Richmond into the local tavern and had to be forcibly disarmed. Whitman 
gushed about Booth: “When he was in a passion, face neck, hands, would be 
suffused, his eye would be frightful – his whole mien enough to scare audience, 
actors, often the actors were afraid of him” … “The words, fire, energy, abandon, 
found in him unprecedented meanings.”146   
This might have been a purely artistic appreciation, but the tenuous division 
between life and theater was shattered when John Wilkes Booth, Junius Brutus’s son, 
himself a powerful Shakespearean actor, murdered Abraham Lincoln, during a 
theater performance, with the phrase, “Sic semper tyrannis!” 147  The phrase is 
traditionally ascribed to Marcus Junius Brutus upon the assassination of Julius 
Caesar. Although Shakespeare does not use the phrase, the dramatic flourish is 
thoroughly in line with the tradition of American Shakespeare acting of the Cooke-
Kean school. Indeed, in a letter published by the National Intelligencer, justifying 
his actions, Booth quoted Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Ibid. pp. 159-60.  
147 Ibid. pg. 160.  
	   75	  
When Caesar had conquered the enemies of Rome and the power that was 
his menaced the liberties of the people, Brutus arose and slew him. The 
stroke of his dagger was guided by his love for Rome. It was the spirit and 
ambition of Caesar that Brutus struck at.  
 
“O then that we could come by Caesar’s spirit,  
And not dismember Caesar! But alas!  
Caesar must bleed for it!”  
 
I answer with Brutus. 
 He who loves his country better than gold or life.  
      JOHN W. BOOTH148 
Such a disturbing crossing of the threshold between life and reality was fertile 
ground for Whitman’s persona in “Song Of Myself.” It must be said, though, that 
while Whitman lavished praise on the acting of Junius Booth, he had very little good 
say about his son’s acting: he was “as much like his father as the wax bust of Henry 
Clay,” to the “genuine orator.”149 
Perhaps because Shakespeare was simply too threatening as a precursor, 
Whitman’s Shakespearean echoes are scarce, with the notable exception of the 
poem, “Hours Continuing Long,” which Nils Clausson has argued, persuasively, 
echoes Shakespeare’s Sonnet 29.150 151 As such, Whitman continues in the American 
Protestant tradition, articulated by Jones Very in a more generous spirit. Whitman 
doesn’t question Shakespeare’s genius; indeed, he ranks him with Chaucer and 
Homer. But he argues in “A Thought on Shakespeare” (1886) that Shakespeare 
“exhales that principle of caste which we Americans have come on earth to 
destroy.”152 Whitman goes on to conclude that Shakespeare’s comedies “have the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 John Wilkes Booth, quoted in Shapiro, pg. 197.	  
149 Walt Whitman, "THE BOWERY," Leader, May 3, 1862.  
150 While I do not subscribe wholeheartedly to Harold Bloom’s theory of poetic influence, 
Whitman spent so much of his career promoting himself as the national poet of America 
destined, as we shall see, to displace Shakespeare (and the feudal England Shakespeare 
represents to Whitman) that I feel the evocation of Bloom is warranted. 
151 Nils Clausson, ""Hours Continuing Long" as Whitman's Rewriting of Shakespeare's 
Sonnet 29," Whitman Quarterly Review 26 (Winter 2009): pp. 131-42.	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unmistakable hue of plays, portraits, made for the divertissement only of the elite of 
the castle, and from its point of view. The comedies are altogether nonacceptable to 
America and Democracy.”  
Whitman’s lack of generosity towards Shakespeare extended to his 
subscription, in later life, to the bizarre theory propounded by Delia Bacon, that 
Shakespeare was not the true author of the plays, but that Francis Bacon wrote 
them. He even wrote a poem, published in the late collection, Good-bye My Fancy, 
entitled, “Shakspere-Bacon’s Cipher.” In propagating Delia Bacon’s theory, 
Whitman, at one stroke, dispensed with a rival and advanced his own Protestant 
theory that American democracy – most exemplified, of course, in his own poetry - 
would fulfill the unrealized promise in Shakespeare’s plays. According to Whitman, 
Shakespeare could only be one of the “wolfish Earls so plenteous in the plays 
themselves.” He writes:  
Will it not indeed be strange if the author of “Othello” and “Hamlet” is 
destin’d to live in America, in a generation or two, less as the cunning 
draughtsman of the passions, and more as putting on record the first full 
expose – and by far the most vivid one, immeasurably ahead of doctrinaires 
and economists – of the political theory and result, or the reason-why and 
necessity of them which America has come on earth to abnegate and 
replace.153 
 
Such a view, as we will discover, extended to what Whitman regarded as 
Shakespeare’s “prurient” sexual politics. Whitman asserted, in his late essay against 
censorship, “Memorandum at a Venture,” that he could replace such a politics with 
a healthier one. In my view, Whitman’s disavowal of Shakespearean perversity (and, 
indeed, the perversity of his own earlier work) is over-determined by the structuring 
power of the perverse jeremiad.  
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AS IF THE BEASTS SPOKE 
 
In the censored poem, “A Woman Waits for Me,” Whitman would articulate the 
radical identity politics that he would adhere to throughout his writing career:  “Sex 
contains all, bodies, souls, / Meanings, proofs, purities, delicacies, results, 
promulgations . . .”  (3-9)154 
Whitman was extending Wordsworthian “Nature” to the breaking point. In 
doing so, he was quite conscious that he was inaugurating a new theory of poetry 
incorporating sexual expression:  
From another point of view “Leaves of Grass” is avowedly the song of Sex, 
and Amativeness, and even Animality – though meanings that do not usually 
go with these words are behind all, and will duly emerge; and all are sought 
to be lifted into a different light and atmosphere. Of this feature intentionally 
palpable in a few lines, I shall only say the espousing principle of those lines 
so gives breath to my whole scheme that the bulk of the pieces might as well 
have been left unwritten were those lines omitted;155  
 
Here, Whitman regards “Amativeness” and “Animality” as the “espousing 
principle” of his poetry. It is so central to his poetic project that “the bulk of the 
pieces might as well have been left unwritten were those lines omitted.”  
Whitman could also appeal to nature implicitly to “naturalize” his 
descriptions of homoerotic sex: “The souse upon me of my lover the sea” 
(Spontaneous Me, 34); he could depict the masturbatory fantasies of a solitary, 
unmarried woman watching twenty eight young men bathing (“Which of the young 
men does she like the best? /Ah, the homeliest of them is beautiful to her” [“Song of 
Myself,” 204-205]); he could describe a woman’s genitals as  “the exquisite flexible 
doors” (SOM, 1292); he could delight in his own genitals as natural objects: “love-	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root” (SOM 22); “Root of wash’d sweet-flag” (SOS, 534); “hubb’d sting of myself” 
(Spontaneous Me, 24) “calamus-root” (“These I Singing in Spring,” 20); or he could 
turn genitals themselves into a poem, “wherever are men like me, are our lusty, 
lurking masculine poems” (SOM, 10).  
For Whitman’s contemporaries, the dichotomy between body and soul could 
easily conjure the division between Prospero’s “dainty spirit, Ariel” and Caliban in 
The Tempest. Coleridge writes:  
Ariel has in everything the airy tint which gives the name; and it is worthy of 
remark that Miranda is never directly brought into comparison with Ariel, 
lest the natural and human of the one and the supernatural of the other 
should tend to neutralise each other; Caliban, on the other hand, is all earth, 
all condensed and gross in feelings and images; he has the dawnings of 
understanding without reason or the moral sense, and in him, as in some 
brute animals, this advance to the intellectual faculties, without the moral 
sense, is marked by the appearance of vice.156  
 
In from Pent-Up Aching Rivers, Whitman evokes his “true song of the soul” . . . as 
“Renascent with grossest Nature or among animals” (15). An anonymous reviewer 
published in The New Eclectic published in 1868, summarizing the views of Mr 
Robert Buchanan writes:  
The "poem" here referred to is the one which contains the key to Walt 
Whitman's philosophy and poetic theory. It is in it that he describes himself 
and his qualifications for the office of poet of the future, grounding his claim 
upon the fact of his being "hankering, gross, mystical, nude, one of the 
roughs, a kosmos, disorderly, fleshy, sensual, no more modest than 
immodest"; and proposing to produce poetry of corresponding qualities, a 
promise which we must say he most conscientiously fulfils. 
 
He then adds:  
Then Mr. Robert Buchanan took him up in the Broadway magazine, and, 
saying nearly all that has ever been said against Walt Whitman—that he is 
no poet and no artist, that he is gross, monotonous, loud, obscure, prone to 
coarse animalism and to talking rank nonsense—  [Anonymous].157  	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This is typical of Whitman’s reviewers who picked up immediately on his 
“philosophy and poetic theory” which they correctly associated with “animalism.” 
Whitman was called by reviewers a “monster,” a “goatish satyr,” a “Centaur . . . 
half-man, half beast.”158 This response, at times, clearly evoked Whitman as the 
earthy, animalistic antithesis to Emerson. One reviewer called Whitman pointedly 
“Emerson muscularized.”159 
Emerson, in his letter to Thomas Carlyle, described the man who referred to 
him, for a time, as “master” – as a “nondescript monster which yet has terrible eyes 
and buffalo strength.” Henry Thoreau, who, according to Emerson “loved Walt,”160 
described some “disagreeable” passages in Leaves of Grass this way:  
It is as if the beasts spoke. I think that men have not been ashamed of 
themselves without reason. No doubt there have always been dens where 
such deeds were unblushingly recited, and it is no merit to compete with 
their inhabitants.161   
(italics added)  
And Carlyle responded succinctly to the copy of Leaves of Grass Emerson gave him to 
read: “It was as though the town bull had learned to hold a pen.”162  The 
contemporary reviewer, John Hollingshead, summarized the troubled relationship 
between the Emerson and Whitman:   
EACH literary man of any distinguished mark or position has raised at least 
one monster, who seizes his style, his principles, his peculiar modes of 
thought, and carries them headlong downwards into the great gulf of 
absurdity. This Frankenstein,—this attendant spirit,—is faithful, but unruly. 
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It multiplies every action, whim, or fancy that it copies by three or four; it 
leaps higher, dives lower, speaks louder, and goes farther than its master;163 
 
This insinuation of a spiritual alliance between the “monster” and his “master” 
certainly disconcerted Emerson. The words from the review were also prescient – in 
that Whitman proved as “unruly” as Caliban.  
In his own early notebook drafts for the 1855 edition of Leaves of Grass, in a 
poem that was rewritten with the title “Now Lucifer Was Not Dead,” and eventually 
became “The Sleepers,” Whitman could identify himself quite directly with another 
version of an American Caliban: the African American slave seeking revenge. Here 
Whitman evokes, tellingly, the scene in The Tempest after Miranda denounces 
Caliban for responding to her teaching him language (when he “wouldst gabble like 
/ A thing most brutish” [I. ii. 356-357]) by attempting to rape her:  
You taught me language, and my profit on't 
Is, I know how to curse. The red plague rid you 
For learning me your language! (Tem. I. ii. 363-365)  
 
Whitman writes, from the point of view of the African American slave:  
 
O topple down like Curse! 
      topple more heavy than 
      death! 
I am lurid with rage!  
 
I invoke Revenge to assist 
      me— 
 
Let fate pursue them 
I do not know any horror 
      that is dreadful enough 
      for them— 
What is the worst whip 
      you have 
May the genitals that 
      begat them rot 
May the womb that begat [sic]164 
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Here, Whitman not only evokes Caliban, but he does so with the instinctive 
recognition that Prospero has no ‘natural’ right to rule over Caliban. Thus, 
Whitman uses the very Shakespeare play that was most associated with Emerson’s 
assertion of the democratic authority of the individual – and, by implication, the 
state – and turns it on its head to indict that authority at its foundation. Yet even in 
this early fragment in a private notebook, Whitman refuses to follow Shakespeare’s 
radicalism where it would naturally lead him. Whitman’s Caliban resembles 
Shakespeare’s in that he is filled with the desire for “revenge” and understands that 
he must not merely overthrow Prospero in the form of his white overlords, but he 
must “rot” the “genitals that / begat them.” Yet he makes no suggestion of 
Caliban’s plan to marry Miranda and “people[] else / This isle with Calibans” (I. ii. 
350-351). Whitman’s narrator would merely murder his overlords, but he would still 
implicitly preserve racial segregation. He does not hint at the rape of a white woman 
or miscegenation, which would have been a far more disturbing concept in 
antebellum America. In the very process, then, of assuming Caliban’s voice, 
Whitman bleaches out his most profoundly perverse potential.  
Still, Whitman’s ambition to identify with the outcast and excluded in 
American society cannot be denied. If the scandalous nature of his poetry was 
responsible for gaining him readers, it also cost him prestige – most conspicuously 
the friendship of Emerson that he so coveted. Although Emerson wrote Whitman an 
important letter of recommendation, he excluded him from his late poetry 
anthology, Parnassus – and even in Emerson’s private journals, he startlingly 
recorded only a few phrases about Whitman. Typical of these sparse references is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 “The Walt Whitman Archive,” Notes and Examples for “The Making, and Unmaking of 
Walt Whitman’s ‘The Sleepers’,” Ken Price and Brett Barney, accessed March 23, 2014, 
http://www.whitmanarchive.org/resources/sleepers/sleepers.html. 
	   82	  
the embarrassed humour of this recorded observation by a friend – which, notably 
doesn’t even mention Whitman’s name: “Whipple said of the author of ‘Leaves of 
Grass,’ that he had every leaf but the fig leaf.”165 It appears that, like Prospero, it 
was only with great reluctance that he acknowledged “this thing of darkness” (V. i. 
275).  
 
VOICES INDECENT, BY ME TRANSFIGURED 
 
As I have argued, though, it is not so easy to polarize Emerson and Whitman in the 
way that his reviewers and contemporaries clearly wanted to. For while Whitman’s 
means were radical, his goal was – in many ways – just as conservative as 
Emerson’s. Whitman’s radical departure from the Romantic conception of “nature” 
was indebted to a separate, phrenological materialist tradition – most exemplified by 
the phrenologist and publisher of  the 1855 Leaves of Grass, Orson Fowler. Laqueur 
calls phrenology “the nineteenth century equivalent of modern biological 
determinism.”166 Yet, in America, the phrenolological tradition was advocated by 
people whom Horowitz argues were from an “evangelical milieu” . . . “trying to 
make an accommodation with science and its understanding of human 
reproduction.”167 As with the “sexual purity” movement, Fowler’s goal was to 
promote the health of the American youth. 
Ironically, it was Fowler’s scientific book about sex, Sexual Science; Including 
Manhood, Womanhood, and Their Mutual Interrelations, that led him to his split with his 	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publishing partner, Samuel Wells. A year later, Wells also cracked down on 
Whitman – thus ending their publishing agreement. Although Fowler offended 
conservative morality, his aim was far from being the release of raw libido. As 
Reynolds observes:  
The nastiness was in the eye of the beholder, for both Orson Fowler and 
Whitman had a deep-seated belief in the sacredness and purity of sex when 
rightly treated. Both stood opposed to the desacralization of sex in popular 
culture, and both hoped to reinstate sex as fully natural, the absolute center 
of existence.168  
 
Whitman, like Fowler, wanted to anchor existence in sexuality, but he wanted to do 
so in a way that was “fully natural.” In other words, Whitman wanted to assert that 
what he repeatedly called a “healthy,” “chaste,” and – as he would later describe it 
in “Memorandum at a Venture,” “unperverted” sexuality was a fit subject for 
poetry. As critics as varied as Reynolds, Brasas, and Killingsworth, observe, 
complicating matters is the fact that the later Whitman deliberately attempted to 
systematize his early views about sexuality in such a way that they evaded the 
radical implications of the early exuberant celebratory mode of his work from 1855 
through to 1865. As Killingsworth writes:  
The heterogeneity of the imaginative text is a leading characteristic of 
Whitman's poetry of the body between the years 1855 and 1865. It appears 
in 1856 as a de-structuring force that is an affront not only to conventional 
values and language but to Whitman's own attempt to coopt those values 
and that language.169 
 
Yet it is my contention that – though in the earlier books Whitman, to use his own 
words from a letter to Symonds, let the “spirit impulse (female) rage its utmost 
wildest damnedest,”170 his conservatism was always present. In one sense, in his 
public persona (outside of his private first drafts) he wanted Caliban’s poetic 	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sensibility; but he wanted to exclude Caliban’s dissident sexuality - exemplified by 
Caliban’s potential cross-species rape of Miranda. Moreover, Whitman’s larger 
poetic project suggests a covert identification with the very colonizing features of 
language that Miranda betrays in her contemptuous demand that Caliban should 
have been grateful to her for teaching him the language of his oppressors.   
As we have seen, Fowler was an unabashed sexual liberationist, but of a very 
qualified sort. He advocated what, for the time, was a radical view of the purity, 
health, and wholesomeness of sexuality – almost identical to that of Whitman. Like 
Whitman, Fowler asserts that sex is “what steam power is to machinery – the prime 
instrumentality of its motions and productions,” the very “chit-function of all males 
and females.”171 Fowler endorsed ideas that were, then, very radical: a materialist 
and scientific view of the body; the value of personal choice in marriage not just for 
men, but for women; the importance of libido and sexual pleasure for women and 
men; the proto-Freudian notion that emotional problems spring from lack of sexual 
satisfaction. Whereas Whitman could affirm, “Welcome is every organ and attribute 
of me, and of any man hearty and clean,” or “Perfect and clean the genitals 
previously jetting, perfect and clean the womb cohering” (“The Sleepers,” section 8, 
152), Fowler could wax lyrical about the testicles, calling them “God’s only 
messengers of all life” and therefore “angelic” (pg. 710), and “sperm” could be 
characterized as miniature Hamlets, “drop[ping] this mortal coil” and mount[ing] 
on the pinions of immortality” . . . “Great God, what wonders hast Thou wrought 
by means of this infinitesimal entity!”   
As radical as all of this admittedly was for the time, Fowler also, though, 
viewed this celebration of sexuality staunchly within the context of a traditional 	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marriage - “this conjugal inspiration and talent”  – and he had the stated goal of 
rooting out “perverted” sexuality as the primary cause of “vice” and corruption of 
the youth:  
All hail, then, this love sentiment, this conjugal inspiration and talent . . . Its 
perversion alone is despicable, and so is that of all our other faculties . . . 
Amativeness, when and because perverted, becomes one of the vilest of the 
human vices; whereas, when properly exercised, none of the human powers 
or virtues are more honorable or praiseworthy, or to be cultivated.172  
 
Like Whitman, Fowler’s ideas about the importance of “sexuality” for physical and 
emotional ‘health’ were asserted with an evangelical fervor that was not so much a 
form of permissiveness or tolerance - but an attempt to root out perversion by 
violent assertion of its opposite.  
As I have claimed, the particular concern of sexual reformers with the sexual 
health of the nation’s young people in antebellum America was stimulated by the 
evangelical fervor of the Second Great Awakening, and intensified by rapid 
economic development, a population explosion, the economic instability of 
Jacksonian “boom and bust” capitalism, and a demographic shift from rural to 
urban centers. There was yet a more stark and immediate reason for Fowler and 
Whitman’s obsession with sexual health. Manhattan was a city plagued by disease 
including “yellow fever, measles, tuberculosis, and, beginning in the late forties, 
cholera.”173 Between 1840 and 1855, the annual death-rate climbed from one in 
every forty New Yorkers to one in twenty-seven. As Reynolds observes:  
In 1847, Whitman noted in the Eagle that only half of the 450,000 children 
born annually in American lived to be twenty-one and that in large cities like 
New York and Boston the death rate was especially high. “As much as the 
present time is vaunted over the past”, [Whitman wrote], “in no age of the 
world have so many influences been at work averse to health and to a noble 
physical development, as are working in this age!”174 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Fowler, pp. 81-82.  
173 Reynolds, pg. 238.  
174 Ibid.  
	   86	  
 
More than merely physical disease, though, Americans in the mid 19th century, 
according to contemporary accounts, including that of Alexander Tocqueville, 
experienced an emotional and spiritual malaise. Tocqueville writes of this, echoing 
Emerson’s words about a Hamlet diseased by “Introspection”:  
The strange melancholy often haunting inhabitants of democracies in the 
midst of abundance, and of that disgust with life sometimes gripping them in 
calm and easy circumstances.175 
 
Whitman observed in 1854:  
Our country seems to be threatened with a sort of ossification of spirit . . . 
For I do not believe the people of these days are happy. The public 
countenance lacks its bloom of love and its freshness of faith – For want of 
these, it is cadaverous as a corpse.176 
 
As Reynolds observes, in the 1830’s the reform movements proposed a variety of 
“’natural’ forms of healing,” such as the “water cure” and there was a new emphasis 
on health and physical fitness: “Regulation of diet, exercise, ventilation, temperance, 
and other personal habits were thought to ensure mental and physical health.”177 
Whatever the proximal cause, both Whitman and Fowler possessed a religious sense 
that not a dissident, but a pure and “unperverted” sexuality would improve the 
health of the nation.  
Admittedly, mid 19th century sexual reformers’ grim obsession with 
masturbation seems light-years from Whitman’s early exuberant celebration of 
sexuality – which includes masturbation in this passage from “Song of Myself”:  
I hear the trained soprano . . . . she convulses me like the climax of my love-
grip; 
The orchestra whirls me wider than Uranus flies, 
It wrenches unnamable ardors from my breast, 
It throbs me to gulps of the farthest down horror, 
It sails me;178  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Ibid., pg. 331.  
176 Ibid.  
177 Ibid., pg. 332.  
178 See, for comparison, revised 1891 edition, section 26, 603-605.  
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(1855, p. 684, 601-604)  
 
Yet, it is notable that this passage was edited in the later 1891 edition of Leaves of 
Grass to exclude the explicitly masturbatory “love-grip” – and the “unnamable 
ardors.” In a liberationist vein, Whitman could fiercely and explicitly denounce 
sexual “reformers” – referring disdainfully to fear of the “scrofula” caused by 
tuberculosis, supposed to be caused by sexual excess:  
 What blurt is this about virtue and about vice? 
Evil propels me and reform of evil propels me, I stand indifferent,  
My gait is no fault-finder’s or rejecter’s gait, 
I moisten the roots of all that has grown.  
 
Did you fear some scrofula out of the unflagging pregnancy?  
Did you guess the celestial laws are yet to be work’d over and rectified?  
     (SOM, section 23, 463-469)        
 
In other passages in “Song of Myself,” Whitman could refer to the “treacherous tip 
of me” – that succumbs to a “red marauder” - and he evokes contemporary 
accounts of masturbatory insanity:  
 I am given up by traitors,  
 I talk wildly, I have lost my wits, I and 
 Nobody else am the greatest traitor,  
 I went myself first to the headland,  
 My own hands carried me there. 
                      (SOMS, section 28, 637-638)  
 
As the insane asylum superintendent, Samuel Woodward, would attest, Whitman 
has only his “own hands” to blame! In Spontaneous Me, Whitman could write again in 
this melodramatic vein:  
The young man that wakes deep at night, the hot hand seeking to repress 
what would master him,  
The mystic amorous night, the strange half-welcome pangs, visions, sweats,  
The pulse pounding through palms and trembling encircling fingers, the 
young man all color’d, red, ashamed, angry;  
        (SM, 32-34) 
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Even in the early poem “The Sleepers,” Whitman could exhibit the same image of 
the “sick gray-face[d] onanists” (S, 7) evoked both by psychiatrists and sexual 
reformers like Graham. 
Ultimately, Whitman employed ideas from evolutionary biology for the 
purpose of asserting the old American teleology. As Harold Aspiz explains, 
Whitman did this by incorporating a version of the Lamarckian idea of “soft 
inheritance,” which argued that traits acquired during the lifetime of an organism 
could be passed on to offspring.179 Whitman vulgarized Lamarck’s theory to suggest 
that healthy sexual behavior would result in robust children, thus implying that the 
sexual pervert was an obstacle to America’s optimistic future. In his paean to robust 
American youth, “Song of the Open Road,” Whitman excluded the sexually 
“diseas’d” from the journey towards America’s optimistic future:  
Come not here if you have already spent the best of yourself! 
Only those may come who come in sweet and determin’d bodies,  
No diseas’d person, no rum-drinker or venereal taint is permitted here.180  
      (SOR, section 10, 135-137) 
 
Recall that this same poet who, in “A Woman Waits for Me,”  “shall demand 
perfect men and women out of my love-spendings” – uses the imagery of “spending” 
to evoke the healthy progeny that Whitman felt required “sweet and determin’d 
bodies.” This voice couldn’t be more different from that of “Song of Myself” in 
which Whitman cries:  
 Through me many long dumb voices,  
Voices of the interminable generations of prisoners and slaves,  
Voices of the diseas’d and despairing and of thieves and dwarfs . . .  
(SOM, section 24, 508-510)  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Harold Aspiz, Walt Whitman and the Body Beautiful (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1980), pp. 183-209.  
180 See pg. 12, Barker-Benfield, The Horrors. “Spend” in the nineteenth century meant to 
reach orgasm. It was the shortened form of the more refined term “expenditure.” 
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How do we resolve the apparent disjunction? Quoting Eve Sedgwick, Killingsworth 
contends that Whitman “lived and wrote” in an “anxious, sharply dichotomized 
landscape.” Referring to Whitman’s journalism, Killingsworth argues:  
I heard a very different voice. It spoke of reserve and prudence, and it 
warned of the folly and danger that awaited sexual experimenters. Addressed 
to the young and the old, it seemed the very essence of a dominating and 
chauvinistic middle age.181 
 
These two voices, as Killingsworth argues, run alongside one another throughout 
Whitman’s poetry as well as his prose. The answer, though, might not only be 
within Whitman’s complex identifications as a poet, but also within the reform 
movements themselves. Whitman’s voice addresses the “excluded,” the “dwarfs,” 
the “diseas’d and despairing,” but his real aim is to heal them. As Reynolds 
observes:  
Both physical and psychological ills are challenged by the powerful “I” of 
“Song of Myself,” who is equipped with the full range of life-affirming, 
health-giving restoratives from mid-nineteenth century therapeutic 
thought.182 
 
After all, Whitman claims his poems will “filter and fibre your blood.” In other 
words, Whitman’s poems make a move that is as old as the theological perverse itself  
(a move that is still very much alive through the Twelve Step programs and their 
innumerable offspring) which is to turn “perversion” into “conversion.”183 Whitman 
writes:  
 Through me forbidden voices, 
Voices of sexes and lusts, voices veil’d and I remove the veil,  
Voices indecent, by me clarified and transfigur’d.  
(italics added, SOM, section 24, 516-521)  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Killingsworth, pg. xv.  
182 Reynolds, pg. 332.  
183 Jake Flanagin, "The Surprising Failures of 12 Steps," The Atlantic, March 25, 2014, 
accessed January 10, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/03/the-
surprising-failures-of-12-steps/284616/. 
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Notice the words, “by me clarified and transfigur’d.” As a contemporary reviewer, 
Robert Buchanan observes, evoking the Proteus trope from Shakespearean 
criticism:  
In a few vivid touches we have striking pictures; the writer shifts his identity 
like Proteus, but breathes the same deep undertone in every shape. He can 
transfer himself into any personality, however base. "I am the man—I 
suffered—I was there." He cares for no man's pride. He holds no man 
unclean.184 
 
Buchanan’s Whitman, like Shakespeare, possesses a kind of “Negative Capability.” 
He can “transfer himself into any personality, however base.” This ability to 
“transfer” does not taint the “I.” On the contrary, it proves his Christ-like 
compassion: “He holds no man unclean.” Unlike Shakespeare, though, Buchanan 
implies that Whitman has a deliberately moral purpose, one that could only be 
realized by what Emerson called the “poet-priest” of American democracy.  
Whitman’s complex “redeemer” sexual persona is captured in the censored 
poem, “To A Common Prostitute.” In this poem, Whitman transfigures the role of a 
man soliciting sex from a prostitute into a Christ-like posture, evoking the Mary 
Magdalene tradition (Luke 7:36-50) – which holds Mary Magdalene to be a 
prostitute:  
I am Walt Whitman, liberal and lusty as Nature,  
Not till the sun excludes you do I exclude you,  
Not till the waters refuse to glisten for you and the leaves to 
rustle for you, do  my words refuse to glisten and rustle for you. 
 
My girl, I appoint with you an appointment—and I charge you that you 
make preparation to be worthy to meet me, 
Till then, I salute you with a significant look, that you do not forget me. 
And I charge you that you be patient and perfect till I come.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184  Buchanan, Robert. “Walt Whitman.” The Broadway 1 (November 1867): 188-95. 
Whitman Archives. For a full account of the “Proteus” trope in Shakespeare criticism, see 
Jonathan Bate, Shakespeare and the English Romantic Imagination (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989), pp. 14-16. See also William Richardson, A Philosophical Analysis and Illustration of Some 
of Shakespeare's Remarkable Characters By W. Richardson. (London: Printed for J. Murray, 1784), 
pg. 38 and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria or Biographical Sketches of My Literary 
Life and Opinions (New York: Leavitt, Lord &, 1834), pg. 186.  
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Prostitution was, in New York of 1855, a 6.35 million dollar a year business – 
second only to tailoring. Here, Whitman explicitly “transfigure”[s] the very symbol 
of sexual “disease” and licentiousness that plagued the city of New York during 
1820 to 1865, the assignation with a prostitute, into a figure for Christ’s 
“appointment” with humanity.185 Whitman consciously sublimated the “liberal and 
lusty” persona of his earlier poems in order to fashion this image of himself. 
Whitman has fashioned himself to become the new Christ-like American poet who 
would replace Shakespeare by not only writing immortal verse, but by healing the 
nation. The distinction between Whitman’s project and that of the sexual reformers 
– who eventually succeeded in censoring his 1881 Leaves of Grass was one of means, 
but not of ends.  
 
 
THE SHADOW OF EMERSON 
 
In his late, embittered essay about Emerson, entitled “Emerson's Books, (The 
Shadows of Them),” Whitman casts his former “Master” as part of the aristocratic 
“select class” of the Shakespearean “Old World” inimical to the “plan” of America. 
This was the very type of writer that Emerson himself argued must be superseded by 
the American “poet-priest.” Whitman writes:  
The plan of a select class, superfined, (demarcated from the rest,) the plan of 
Old World lands and literatures, is not so objectionable in itself, but because 
it chokes the true plan for us, and indeed is death to it.  
 
Emerson is associated with the “death” that, along with the “plan of Old World,” 
stands in the way of America fulfilling its destiny. Yet, Whitman also chides 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Reynolds, pg. 227.  
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Emerson for lacking Shakespeare’s primal power. Ironically, Whitman’s criticism of 
Emerson inadvertently echoes Emerson’s own criticism of American verse in the 
essay that Whitman revered, “The Poet.” As Emerson writes:   
. . . this genius is the landscape-garden of a modern house, adorned with 
fountains and statues, with well-bred men and women standing and sitting in 
the walks and terraces. We hear, through all the varied music, the ground-
tone of conventional life. Our poets are men of talents who sing, and not the 
children of music. The argument is secondary, the finish of the verses is 
primary.186 
In “The American Scholar,” we recall, Emerson evoked the Hamlet-like poet, 
plagued by “Introspection,” “sickl’ied  o’er with the pale cast of thought,” who 
plants an “oak tree” in a “flower-pot” . . . “there to hunger and pine.” Emerson and 
Whitman largely agreed that the disease of the “Old World” stood in the way of the 
future. In his late essay, Whitman aligns the man he earlier regarded as his “Master” 
(or, as he recounts bitterly, he “address’d him in print as ‘Master,’ and for a month 
or so thought of him as such”) with all that Emerson had originally rejected of the 
Old World, including Shakespeare.  
To liberate American individuality was to displace disease onto the 
Shakespearean Old World and to affirm what Whitman calls “normal and 
unperverted” sexuality fit for a democracy. In this sense, then Whitman’s “perverse” 
is not located so much in his homosexuality – which he consistently denied after the 
rise of sexology in the 1870’s - but, paradoxically, in his sexual evangelism: his 
confident assertions of healthy, mature masculine sexuality – and his consequent 
fear of its perversion by disease and degeneration.  
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THE NEW AMERICAN PERVERT 
 
In 1881, Whitman was the subject of a large public controversy over the censoring 
by the Boston district attorney, Oliver Stevens, of his new edition of Leaves of Grass. It 
was the first edition of the book published by a respectable publisher, James R. 
Osgood. It was a handsome volume – and, as Whitman instructed, “markedly plain 
& simple even to Quakerness - . . . no sensationalism or luxury – a well made book 
for honest wear & use & carrying with you.”187 He had published a successful and 
heavily expurgated copy of his poetry in England through William Michael Rosetti, 
Pre-Raphaelite and son of the famous Dante Gabriel Rossetti; he had edited many 
of the racier passages from his earlier editions; he also included an extensive book of 
“inscriptions” filled with patriotic bluster and “religious mist”188 – and intended, in 
part, to bury the more sexually explicit poems; he renamed the expansive early 
poem, “Whitman,” to the more respectable, “Song of Myself;” and he relegated the 
original defiant, cocky, and sensual 1855 portrait of himself to the middle of the 
book.189  
The newly respectable Whitman received, on the whole, good reviews for 
the book. Eight of the first nine reviews of the new 1881 edition were mostly 
positive. 190 Still, through the zealous activism of figures like Anthony Comstock, 
who in 1871 established the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, the new 
Leaves of Grass confronted antiobscenity laws that doomed it from the start. Whitman 
was asked to censor what he called his “sexuality poems.” At first, he attempted to 
revise the offending poems: “Woman Waits,” “Body Electric,” and “Spontaneous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Reynolds, pg. 534.  
188 Ibid. pg. 536.  
189 Ibid. pg. 535.  
190 Ibid. pg. 538.  
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Me.” When his publisher, Osgood, indicated that more revision would be required, 
Whitman refused: “The list whole & entire is rejected by me, & will not be thought 
of under any circumstances.”191  
Whitman immediately wrote an essay, “A Memorandum at a Venture,”192 
published in The North American Review, in defence of the 1881 volume of Leaves of 
Grass. In “Memorandum,” Whitman formulated his most coherent theory about the 
expression of sexuality in poetry. Admittedly, the later Whitman who penned 
“Memorandum” was markedly different from the man who celebrated himself in 
1855, but the essay is not, in my view, at all inconsistent with the more 
“heterogeneous” editions from 1855-1865.  
Whitman argues that there are two contemporary approaches towards 
sexuality that are deeply problematic. One of those views is the view of the prudish – 
like Comstock – which, in his view, “has led to states of ignorance, repressal.” For 
Whitman, this view, far from leading to the elimination of sexuality or the 
purification of society, simply “cover[s] over disease and depletion.” The absence of 
a frank discussion of sexuality has the “scent” of “something sneaking, furtive, 
mephitic” that “pervade[s] all modern literature, conversation, and manners.”  
The second view of sexuality is the polite literary tolerance of it  – but only 
within exclusive “masculine circles.” This is exemplified by the tradition that has 
been inherited in America from the Old World: “especially in England” . . . “from 
the oldest times down” – and it is in “Shakspere almost anywhere.” This is far “less 
dangerous than the conceal’d one” – but, only as a “disease which comes to the 
surface” and is thus easier to treat. It also descends from an exclusive, aristocratic 
tradition that, in Whitman’s view, is alien to the aspirations of a democratic people.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Quoted in: Reynolds, pg. 541.  
192 Whitman, Walt, and Floyd Stovall. Prose Works 1892. New York: New York University 
Press, 1963. 
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Whitman proposes a third view, which is that “America” is “to be the place” 
that “must work out a plan and standard on this subject” . . . “for thoughtfulest men 
and women, and thoughtfulest literature.” Of this third view, Whitman writes:  
. . . the sexual passion in itself, while normal and unperverted, is inherently 
legitimate, creditable, not necessarily an improper theme for poet, as 
confessedly not for scientist—that, with reference to the whole construction, 
organism, and intentions of “Leaves of Grass,” anything short of confronting 
that theme, and making myself clear upon it, as the enclosing basis of 
everything . . . [sic, italics added]  
 
Whitman, here, establishes for himself a poetic project that is explicitly and 
ostentatiously sexual, but that also removes from sex everything that makes it – and 
one might add his own verse – sexy: namely the “abnormal” and the “perverted.” 
Whitman’s evocation of the “scientist” here is consistent with claims he made in 
defence of his “ sexuality poems” throughout his career. In another late prose work, 
Whitman adds:  
Literature is always calling in the doctor for consultation and confession, and 
always giving evasions and swathing suppressions in place of that “heroic 
nudity” on which only a genuine diagnosis can be built.193  
 
Whitman regards his poetry as having the same new claim for frank and open 
physiological examination of “heroic nudity” that the American “doctor” was 
beginning to claim. He even regards his poetry as a method for the “diagnosis” of 
disease. In 19th century America, female patients received notoriously poor care 
from the predominantly male doctors who, because of the prudery of the time, were 
unable to examine them without clothes.194 Whitman imagines poetry as advancing 
like “science” and medicine with the aim of improving the health of the population.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Whitman, pg. 809.  
194 “. . . in America where most women would have preferred to die than have a physician  - 
a man - examine their bodies, it was a “delicacy” nearly impossible to surmount, and as a 
consequence a great many Americans did die, and young men in medical training in 
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Whitman goes on to suggest that the prior views of sex are not only 
“prurient,” but misogynistic and exclusionary; they exhibit a subtle contempt 
towards women:  
To the movement for the eligibility and entrance of women amid new 
spheres of business, politics, and the suffrage, the current prurient, 
conventional treatment of sex is the main formidable obstacle. The rising 
tide of “woman’s rights,” swelling and every year advancing farther and 
farther, recoils from it with dismay. There will in my opinion be no general 
progress in such eligibility till a sensible, philosophic, democratic method is 
substituted. 
 
His alternative is to develop a notion of generous and robust sexual expression (“the 
demesne of poetry and sanity”) that is also – for the time – a radical vision of 
equality between the sexes. For, Whitman is not just arguing that sexuality is a 
proper theme for a poet, but that, in order for women to attain the proper rights 
and responsibilities of full citizenship in a democracy, they must not be excluded 
from frank discussions of sexuality. As Killingsworth observes:  
Political power is dependent upon sexual identity; sexual experience unlocks 
the mystery of the physical, the knowledge of which is necessary if one is to 
assume leadership in the realm of human action;195   
 
The old chauvinistic tradition, embodied by Shakespeare, is an old-boys network 
that is an obstacle to women’s opportunity and a utopian future of sexual equality.  
As essential as were the advances in women’s rights, Whitman does not 
‘liberate’ sexuality here. He displaces  the burden of unsocialized sexuality onto the 
old order – exemplified, in large part, by Shakespeare. Perverse sexuality is precisely 
what ‘cannot’ be linked to social movements such as that of women’s suffrage. By 
associating “normal and unperverted” sexual expression to the women’s rights 
movement, Whitman creates a new, more virulent perverse – one that becomes, as 
we have seen, an anti-social negation of the “True America” – an attack on the 
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future of the species itself. As Bercovitch writes, regarding the American project 
more broadly:  
Here, in short, the national prospect encompassed teleology, nostalgia, and 
universalist principle. This way of life (prophesy and experience combined) 
was “futurity” itself. It was the work of ideology in all cultures to co-opt 
utopia – to extol its particular norms as universal ideals and then to 
incorporate these ideals as perfection incarnate sub specie aeternitatis (as in 
monarchy the norms of the Good Ruler coalesced as a reflection of the 
heavenly kingdom) – and in this case the utopia was the True America.196  
 
Whitman’s essay sets itself the impossible project – that writing can do away with 
the distinction between sexuality that is “prurient” and “secret” and sexuality that is 
“healthy” and socially valuable. This is surely a more onerous project even than that 
set by Emerson – who writes of “self-reliance” without setting himself the impossible 
task of converting perverse sexuality into healthy sexuality. Yet Whitman’s project is 
very much informed by Emerson’s project – and by Shakespearean sexual anxieties 
that are everywhere present in Emerson’s work.  
 
WHITMAN AND SEXUAL LIBERATION  
 
Ironically, it is also the vicious male chauvinism that Whitman so rightly denounces 
that was the fertile terrain of his early homoerotic verse. For the kind of polarized 
society that frowned upon women reading the unedited classics such as Shakespeare 
and Rabelais, was one in which men possessed an idealized, homoerotic intimacy 
that would make Whitman’s “Calamus” poems not only possible, but unnoticed by 
the era’s defenders of public morality. It was Whitman’s very stance for frankness in 
the public expression of “sexuality” that caused the death of his own nostalgic 1855-
1865 world of manly “camaraderie.” By the 1880’s, when Whitman wrote 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Sacvan Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978, 
2012), pg. xx.  
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“Memorandum,” he inhabited a much changed world – in which the very 
evaluation of sexuality in the medical and scientific terms that he repeatedly 
advocated - was beginning to solidify into the psychiatric classification of the 
“perverse sexual orientation” of “homosexuality.” 
Whitman’s response was deliberately to convert his earlier notion of 
“camaraderie” into a form of Neo Platonic mysticism, and the effect was to bleach 
his later poetry of the sexual excesses that had invigorated his earlier work from 
1855-1865. It may have been not so much Whitman’s own lack of truthfulness, but 
his confusion at the new emerging medical category of “homosexuality” – a 
category his own insistence on the open expression of sexuality, in part, fostered – 
that led to Whitman’s disavowal of the homoerotic meaning of his “Calamus” 
poems. When Symonds asked him directly, in 1890:  
[In your conception of Comradeship] do you contemplate the possible 
intrusion of those semi-sexual emotions and actions which no doubt occur 
between men? I do not ask whether you approve of them, or regard them as 
a necessary part of the relation. But I should much like to know whether you 
are prepared to leave them to the inclination and the conscience of the 
individuals concerned?197 
 
Whitman’s response was bewildered:  
Ab't the question on Calamus pieces &c: they quite daze me. L of G. is only 
rightly to be construed by and within its own atmosphere and essential 
character – all of its pages & pieces so coming strictly under that – that the 
calamus part has even allow'd the possibility of such a construction as 
mentioned is terrible – I am fain to hope the pages themselves are not to be 
even mention'd for such gratuitous and quite at the same time undream'd 
and unreck'd possibility of morbid inferences – wh' are disavowed by me and 
seem damnable.198 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Horace Traubel and Gary Schmidgall, Intimate with Walt: Selections from Whitman's 
Conversations with Horace Traubel, 1888-1892 (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2001), pg. 
xiii.  
198 Traubel, pg. xiv.  
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Careful attention to Whitman’s language in this passage is instructive: “daze,” 
“undream’d,” and unreck’d.” Whitman’s response – and Whitman’s subsequent 
qualification of it, has often been interpreted as “disingenuous”:199  
Symonds is right, no doubt, to ask the questions: I am just as much right if I 
do not answer them. I often say to myself about Calamus – perhaps it means 
more or less than what I thought myself – means different: perhaps I don’t 
know what it all means – perhaps never did know.200  
 
Though Whitman undoubtedly attempted to conceal his sexual attraction to men – 
going so far as to create a numerical system to disguise the names of men in his 
journals – these passages don’t strike me as disingenuous so much as mystified. 
Whitman lived within an era in which there was a dramatic shift in the meaning of 
“perverse” – a shift that his poetry was very much involved in. The fact that the 
genuinely liberating features of sexual discourse could have a dark underbelly – that 
liberation itself, in part, advanced the notion of “morbid” sexual pathology – could 
never have occurred to him.  
It is my contention that the deepest perversity in Whitman lies, therefore, not 
in his homoerotic poetry – which is rather anodyne – but, in his deeply held belief 
that his frank poetic treatment of “healthy sexuality” would, like Graham’s 
vegetarian diet, supply a cure for the perverse sexual excess that gave rise to 
prostitution and pornographic literature in his era. In fact, what happened is that 
frank sexual expression – of the very clinical kind that Whitman had so much faith 
in – liberated discourse to create medical categories that would re-evaluate his own 
poetry of “health” as the epitome of the disease and death he so feared. As Foucault 
observes, this also opened the way for “counter-discourses” already evident in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Eve Kosofsky. Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1990), pg. 204. 
200 Traubel, pg. 85.  
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Symonds’ cautious letter to Whitman. Whitman was deaf to these, though – as he 
never fully adapted to the era that was superseding his own.201 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), pp. 122-127. 
Foucault’s argument that the so-called sexual “revolution” that occurred between the world 
wars in the 20th century was “nothing less—and its importance is undeniable–than a tactical 
shift and reversal in the great deployment of sexuality” (pg. 127) is characteristic of his 
argument throughout The History of Sexuality that sovereign power metamorphosed during 
the industrial revolution into modern disciplinary power. In my view Foucault’s account is 
also applicable to the transformation of sexuality that Whitman lived through. See also 
Foucault’s pt. 2 “The Repressive Hypothesis” in the same volume.  	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 THE IMAGINATION DISEASED: 
HAWTHORNE, INCEST, AND THE RETURN OF 
THE SHAKESPEAREAN REPRESSED 
 
 
OVERVIEW 
 
I first demonstrate the extensive and infrequently explored influence of Shakespeare 
upon Nathaniel Hawthorne, which reveals a Gothic pattern of association that, in 
Hawthorne’s mature work, evokes Jacksonian sexual pathology and Augustinian 
non-being.   
In The Scarlet Letter, Hawthorne descends fully into the terrors of Augustinian 
non-being, attempting to discover a moral and humane vision of America’s future 
by overcoming the pathological perversity and ontological terror of Shakespeare’s 
Macbeth. This attempt is foiled by the incestuous undercurrent in the relationship 
between Dimmesdale and Pearl, conjured by imagery from Shakespeare’s Hamlet. 
Hawthorne then duplicitously attempts to displace Dimmesdale’s perverse sexuality 
onto Pearl, producing a redemption narrative in which America’s future depends 
upon the supposed conversion of the perverse child into a symbol of antebellum 
womanhood. Dimmesdale’s confession of iniquity to the multitude, far from 
humanizing Pearl and redeeming American history, in fact, manipulates Pearl 
through guilt into renouncing her anarchic spirit and becoming precisely the kind of 
conformist that Dimmesdale is, at heart.  
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THE STRATFORD BEDLAMITE  
Thence I was ushered up stairs to the room in which Shakespeare is 
supposed to have been born: though, if you peep too curiously into the 
matter, you may find the shadow of an ugly doubt on this, as well as most 
other points of his mysterious life.202 
It was 1857 when Hawthorne made the pilgrimage to Shakespeare’s birthplace in 
Stratford-upon-Avon. This was the same trip that Thomas Jefferson and John 
Adams took in 1786. At the time, he lived in the nearby town of Leamington Spa. 
He had been United States consul for the port of Liverpool for five years, and had 
moved, temporarily, to the countryside before his departure to Italy in January of 
1858.  
While at the birthplace, he peered up the immense chimney, wondering if 
“Shakespeare may have seen the blue sky by day and the stars glimmering down at 
him by night” through its “immense passageway.”203 On the whole, though, he 
found the house “whitewashed and very clean, but woefully shabby and dingy, 
coarsely built, and such as the most poetical imagination would find it difficult to 
idealize.” He felt it incumbent upon him to confess:  
I should consider it unfair to quit Shakespeare’s house without the frank 
acknowledgment that I was conscious of not the slightest emotion while 
viewing it, nor any quickening of the imagination.204 
Despite his disappointment, it is notable that he was self-consciously aware that he 
was expected to have such a “quickening of the imagination.”205 
The descriptions of such a journey by American literary figures were so 
“innumerable” that Hawthorne could only justify his to his audience by using it as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Nathaniel Hawthorne, Our Old Home (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1901), pg. 159.  
203 Hawthorne, Our Old Home, pg. 158.  
204 Ibid, pp. 162-3.  
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part of the framework for a Gothic narrative. The story he told was of his encounter 
with one of the most eccentric American residents in Stratford-upon-Avon’s long 
history, Delia Bacon. The specific subject of Hawthorne’s story is Delia’s visit to 
Trinity Church, where Shakespeare is buried, to seek confirmation for her theory, 
subsequently published in her book, The Philosophy of the Plays of Shakespeare Unfolded 
(1857), that Francis Bacon was the chief author of Shakespeare’s plays.206 
Hawthorne had met Delia on July 29, 1856. Subsequently, she sent 
Hawthorne a manuscript containing the ideas upon which her book would be 
based, argued through a close reading of King Lear, Coriolanus and Julius Caesar. 
Hawthorne’s wife Sophia thought the work brilliant.207 Hawthorne thought that 
Delia was “mad” but highly intelligent, and he reluctantly provided the financial 
support for the publication of her book. He wrote:  
The woman is mad . . . but the book is a good one; and as she threw herself 
on me, I will stand by her in spite of her nonsense . . . How funny, that I 
should come in front of the stage-curtain, escorting this Bedlamite!208 
He got far more than even he had could have foreseen, for Delia turned out to be 
completely intractable to his editorial decisions. Hawthorne felt honor-bound to 
write a preface for the book — which he put off for months — and to finish 
overseeing the book’s publication; but the book proved a disaster.  
In her book, Delia argues that Shakespeare’s plays were proto-republican 
polemics produced by a “freemasonry” of courtiers in Elizabeth’s and James’s 
courts, founded by Sir Walter Raleigh and including Edmund Spenser and – in 
France – Montaigne (as well as many others, though it is not always clear to whom 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 I use Delia Bacon’s first name throughout this section so as not to confuse her with 
Francis Bacon. 
207 Nina Baym, "Delia Bacon: Hawthorne's Last Heroine," Nathaniel Hawthorne Review 20, no. 
2 (Fall 1994).  
208 Quote in: Edwin Haviland. Miller, Salem Is My Dwelling Place: A Life of Nathaniel Hawthorne 
(Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1991), pg. 422.  
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she is referring).209 From the top, the plays would convey the new philosophy of 
“MORALITY” and “POLICY” in cipher to those courtiers across Europe within 
the secret society; from the bottom, the plays would teach the “Doctrine of Human 
Nature and Human Life” to the uneducated. The plays were not intended, as Delia 
quoted Francis Bacon, to “innovate greatly but quietly, and by degrees scarce to be 
perceived.’” 210 They would operate not in Shakespeare’s time, but across the 
centuries (“as letters to the future”), gradually working to reconcile human beings to 
a Nature divinely revealed to that select School of courtiers.211 In Delia’s view, 
Francis Bacon was the “new interpreter of Nature”… a “priest”…“whose work” 
bore “the seal of” a divine “testimony” that was written “in the large handwriting 
of”…“Providence Divine.”212   
This view of Shakespeare, as a prophet of a newly revealed gospel, was 
actually not, as we have seen, very far short of Emerson’s own claims for the Bard. 
Where Emerson claimed implicitly that Shakespeare exemplified an occult 
relationship between the self and nature, Delia was interested in the mechanism by 
which nature was interpreted to human beings. She felt that Francis Bacon had 
revealed this mechanism in the Novum Organon and that it was then given sensuous 
embodiment by the plays attributed to Shakespeare. In this way, Delia justified 
using The Advancement of Learning as a gloss to read King Lear, Coriolanus, and Julius 
Caesar.  
Though full of rich insights, the book is clearly in draft form. If one separates 
out Delia’s unsubstantiated claims about the secret society founded by Walter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Delia Bacon, The Philosophy of the Plays of Shakespeare Unfolded (London: Groombridge and 
Sons, 1857), pg. lxxii.  
210 Bacon, pp. 96, 187. See Francis Bacon, “Of Innovation” in The Essays of Francis Bacon Vol. 
1 (London: J. Walter Printing-House-Square, 1787), pg. 128.  
211 Bacon, Philosophy, pg. 147.  
212 Bacon, pg. 124.  
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Raleigh and Francis Bacon’s supposed authorship of the plays, the book’s idea, to 
analyze Shakespeare’s plays in light of Bacon’s Advancement of Learning, is highly 
original and it gives rise to insightful and innovative readings. It also shows a 
wonderful mastery of the texts of the plays and a deft ability to place quotes. What it 
lacks is a strong narrative with clearly identified historical figures, a persuasive 
description of their deeds, and anchoring supporting details. Delia’s perception, 
though, of internal division within Elizabethan and Jacobean political culture, her 
sensitivity to Shakespeare’s riddling language and her intuition that an underground 
utopian, proto-republican sympathy exists in the plays, is not only insightful, but, as 
Nina Baym argues, it prefigures New Historicism.213 Indeed, though far from being 
a “perverse” reading of Shakespeare, Delia’s book foreshadows my own work, with 
its attention to a covert subtext deciphered by close readers of the plays.  
The critics, as Hawthorne foresaw, lambasted the book and, for reasons that 
are probably unrelated, Delia was committed to an insane asylum.214 Hawthorne’s 
depiction of Delia in Our Old Home – perhaps out of an attempt to elicit sympathy for 
her – as a nineteenth century Gothic “madwoman in the attic,” visiting Trinity 
Church late at night with a lantern, hoping to find evidence of the true identity of 
the plays’ author there, pleading with the local church officials to exhume the body 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Nina Baym, "Delia Bacon, History's Odd Woman Out," The New England Quarterly 69, 
no. 2 (June 1996): pg. 246. For a hint of the uncanny prescience of Delia’s critical approach 
(as opposed to her misguided historical methodology), see, for example, Kiernan Ryan’s 
recent argument, “It’s my contention that this profound commitment to the universal human 
potential to live otherwise is the secret of the plays’ proven ability to transcend their time. 
This is what drives their radical dissatisfaction with Shakespeare’s world, divorcing their 
vision from the assumptions and attitudes that held sway in early modern England, and 
opening them up to the future and the prospect of the world transfigured. That prospect – 
the tidal pull of futurity that inflects their language and form at every turn – is what propels 
Shakespeare’s plays beyond the horizon of his age to speak with more authority and power 
than ever to ours.” Kiernan Ryan, Shakespeare's Universality: Here's Fine Revolution (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2015), pg. 9.  
214 See James Shapiro’s vivid recounting of this story. James Shapiro, Contested Will: Who 
Wrote Shakespeare? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), pp.110-124.  
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from Shakespeare’s grave, and communing with local ghosts – sealed her reputation 
in the eyes of the public. It would take well over a century for Delia’s status to be 
reevaluated, first in the richly informative and well-researched 1957 biography by 
Vivian Hopkins entitled Prodigal Puritan A Life of Delia Bacon; more recently in the 
works (cited here) by Nina Baym and Karl Shapiro.  
Delia’s book may not have transformed Hawthorne’s view of Shakespeare, 
but his experience of meeting her moved him to create one of his most memorable 
insights into the Bard:  
Shakespeare has surface beneath surface, to an immeasurable depth, 
adapted to the plummet-line of every reader; his work presents many phases 
of truth, each with scope large enough to fill a contemplative mind. 
Whatever you see in him you will surely discover, provided you seek truth. 
There is no exhausting the various interpretations of his symbols; and a 
thousand years hence, a world of new readers will possess a whole library of 
new books, as we ourselves do, in these volumes already written.215 
 
Not surprisingly, given how personally invested he was in his sketch of Delia, 
Hawthorne’s insight could just have easily been made about his own novel, The 
Scarlet Letter.216 In the context of Hawthorne’s fictionalized account of Delia’s mad 
pursuit for a cipher to explain the mystery of Shakespeare’s plays, it also evokes the 
plays as a dangerous and unsettling labyrinth in which madness potentially awaits. 
This is an intimation of a Gothic Shakespeare that Hawthorne struggled most 
intensely to exorcise in The Scarlet Letter.  
 
 
GOTHIC SHAKESPEARE  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 Nathaniel Hawthorne, Our Old Home (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and 
Company, 1901), pp. 175-6.  
216 Nina Baym, in fact, argues that Hawthorne’s sketch of Bacon is shaped by the two 
character types that dominated his fiction: “the individual whose obsession determines the 
shape of the inner and outer life, and the antinomian heroine who defies social 
conventions.” Baym, “Hawthorne's Last Heroine", pg. 5. 
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The Gothic genre is itself inextricably linked to the influence of Shakespeare. The 
preface to the second edition of the novel that inaugurated the Gothic genre, 
Horace Walpole’s The Castle of Otranto (1764), uses the authority of Shakespeare, the 
“great master of nature,” in order to establish credibility for the invention of the new 
genre.217 After Walpole, allusions to Shakespeare and the evocation of his authority 
became a traditional feature of the Gothic genre.218 As John Drakakis writes:  
Shakespeare’s investments in the resources of the supernatural, his 
predilection for spectres, graveyards, the paraphernalia of death, moving 
statues, magical transformations and the emphasis upon the ‘non-rational’ as 
a category of human experience all render his plays open to the descriptive 
term ‘Gothic’.219 
 
Underlying the emphasis on the “non-rational” is the experience of “the uncanny,” 
a subject treated by Sigmund Freud in his seminal essay with that title. For Freud, 
the uncanny is deeply implicated in the return of structures of infantile perception 
surmounted by the adult; this takes the form of the revivification of the infant’s belief 
in “animism” and the “omnipotence of thoughts” as well as the eruption of 
complexes, such as the Castration Complex and the Oedipus Complex, that 
structure the infant’s perception.220 If Freud is correct, then it is no accident that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 Horace Walpole and W. S. Lewis, The Castle of Otranto: A Gothic Story (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), pg. 10.  
218 See also Christy Desmet and Anne Williams, Shakespearean Gothic (Cardiff: University of 
Wales Press, 2009); for Gothic Shakespeare’s influence on French postmodernism, see 
Richard Wilson, Shakespeare in French Theory: King of Shadows (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 
29-75.  
Arguably, Derrida’s Gothic reading of Hamlet in Spectres of Marx, especially his extended 
analysis of Hamlet’s phrase, “the time is out of joint” (I. v. 188) in chapter 1, with its close 
attention to the term “perverse,” is relevant to my study. The perverse jeremiad, however, is 
an enclosed system that reels between utopia and dystopia, which is different from 
hauntology’s sense of the past’s many open potential possibilities. Jacques Derrida, Specters of 
Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International (New York: Routledge, 
1994), pp. 22-24.   
219 John Drakakis and Dale Townshend, Gothic Shakespeares (Milton Park, Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2008), pg. 24.  
220 Sigmund Freud, David McLintock, and Hugh Haughton, The Uncanny (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2003).  
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writers of early Gothic novels such as Ann Radcliffe, in her posthumously published 
essay “On The Supernatural In Poetry” (1826), relied upon figures like the Ghost in 
Hamlet to justify the use of the supernatural in the new genre; for figures like the 
Ghost in Hamlet not only horrify but they are a key to psychological depth. 221 
As I will argue, Hawthorne’s fiction, and indeed the American fiction of the 
19th century, is so steeped in Gothic tropes that his allusions to Macbeth and Hamlet 
must be seen partly within that tradition. More, the Gothic genre is preoccupied 
with taboo and transgression; this clearly over-determines the way that the 
Shakespearean perverse is deployed by Hawthorne (and later Melville). 222  
Hawthorne’s delicate psychological use of Shakespearean allusion, however, exceeds 
the Gothic tradition that he inherits. It will be important, therefore, to foreground 
Hawthorne’s relationship to the Gothic genre in order to discover his unique 
contribution to it.  
 
 
THE PERVERSE IN GOTHIC  
 
Hawthorne may have, from his childhood, associated Shakespeare with the Gothic 
genre. Hawthorne’s sister recalled that young Nathaniel frequently recited, “My 
lord, stand back, and let the coffin pass” (I. ii. 38) from Richard III. As Brenda 
Wineapple observes, this might be a casual recollection if it were not for the fact that 
somber processions of coffins were a grisly commonplace in Salem. Wineapple also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 “Oh, I should never be weary of dwelling on the perfection of Shakespeare, in his 
management of every scene connected with that most solemn and mysterious being, which 
takes such entire possession of the imagination, that we hardly seem conscious we are beings 
of this world while we contemplate ‘the extravagant and erring spirit.’” Ann Radcliffe, "On 
The Supernatural In Poetry," ed. David Sandner, in Fantastic Literature: A Critical Reader 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), pg. 46.  
222 David Punter, A New Companion to the Gothic (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pg. 3.  
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suggests that Hawthorne may have felt a personal affinity with the play, as his lame 
uncle Richard, Richard Manning III, became the family patriarch after 
Hawthorne’s grandfather died, but only after a power struggle with rival contenders 
for the throne, which led to his departure from Salem, to Maine. Wineapple writes:  
Shakespeare’s Richard III: malformed, robbed by nature, a villain to be 
sure; and crippled Uncle Richard: paterfamilias absconditus, a kind of hero and, 
for having abandoned his nephew, a kind of villain too.223  
Hawthorne’s later description of Zenobia recounting the chilling story of the 
“Veiled Lady” in The Blithedale Romance, describes her as “fond of readings from 
Shakespeare, and often with a depth of tragic power, or breadth of comic effect, that 
made one feel it an intolerable wrong to the world, that she did not go upon stage.” 
224 These dramatic readings may have been inspired by Hawthorne’s own readings 
of Shakespeare, Spenser and Milton to his wife “beneath the astral lamp” in the 
evening.225   
As we will explore later, Hawthorne’s nickname in College was Oberon, 
King of the Fairies, in A Midsummer Night’s Dream. For Hawthorne, this name 
conjured not only the magic of romance, but also Oberon’s sobriquet, “king of 
shadows” (III. ii. 347). In his early Gothic novel, Fanshawe, published anonymously 
in 1828 and, Hawthorne thought, lost to history, Hawthorne was anxious to claim 
his affiliation with Shakespeare, giving three of his ten chapters Shakespearean 
epigraphs. This habit of using Shakespearean epigraphs follows a pattern familiar to 
Gothic fiction, exemplified by such novels as Ann Radcliffe’s The Mysteries of Udolpho 
(1794), Matthew Lewis’s The Monk (1796), and Charles Maturin’s Melmoth the 
Wanderer (1820).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Brenda Wineapple, Hawthorne: A Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), pg. 26.  
224 Nathaniel Hawthorne and Millicent Bell, Collected Novels (New York: Library of America, 
1983), pg. 725.  
225 Wineapple, pg. 162.  
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Hawthorne was never again so keen to claim lineage from Shakespeare, 
though hints remain such as the allusion in the title of his first book of short stories, 
Twice Told Tales, to the lines from King John: “Life is as tedious as a twice-told tale, / 
Vexing the dull ear of a drowsy man” (III. iv. 108-9). He would also never again 
write explicitly in the Gothic genre, except in isolated short stories. Though all of 
Hawthorne’s novels contain Gothic themes, such as the dark forest and the 
supposed witch, Mistress Hibbins, in The Scarlet Letter (1850), the gloomy mansion in 
The House of the Seven Gables (1851) which preserves the inheritance of “Maule’s 
curse” and The Marble Faun’s (1860) setting amidst the crumbling ruins of Rome, 
Hawthorne deliberately set his work apart from that genre, preferring, in his famous 
preface to The Blithedale Romance (1852), to call his work “romance” and himself a 
“romancer,” placing himself in the tradition of the “Faery Land” of Spenser.226   
In a larger sense, though, the Gothic genre is inescapable for American 
authors, especially in Hawthorne’s period, because it is already implied within the 
structure of the American jeremiad. As David Punter argues, the Manichean 
dichotomies of the traditional English Gothic novel with its oppositions between the 
supposed Protestant enlightenment and Catholic superstition, a republican political 
culture and monuments to a crumbling aristocracy, Roman civic order and 
medieval barbarity, were reproduced in the “Puritan consciousness itself” with its 
“Gothic imagination of good and evil, and perilous human experience.” This, in 
Punter’s view, is the basis for the later themes that constitute the American variant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 “In the old countries, with which fiction has long been conversant, a certain conventional 
privilege seems to be awarded the romancer; his work is not put exactly side by side with 
nature; and he is allowed a license with regard to every-day probability, in view of the 
improved effects which he is bound to produce thereby. Among ourselves, on the contrary, 
there is as yet no such Faery Land, so like the real world, that, in a suitable remoteness, one 
cannot well tell the difference, but with an atmosphere of strange enchantment, beheld 
through which the inhabitants have a propriety of their own. This atmosphere is what the 
American romancer needs.” Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Blithedale Romance (Boston: Ticknor, 
Reed, and Fields, 1852), pg. IV.  
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on the genre: “the frontier, the Puritan legacy, race, and political utopianism.”227 
These themes inform American literature at its very beginning. They are 
central, for example, to what many scholars regard as the pioneering work of 
American fiction, Charles Brockden Brown’s Gothic novel, Wieland (1798). In 
Brown’s novel, the structure of the American jeremiad, with its anxiety about the 
potential collapse of the new American republic, is adapted to the apparatus of the 
Gothic genre. As Punter argues, the utopia in Wieland has implicit parallels with the 
United States:  
. . . it is rationalist, based on Enlightenment principles, and significantly 
without recourse to external authority . . . The dreadful collapse of this 
happy and independent society could suggest a pessimism about the future of 
self-government.228   
 
Brown apparently even went so far as to mail a copy of his novel to Thomas 
Jefferson, presumably with the intention of providing a warning to him about threats 
to the American project.229 This theme, which links the Gothic genre to threats of 
dystopia extends into the fiction of Hawthorne’s contemporary, Edgar Allen Poe, 
whose theory of a “perverse” destructive impulse unaccounted for by rationalistic 
Enlightenment principles is elaborated in such stories as “The Man of the Crowd” 
(1840), “The Black Cat” (1843), “The Tell-Tale Heart” (1843), and “The Imp of the 
Perverse” (1845). In “The Imp of the Perverse,” Poe’s murderer-narrator writes:  
Examine these and similar actions as we will, we shall find them resulting 
solely from the spirit of the Perverse.  We perpetrate them merely because we 
feel that we should not.  Beyond or behind this, there is no intelligible 
principle. And we might, indeed, deem this perverseness a direct instigation 
of the Arch-Fiend, were it not occasionally known to operate in furtherance 
of good.230 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Punter, A New Companion, pg. 163. See also Chris Baldick, The Oxford Book of Gothic Tales 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. xix-xx. 	  
228 Ibid. pg. 166.  
229 Ibid. pg. 166.  
230 Edgar Allan Poe and Dawn B. Sova, The Complete Tales and Poems of Edgar Allan Poe (New 
York: Barnes & Noble, 2007), pg. 283.  
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Here, Poe transposes a traditional view of the Pauline wayward will into criminal 
psychology. The rather crude irony of the story is, of course, that the narrator feels 
betrayed not by his, he imagines, eminently rational scheme “wrought with 
thorough deliberation” to commit a murder to receive an inheritance, but by his 
need to confess it.231 As we will discover, Hawthorne is not content to remain with a 
conception of the “perverse” as psychologized moral theology, but his starting point 
is the same as Poe’s. It is no surprise then that, as Richard Kopley persuasively and 
thoroughly argues, Hawthorne may have adapted Poe’s allusions to Macbeth in “The 
Tell-Tale Heart” to The Scarlet Letter.232 As we will discover in the section that 
follows, Poe’s tendency to link psychology and moral theology was a common one. 
Hawthorne drew not only from the Gothic tradition, but from the developing 
language of psychology, empowered by the inception and rapid expansion of 
America’s asylum movement, with its explicit taxonomy of sexual diseases.  
   
 
A FEAST OF LUSCIOUS FALSHOODS  
 
By some witchcraft or other – for I really cannot assign any reasonable why 
and wherefore – I have been carried apart from the main current of life, and find it 
impossible to get back again. (Hawthorne, letter to Longfellow)233 
If Emerson could occupy the optimistic the role of Prospero – as the personification 
of the Shakespearean imagination, Nathaniel Hawthorne was far more likely to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Poe, pg. 283.  
232 In Kopley’s reading, Chillingworth assumes the combined role of the murderer / 
narrator in Poe’s short story and Macbeth / Lady Macbeth. It is more difficult to trace 
Hamlet’s ghost in The Scarlet Letter, but the grim, tormenting presence of Chillingworth can be 
read as a haunting patriarchal authority commanding Dimmesdale to undo the ill effects of 
his own sexual transgression.  
 
233 F. O. Matthiessen, American Renaissance (New York: Oxford Univ., 1966), pg. 227.  
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approach the Shakespearean imagination with reserve and skepticism. He did not 
bring with him the transcendentalist assumption of the subject’s centrality in relation 
to the phenomenal world. Rather, he maintained psychological and moral principles 
that were aligned with the 18th century tradition of Locke, Johnson, and Burke.  
Theologically, contrary to the transcendentalists, Hawthorne inherited what 
Melville famously called “that Calvinist sense of Innate Depravity and Original Sin, 
from whose visitations, in some shape or other, no deeply thinking mind is always 
and wholly free.”234  
Melville felt that Hawthorne’s sense of “Innate Depravity” was the real 
source of his Shakespearean profundity:   
this blackness . . . the infinite obscure of his background, – that background, 
against which Shakespeare plays his grandest conceits, the things that have 
made for Shakespeare his loftiest, but most circumscribed renown, as the 
profoundest of thinkers.235  
 
Melville is, of course, right. The Calvinist doctrine of Innate Depravity is at the core 
of Hawthorne’s work – and it is not merely mediated through the Augustinian 
tradition that Hawthorne inherited through his Puritan ancestors. It is also derived 
from his peculiar reading of Shakespeare.236 At the same time, what Melville doesn’t 
observe is that the pathologized imagination that Hawthorne inherits is one that 
derives from a distinctly antebellum psychiatric understanding – which, in turn, is 
animated by Shakespearean representations of sexual perversity. It is my view that 
Hawthorne attempts to inoculate not only his work, but American history, and by 
implication its destiny, from the Shakespearean perverse, but that the perverse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 “Hawthorne And His Mosses,” in: Herman Melville et al., Moby-Dick (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1967), pg. 521. 
235 Herman Melville et al., Moby-Dick (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967), pg. 522.  
236 Hawthorne himself identified his precursors in the Protestant poetic tradition: Spenser, 
Bunyan, and Milton.  See, for example, pg. 200, Matthiessen. Matthiessen also sees 
Hawthorne in the Augustinian tradition of the psychomachia – best exemplified in the 
Renaissance by Spenser’s Faerie Queene  and in medieval poetry by The Romance of the Rose. pp. 
247-247, Matthiessen.   
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returns as a tragic force to undermine this project.  
In Hawthorne, the relationship between the imagination and the body is 
foregrounded – as is its potential as the cause of a nervous disease of sexual 
perversion. This disease has many different aspects – but, the dominant one is what 
he calls the “unpardonable sin” which develops from a cultivation of the intellect in 
the absence of “sympathy” (see OED 3B, the “capacity of entering into or sharing 
the feelings of another or others”).237 Hawthorne describes it in the short story, 
“Ethan Brand” (originally known as “The Unpardonable Sin,” 1850):  
He had lost his hold of the magnetic chain of humanity. He was no longer a 
brother-man, opening the chambers or the dungeons of our common nature 
by the key of holy sympathy, which gave him a right to share in all its secrets; 
he was no a cold observer, looking on mankind as the subject of his 
experiment, and, at length, converting man and woman to be his puppets, 
and pulling the wires that moved them to such degrees of crime as were 
demanded for his study. (italics added)238  
 
The phrase “holy sympathy,” in this passage, contrasts strongly with the “cold 
observer” who is able to treat “mankind” as “the subject of his experiment,” merely 
“puppets.” The importance of the word “sympathy” in Hawthorne’s work has been 
well understood to be evoked in the tradition of Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments – in which “sympathy” is defined as the “source of our fellow-feeling for 
the misery of others” and plays a primary role in human morality. Hawthorne, 
therefore – as was common among antebellum American psychiatrists  – regarded  
“sympathy” as a social and ethical capacity that kept in check the extravagant and 
potentially solipsistic imagination.239 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 "sympathy, n.". OED Online. March 2014. Oxford University Press. 
,http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/196271?rskey=t3U7oU&result=1&isAdvanced=false> 
(accessed April 13, 2014).	  
238 Nathaniel Hawthorne and James McIntosh, Nathaniel Hawthorne's Tales: Authoritative Texts, 
Backgrounds, Criticism (New York: Norton, 1987), pg. 265. 
239	  Lester H. Hunt, "The Scarlet Letter: Hawthorne's Theory of Moral Sentiments," 
Philosophy and Literature 8, no. 1, pp. 76-78;	  Edmund Burke, "A Philosophical Enquiry Into 
the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful" (Open Library), October 7, 2008, pp. 
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The psychiatric industry, in antebellum America, was the institutionalized 
form of the wider social reforms that were undertaken in all parts of society. As we 
have discussed these reform movements were animated from below by public 
anxiety over radical social change that was taking place in the society of the time. At 
the same time, the concepts that animated the reform movement were adapted from 
above by psychiatry. There was, therefore, a symbiotic relationship between the 
burgeoning psychiatric industry, the construction of asylums, and the social reform 
movements that were part of the cultural landscape that Hawthorne participated in. 
Hawthorne was deeply skeptical of these reform movements and the institutions that 
might grow from them – as is clear from a cursory view of the thinly veiled egotism 
in Hollingsworth’s quest to reform criminals in The Blithedale Romance.  
As Benjamin Reiss observes, however, Hawthorne imbibed not only the 
psychiatric theory upon which treatment of the insane was predicated, but the view 
of the asylum itself as a source of rehabilitation:  
[A]lthough Nathaniel Hawthorne sometimes portrayed asylums as spaces of 
punishment rather than cure, he casually accepted the asylum movement's 
central therapeutic premises in his novel The House of the Seven Gables. 
Cloistered in that famous domain, the elderly Hepzibah Pyncheon “had 
grown to be a kind of lunatic, by imprisoning herself so long in that one 
place, with no other company than a single series of ideas.” Her brother 
Clifford is even further gone, and is at one point threatened with being sent 
to a public asylum. But their young cousin Phoebe, whose arrival on the 
scene eventually sanitizes the house from the apparently contagious threat of 
insanity, has perfectly internalized the moral treatment regimen.240  
 
It is not clear whether Hawthorne ever read The American Journal of Insanity 
(hereafter referred to as “The Journal”), but what is clear is that he shared the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72-75, accessed April 13, 2014, 
<https://openlibrary.org/books/OL20594267M/A_Philosophical_Enquiry_Into_the_Ori
gin_of_Our_Ideas_of_the_Sublime_and_Beautiful.>	  
240 Benjamin Reiss, Theaters of Madness: Insane Asylums and Nineteenth-century American Culture 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), p 5. Reiss provides the only detailed study of 
the American Asylum and Shakespeare. Especially important to this thesis is his chapter,  
pp. 79-103, “Bardolatry in Bedlam, Shakespeare and Early Psychiatry.”  
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predominant ideas of the age about the intimate connection between the 
imagination and mental pathology. The Journal, produced by asylum 
superintendents starting in 1844, was written to promote and defend dozens of 
publicly funded asylums that appeared in the Northeastern United States, starting in 
the early 1830’s continuing until the Civil War.241 Notably, the inaugural journal 
issue, for July 1844, highlights this by celebrating the opening of the New York State 
Lunatic Asylum at Utica.242 This is also where the issues of The Journal relevant to 
the period of this study, from 1844-1851 (the latter is the date of the publication of 
The Scarlet Letter and Moby Dick), were published. These issues were as dedicated to 
the pathology of the imagination as they were to establishing Shakespeare as the 
authoritative observer of that pathology.  
While various points of view on the imagination are represented – some 
psychiatrists finding it entirely pathological while others associating it with the 
highest human ideals - the link between imagination and diseases of the mind is 
reiterated again and again. One of Hawthorne’s favorite authors, Samuel Johnson, 
is quoted at length by an anonymous contributor in the second article entitled,  
“Illustrations of Insanity,” of the inaugural edition about the psychological dangers 
of the “imagination”: 
There is no man whose imagination does not sometimes predominate over 
his reason, who can regulate his attention wholly by his will, and whose ideas 
will come and go at his command . . . All power of fancy over reason is a 
degree of insanity; but while this power is such as we can control and repress, 
it is not visible to others, nor considered as any deprivation of the mental 
faculties . . . In time, some particular train of ideas fixes the attention; all 
other intellectual gratifications are rejected; the mind, in weariness or leisure, 
recurs constantly to the favorite conception, and feasts on the luscious falsehood, 
whenever she is offended with the bitterness of truth. By degrees the reign of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 Reiss, Theaters, pg. 4. The title of The American Journal of Insanity was altered in 1921 
to The American Journal of Psychiatry.  
242 Anonymous. The American Journal of Insanity 1 (1844): 1-9. Web. 
<http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=YPwGAAAAcAAJ&q=reign+of+fancy#v=onepage
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fancy is confirmed . .  then fictions begin to operate as realities, false opinions 
fasten upon the mind, and life passes in dreams of rapture or of anguish. 
(italics added)243  
 
Johnson here, quoted by The Journal, combines the 18th century emphasis on the 
dangers of the excesses of the imagination with the Augustinian concept that such 
indulgence produces a “reign of fancy” which entails “feast”[ing] on “luscious 
falsehood.” Although 19th century American psychiatrists regarded their enterprise 
as a humanitarian attempt to separate insanity from religion, the Augustinian 
metaphysics of privative evil is never far from their accounts of insanity. Johnson 
also subtly genders his account of insanity as a lapse in manly government of 
“reason” over “fancy.” 244  The gendered account of insanity was accepted 
uncritically by Jacksonian psychiatrists. The man who succumbs to the “reign of 
fancy” had lost his capacity for what Americans of the antebellum period would call 
“self-reliance.”  
Of course, the view of the asylum superintendents about the imagination was 
ambivalent. An important part of the treatment was the healthy exercise of the 
imagination. The asylum relied upon The Journal to showcase poetry, letters, and 
personal testimonial about stage performances from the inmates as evidence of their 
recovery. As Reiss observes:  
To the extent that patients could produce creditable poetry, learn to work 
efficiently, comport themselves respectably, and advertise that skill in 
published literary works or stage performances, they justified massive public 
and private expenditures in this early form of social engineering.245  
 
These, though, were examples of the socialized and domesticated imagination. As 
we discovered with Emerson and Whitman, if the imagination could be diseased, it 
was also the primary means by which a patient was cured.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 The Journal Insanity Volume 1 (1844): pp. 16-17.  
244 The Journal of Insanity (1844); See, especially, Definition of Insanity – Nature of the Disease, 
pp. 98-99.	  
245 Reiss, pg. 5.  
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In the opening article for the issue of January 1845, entitled, “The Poetry of 
Insanity,” the imagination is both exalted as “the fire of Prometheus” and also 
clearly pathologized:  
Imagination essential to the perfection of either of the fine arts, is the 
predominant element in true poetry . . . Wonderfully exemplified as is the 
power of Imagination, in the annals of poetry, it is no less so in the records of 
Insanity. In the latter, as in the former, it invests the beings of its own 
creation with power, loads them with riches, lavishes upon them the most 
eminent honor, and gives them all the titles of nobility, royalty, and the 
Deity.246  
 
The activity of the imagination in the insane person operates based upon the same 
premise that it does in the gifted poet. To bestow “riches,”  “eminent honor[s],” and 
“titles of nobility” on these beings is to trade homely reality for insubstantial wealth 
and titles. To do so leaves the patient not merely impoverished, but with nothing. 
The danger of excessive imagination is the threat that sympathies that would 
otherwise be put to social use might be diverted into a world that is unbounded and 
solipsistic.  
Although, as Reiss observes, American asylums were “citadels of the anti-
masturbation movement,” they did not directly implicate the Shakespearean 
imagination in contemporary fears about sexual excess.247 Shakespeare was much 
more likely to treated as a cool-headed observer of the insane, a precursor of 
contemporary psychiatrists themselves. As The Journal observes in an 1844 article 
entitled, “Illustrations of Insanity – Shakespeare”:  
The more we read Shakespeare, the more we are astonished; not so much at 
his wonderful imagination, but at the immensity and correctness of his 
knowledge.248 
 
Here, the taint of the dangerous potential of the “wonderful imagination” is 
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carefully distanced from Shakespeare, the clinical authority on the insane.249 The 
common association between artistic endeavors, sensuality, and madness as well as 
the potential  pathology of the reading of books, though, is made clear in The 
Journal. Another notable Journal article, entitled, “Art, Passion, and Madness,” that 
could easily be imagined as the basis of a Hawthorne short-story, combines the 
suspicions of the imagination with fears about the seductive nature of art. It recounts 
the story of a woman who became “passionately enamoured” of a statue:  
Her whole frame seemed to be electrified, as if a transformation had taken 
place within her; and it has since appeared that, indeed, a transformation 
had taken place, and that her youthful breast had imbibed a powerful, alas! 
fatal passion. 250  
 
It is sexual reformers, like Sylvester Graham, who are more explicit about the direct 
connection between imaginative excess and sexual desire that Hawthorne would 
voice through the language of Shakespeare:  
Hence, therefore, SEXUAL DESIRE, cherished by the mind and dwelt on by 
the imagination, not only increase the excitability and peculiar sensibility of the 
genital organs themselves, but always throws an influence, equal to the 
intensity of the affection, over the whole nervous domain.251  
(italics added)  
 
Graham is voicing here a belief that had been pervasive for more than a hundred 
years, but he articulates it with a zealous fervor even more intense than the asylum 
superintendents. There is no hint in Graham, of course, of a connection between 
Shakespeare and the diseased imagination – except a generalized suspicion of the 
imagination. Shakespeare was far too revered for such suggestions. Shakespeare, 
though, in both the asylum publications and in the wider culture, lurks around the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 Reiss,  pp. 84-87.  
250 "American Journal of Insanity, Volume 9 (Google EBook)," Google Books, pp. 363-365, 
accessed November 07, 2013, 
<http://books.google.com/books/about/American_journal_of_insanity.html?id=YfwGAA
AAcAAJ>. 
251 Sylvester Graham, A Lecture to Young Men on Chastity: Intended Also for the Serious Consideration 
of Parents and Guardians (Boston: Light & Stearns, Crocker & Brewster, 1837), pg. 50. 
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edges of these discussions of the illicit imagination.  
One place for a strange liaison between sexual perversion, economic anxiety, 
and Shakespeare occurred in the discussion which followed the Bank Panic of 1837 
(which, in turn, led to a recession lasting through the 40’s). As Laqueur observes, this 
is because the new economy, reliant on bank-notes, speculation, and debt, shared 
with masturbation a “false epistemology.”252 Andrew Jackson, in his farewell speech, 
regarded the “paper-system” as “robbing honest labour of its earnings.” As David 
Anthony observes, the new system was regarded as inimical to a system rooted in 
“labor and reality;” it formed a “laborless model of selfhood that [was] not only 
insubstantial, but also, perhaps, inevitably, self-consuming.”253  
Not surprisingly, these anxieties about the potentially perverse internal 
economy of the imagination and the national economy could fuse in Shakespearean 
imagery. For example, an anti-Jacksonian lithograph entitled “New Edition of 
Macbeth. Bank-Oh’s! Ghost,” in which commerce itself is represented as a ghostly 
return of the repressed, was published during the year of the 1837 Bank Panic by 
Edward Williams Clay. Although Andrew Jackson has “slay[ed] the U. S. Bank,” it 
“continues to haunt him and his horrified successor, Martin Van Buren [who is 
depicted, comically and perversely in drag, as Lady Macbeth], in the spectral form 
of inflation, speculation, and debt.”254 Thus, the pathology of the imagination is 
extended to the national economy – and this is explicitly dramatized through 
Shakespearean imagery.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 Thomas Walter. Laqueur, Solitary Sex: A Cultural History of Masturbation (New York: Zone 
Books, 2003), pg. 294. 
253 D. Anthony, "Banking on Emotion: Financial Panic and the Logic of Male Submission 
in the Jacksonian Gothic," American Literature 76, no. 4 (2004): pg. 723. 
254 Anthony, pp. 725-726.  
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 255 
Hawthorne himself laments, in “The Custom House” introduction to The 
Scarlet Letter, that the production of his own imagination is like the merely “the 
impalpable beauty of a soap-bubble.” He lacks the creative power to manage what 
he calls the “wiser effort” which would have been “to diffuse thought and 
imagination through the opaque substance of to-day.” To do this would be to 
achieve a literary economy as balanced as his internal economy. Rather than the 
“torpid creatures of my own fancy,” he would “find the letters turned to gold upon 
the page.” He concludes, with a lament: “[a] better book than I shall ever write was 
there; leaf after leaf presenting itself to me.” As we have discovered, such a book as 
the acme of Jacksonian mental health was precisely what Whitman attempted to 
write when he published Leaves of Grass. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 Bernard Reilly, American Political Prints, 1766-1876: A Catalog of the Collections in the Library of 
Congress (Boston, MA: G.K. Hall, 1991), entry 1837-7. 
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A BLIGHTED BODY AND A RUINED SOUL 
 
Given Hawthorne’s temperament and background, he was much more likely than 
Emerson to explicitly foreground these anxieties about imagination. As I have 
observed, he had none of the transcendentalist’s faith in the subject’s annexation of 
the powers of nature. Rather, he viewed the imagination with a Johnsonian 
suspicion and an antebellum anxiety about its potential for pathological excess.  
This climate may explain why Hawthorne’s evocations of Prospero are so 
different from Emerson’s depiction of himself as the Shakespearean sage of 
Concord. Hawthorne’s works are filled with the fearful prospect of the imagination’s 
amoral and perverse excesses. For example, he frequently depicts scientists with 
quasi-magical powers who resemble Spenser’s sorcerer, Archimago, more than 
Shakespeare’s Prospero: Aylmer, in “The Birth-Mark” and Rappuccini in 
“Rappucini’s Daughter” are corrupted by their art into dangerous experiments that 
murder those most beloved to them. Professor Westervelt, in The Blithedale Romance 
uses mesmerism to control Priscilla, who is at the mercy of his scheme to market her 
to superstitious audiences as a clairvoyant act called “The Veiled Lady.”  
An unnamed painter in “The Prophetic Pictures” is an “extravagant” (pg. 
467) Prospero whose paintings “had caught from the duskiness of the future – at 
least, so he fancied – a fearful secret, and had obscurely revealed it in his portraits” 
(pg. 458). His “imagination” has been so “lavished on the study” of his two subjects, 
Walter and Elinor, “that he regards them as creations of his own, like the thousands 
with which he had peopled the realms of Picture.”  
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While Shakespeare’s Prospero thunders:   
    graves at my command 
Have waked their sleepers, oped, and let 'em forth 
By my so potent art  
    (V. i. 48-50)      
Hawthorne’s unnamed artist exults:  
‘Oh glorious Art!’ thus mused the enthusiastic painter, as he trod the street. 
‘Thou art the image of the Creator’s own. The innumerable forms, that 
wander in nothingness, start into being at thy beck. The dead live again. Thou 
recallest them to their old scenes, and givest their gray shadows the lustre of 
a better life, at once earthly and immortal . . .’ 
‘Oh, potent Art! As thou bringest the faintly revealed Past to stand in that 
narrow strip of sunlight, which we call Now, canst thou summon the 
shrouded Future to meet her there? Have I not achieved my aim? Am I not 
thy Prophet?’256   
Whereas Prospero’s “insubstantial pageant” is universalized – “we are such stuff as 
dreams are made on” (VI. i. 157) – Hawthorne’s “Prophet” is clearly dabbling in an 
unhallowed art. He does not merely bring back the dead, but he “summon[s] the 
shrouded Future.” The “innumerable forms” that he conjures onto his canvas are 
from a spiritual abyss where they “wander in nothingness.” They “give their grayest 
shadows the lustre of a better life,” but their essence is the void of a diseased 
imagination.   
Hawthorne explicitly diagnoses his Prophet with a  “melancholy fervor”:  
Thus, with a proud, yet melancholy fervor, did he almost cry aloud, as he passed 
through the toilsome street, among people that knew not of his reveries, nor 
could understand nor care for them. It is not good for man to cherish a 
solitary ambition. Unless there be those around him, by whose example he 
may regulate himself, his thoughts, desires, and hopes will become extravagant, 
and he the semblance, perhaps the reality, of a madman.257 
 
The painter fails to maintain Johnson’s “regulat”[ed] economy of the self based 
upon sympathy with the “example” of “those around him.”  Rather, he enters a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 Nathaniel Hawthorne and James McIntosh, Nathaniel Hawthorne's Tales: Authoritative Texts, 
Backgrounds, Criticism (New York: Norton, 1987), pg. 467.  
257 Hawthorne, pg. 467.  
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state that is boundless and “extravagant”: he has become a “madman.”  
Like Emerson’s benign Prospero, Hawthorne’s malevolent Prospero could 
spill over into his personal reflections on the hazards of the writer’s imagination. In 
the story, “The Devil in Manuscript,” (1834) Hawthorne’s narrator, Oberon – his 
Shakespearean nick-name among his closest College friends – exclaims bitterly:  
“Would you have me a damned author? You cannot conceive what an effect 
the composition of these tales has had on me . . . I am surrounding myself 
with shadows, which bewilder me, by aping the realities of life. They have 
drawn me aside from beaten path of the world, and led me into a strange sort 
of solitude, - a solitude in the midst of men, - where nobody wishes for what I 
do, nor thinks nor feels as I do . . . Oh, I have a horror of what was created 
in my own brain.’258  
(italics added)  
 
This is a passage, again, that unites the psychiatric discourse about the perverse 
excesses of the unhealthy imagination with the Augustinian imagery of privative evil. 
Oberon is “drawn” . . . “aside from the beaten path of the world” into a “horror.” 
He is immersed in an insubstantial world of “shadows” that “bewilder” by “aping 
the realities of life.” Whereas Emerson’s Prospero annexes Shakespeare to the self in 
order to enlarge its powers, Hawthorne dramatizes the usurpation of the self by the 
unreal and potentially pathological excesses of the imagination. Emerson attempts 
to authorize America’s literature with the Shakespearean imprimatur; Hawthorne 
dramatizes the imagination diseased by the very solipsism that was always implicit 
within Emersonian self-reliance.  
For if, as Emerson observes in “The American Scholar,” nature can be 
regarded as “this shadow of the soul, or other me,” it is also in danger of becoming a 
narcissistic mirror for boundless egotism. As Leland S. Person observes concisely:  
“[s]elf reliance and self-making can become self-pollution.”259 As Person further 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Hawthorne, pg. 334.  
259 Leland S. Person, The Cambridge Introduction to Nathaniel Hawthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), pg. 53.  
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argues, Hawthorne explores quite explicitly the pathological and masturbatory 
potential of self-reliance in stories like “Monsieur Du Miroir,” with its explicit 
equation of Emersonian self-reliance with the abyss of self-love:  
Thus do mortals deify, as it were, a mere shadow of themselves, a spectre of 
human reason, and ask of that to unveil the mysteries which Divine 
Intelligence has revealed so far as needful to our guidance and hid the 
rest.260  
 
This could very easily be Andrew Norton denouncing Emerson’s “Divinity School 
Address” as the “latest form of infidelity” – except that Hawthorne more typically 
evokes Shakespeare against Shakespeare: the tragic authority of Macbeth mixed 
with the Augustinian ontology of privative evil against Prospero’s sovereign power 
over nature.   
In “Wakefield,” Hawthorne creates a figure of the perverse imagination far 
surpassing the anonymous narrator of “Monsieur Du Miroir.” Though Wakefield 
possesses a strange thematic parallel to Shakespeare’s Macbeth, which we will see 
threads its way through The Scarlet Letter, the story does not contain any certain 
echoes of Shakespeare. Nevertheless, Shakespeare’s Macbeth frames Wakefield’s 
bizarre act with the same view of the perverse will as at once “involuntary and 
intentional” that we will discover in The Scarlet Letter.   
Wakefield is a perfectly ordinary husband with a wife and a child, who earns 
a “foremost place among the doers of eccentric deeds.” He does this by an act of 
supreme solipsism: departing from his wife and children under the pretence of a 
business trip, and moving into an apartment just adjacent the family home in 
London, where he anonymously observes his family for twenty years. In a more 
hopeful story, like “Sights from a Steeple,” Hawthorne could conclude that the 
viewpoint of a “spiritualized Paul Pry, hovering invisible round man and woman, 	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witnessing their deeds, searching into their hearts . . . and retaining no emotion 
peculiar to himself” would be “the most desirable mode of existence.”261 Wakefield 
is an all together more abject figure. Seemingly light-years from Macbeth’s 
“vaunting ambition,” (I. vii. 27) Wakefield is motivated by a “morbid vanity” to 
“perplex” his wife with what he believes, at first, will merely be “a whole week’s 
absence.” Wakefield’s intention is to see how his family, especially his wife, “will be 
affected by his removal.” He also shares with Hawthorne the writer’s desire to 
achieve a vantage point external to his own life.  
Unlike Macbeth, the great exemplar of the depraved criminal imagination, 
Wakefield attacks hearth and home through an act of pure solipsism – unredeemed 
by even the dignity of a criminal. At the moment that Wakefield departs from his 
house with the pretence of a business trip, he is described in this way:  
At that instant his fate was turning on the pivot. Little dreaming of the doom to 
which his first backward step devotes him, he hurries away, breathless with 
agitation hitherto unfelt, and hardly dares turn his head at the distant 
corner.262  
(italics added)   
 
The imagery surrounding Wakefield’s decision, the “turning on the pivot, the 
“backward step,” later “stepping aside,” clearly evokes the tradition of the 
“perverse” – though Wakefield represents a significant innovation. Whereas the 
exemplar of the 19th century imagination, Macbeth, commits a political crime with a 
profoundly social impact, the assassination of Duncan, Wakefield’s “moral change” 
operates within himself.  
For Macbeth, the moral change caused by the murder is summed up in these 
lines: “to know my deed 'twere best not know myself.” (Mac. II. ii. 73) Self and deed 
are irreconcilable. To know his former “self,” he must conceal the “deed” from 	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himself; if he is to know his “deed,” he must erase his former self. For Wakefield, this 
change is eerily similar:  
The singularity of his situation must have so moulded him to itself, that, 
considered in regard to his fellow-creatures and the business of life, he could 
not be said to possess his right mind. 263 
(italics added)  
 
An alien self evoked by “the singularity of his situation” is so cunningly “fit” (“to 
assume a certain form or shape”, OED, 6,7), like a garment, to the original self, that 
Wakefield no longer notices its presence.264 There might also be a secondary sense 
in which the false self is “moulded,” so shaped (OED 3) to resemble the original that 
Wakefield can no longer distinguish between the two. In Macbeth, Banquo evokes a 
similar disjunction between “strange garments” and “mould” a noun meaning the 
shape and form of the body, which may be faintly hinted by Hawthorne:  
  New honours come upon him 
 Like our strange garments, cleave not to their mould  
 But with the aid of use.  
(I. iii. 144.2-146.1)  
 
Hawthorne captures the suffocating, Macbeth-like alien self with the intimacy of a 
habit that has become second nature. Like his unnamed narrator’s relationship with 
Monsieur du Mirroir, Wakefield is trapped within a familiar abyss.  
Like Macbeth’s murder – with its violation of hospitality to a guest – 
Wakefield commits an act, albeit passive, of violence against the “hearth” and it 
condemns him to a terrible spiritual exile: “he was, we may figuratively say, always 
beside his wife and at his hearth, yet must never feel the warmth of the one nor the 
affection of the other.” As Macbeth cries:  
And that which should accompany old age, 
As honour, love, obedience, troops of friends, 	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264 "mould | mold, v.1". OED Online. March 2014. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/122813?rskey=vGC6hc&result=7 (accessed April 13, 
2014). 
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I must not look to have; but, in their stead, 
Curses, not loud, but deep, mouth-honour, breath 
Which the poor heart would fain deny and dare not.  
(V. ii. 24-7)  
 
While Wakefield’s “transformation” borrows the sense of alienation evoked by 
Macbeth’s “depraved” imagination, it is also quite distinct. It is a form of the asocial 
possibilities of the private self that would have been inconceivable to Shakespeare. 
For what is so haunting is Wakefield’s very mundaneness – the ordinariness of his 
“morbid vanity.” He doesn’t possess an active, but a “sluggish temperament.” Yet 
Wakefield’s solipsistic act seems to produce a void within the “sphere of creatures 
and circumstances” in which he is the “central object” that secures his “doom” and 
transforms him into a kind of subhuman creature:   
He is meagre; his low and narrow forehead is deeply wrinkled; his eyes, small 
and lustreless, sometimes wander apprehensively about him, but oftener 
seem to look inward. He bends his head, and moves with an indescribable 
obliquity of gait, as if unwilling to display his full front to the world.  
 
For Macbeth to become doomed to a horrific isolation of spirit, he must murder a 
king. Wakefield simply moves across the street. The contrast couldn’t be more 
profound, yet Wakefield is also a figure of the pathological imagination. Wakefield’s 
“low and narrow forehead” and “eyes, small and lustreless,” his “obliquity of gait,” 
suggest almost a clinical description of idiocy and degradation supposed, at the time, 
to be caused by excessive masturbation. As Graham observes in his Lectures on 
Chastity:  
[T]he wretched transgressor [masturbator] sinks into a miserable fatuity, and 
finally becomes a confirmed and degraded idiot, whose deeply sunken and 
vacant glossy eye, and livid, shrivelled countenance . . . emanciated, and 
dwarfish, and crooked body, and almost hairless head . . . denote a 
premature old age a blighted body and a ruined soul !265 
 
Hawthorne’s depiction of Wakefield as “bend[ing] his head” with an 	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“apprehensiveness about him” . . . “as if unwilling to display his full front to the 
world” is also echoed in the anti-masturbation literature. The “masturbator,” we are 
told, is “timid, afraid of his own shadow, uncertain” . . . his “walk” is not “erect or 
dignified,” but in a “diminutive, cringing, sycophantic, inferior, mean, debased 
manner.”266  
Hawthorne’s hint of Macbeth as an abject portrait of the artist transfigured 
by degenerative masturbatory illness – is startling. Wakefield as Macbeth becomes 
so emptied of tragic stature that he becomes a symbol of the abjection of the urban 
antebellum self with its combination of mundaneness and the dreadful terrors of the 
perverse sexual imagination.267 
 
 
THE CRYSTAL OF DELICATE SENSUALITY  
 
The Scarlet Letter is Hawthorne’s most sophisticated treatment of the perverse 
Shakespearean imagination. The Shakespeare play that dominates the novel’s 
landscape is Macbeth, but Hamlet also has powerful reverberations, as we will see. 
These allusions are mediated through Hawthorne’s vision of the pathologized 
imagination.  
This is explicitly worked up in the culminating scene of Dimmesdale’s 
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Election Sermon as a vision in which the story of the perverse imagination also 
becomes a national myth. As we saw in Whitman, the perverse is precisely what 
threatens America’s “high and glorious destiny.” Not surprisingly, it is Hawthorne’s 
explicit treatment of the moral dilemmas associated with the perverse imagination in 
The Scarlet Letter that first caused the guardians of public virtue to become alarmed. 
In an astonishingly perceptive review, Arthur Cleveland Coxe, for The Church Review, 
accuses Hawthorne of sympathizing with the very diseased and licentious 
imagination that he purported to explore psychologically:  
The language of our author, like patent blacking, “would not soil the whitest 
linen,” and yet the composition itself, would suffice, if well laid on, to 
Ethiopize the snowiest conscience that ever sat like a swan upon that mirror 
of heaven, a Christian maiden’s imagination.”268  
He further charges:   
and damsels who shrink at reading of the Decalogue, would probably 
luxuriate in bathing their imagination in the crystal of its delicate 
sensuality.269 
 
Hawthorne’s prose appears like “crystal” water, but it conceals a  “delicate 
sensuality” that supposedly corrupts like the “Ethiop.” Coxe’s racist rhetoric aside, 
his criticism may well have been deeply embarrassing for Hawthorne. For Coxe 
detects precisely what, as we have discovered, Hawthorne himself felt was the 
morally suspect and potentially pathological character of his own imagination. The 
Scarlet Letter is Hawthorne’s most serious and sustained treatment of this subject.  
For Hawthorne foregrounds the pathological nature of Dimmesdale’s 
imagination in clinical terms:  
Wherever there is a heart and an intellect, the diseases of the physical frame 
are tinged with the peculiarities of these. In Arthur Dimmesdale, thought and 
imagination were so active, and sensibility so intense, that the bodily infirmity 
would be likely to have its groundwork there. 
                  (italics added, pg. 83)  	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In Dimmesdale, “bodily infirmity” has its very “groundwork” in “intense” “thought 
and imagination.” Chillingworth, the professional doctor, also opines that 
Dimmesdale, “of all men whom I have known, [is] he whose body is the closest 
conjoined, and imbued, and identified, so to speak, with the spirit whereof it is the 
instrument” (pg. 91). As we have seen, this is perfectly consistent with the psychiatric 
attitude of Hawthorne’s day.270 In a typical opinion by William Sweetser in Mental 
Hygiene, a self-help book intended for a popular audience, published in the same year 
as The Scarlet Letter (1850), the sensitive and studious “sensibility” exemplified here by 
Dimmesdale is pathologized.271 Sweetser’s Mental Hygiene is particularly useful not 
only because of the date of its publication, but because the book shared some of 
Hawthorne’s didactic purpose: it is intended to bridge the gap between psychiatry 
(“mental hygiene”) and the wider public – with a dose of moral instruction thrown 
in. As such, it is written in a literary style. Like the asylum superintendents, 
Sweetser’s book is peppered with allusions to Shakespeare and his chapter on the 
“Moral and Physical Disorder” of “The Imagination”272 is specifically indebted to 
Shakespeare. While there is no evidence that Hawthorne read Sweetser, they both 
share the same fusion of moral philosophy for the common reader, psychiatric 
reasoning, and Shakespeare allusion.  
In his chapter on the “Moral and Physical Disorder” of “The Imagination,” 
Sweetser affirms a dynamic that we have seen before. The diseased imagination 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 “To be nervous in the nineteenth century was therefore more than a passing description 
of individual personality; rather, nervousness characterized the basic psychological 
assumption of the century. Because the nervous system united the body together, from the 
brain all the way to the toes, the cultural impact of the nerves proved both physical and 
metaphysical.”  Justine S. Murison, The Politics of Anxiety in Nineteenth-century American Literature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pg. 2. 
271 William Sweetser, Mental Hygiene, Or, An Examination of the Intellect and Passions: Designed to 
Illustrate Their Influence on Health and the Duration of Life (New-York: Langley, 1843).  
272 Ibid., pp. 362-377. 
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thwarts the “intention of nature” by “revers”[ing] “the order of things.” 273 Sweetser 
goes farther, though – as Hawthorne would. For he specifically connects this to the 
“long habits of solitary reflection” characteristic of Dimmesdale. Sweetser quotes the 
sexual outlaw, Byron’s Manfred, to describe the dangerously asocial lack of 
“sympathy” that goes hand in hand with the perverse imagination:  
    Though I wore the form,  
 I had no sympathy with breathing flesh.  
 My joy was in the wilderness – to breathe  
 The difficulty air of the iced mountain's top . . .274  
 (italics added)  
 
Just prior to suggesting the generally pathological character of the Byronic hero, 
Sweetser presents Exhibit A of the “unhealthy character of the imagination”: a vivid 
portrait of the early life of Rousseau, made notorious in the history of the pathology 
of masturbation for his account of “the dangerous supplement” in his Confessions 
(1782).275 Rousseau, for Sweetser, is an example of the “morbid excess of sensibility” 
and its “unhappy nervous infirmities.” (pg. 364) Though Sweetser, of course, could 
never have known about Hawthorne’s novel, Rousseau and Dimmesdale are clearly 
deviants of a very distinct psychiatric type. 
Hawthorne, in his description of Dimmesdale, also observes his dubious habit 
of sitting in his solitary “close and stifled study” reading books:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 “I had learned to use that dangerous substitution [“supplément”] which defrauds nature 
and saves young men of my temperament from many disorders, but at the expense of their 
health, their strength, and sometimes their life itself. This vice, so congenial to shame and 
timidity is, in addition, very attractive to those of a lively imagination, for it places at their 
disposal, as it were, the whole of the other sex, and makes a lovely woman that tempts them 
serve their desires without needing to obtain her consent. Seduced by this baneful 
advantage, I set about destroying the good constitution with which nature had provided 
me.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Angela Scholar, and Patrick Coleman, Confessions (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), pg. 106. See also “Once he knows this dangerous 
supplement, he is lost. From then on he will always have an enervated body and heart. He 
will suffer until his death the sad effects of this habit, the most fatal to which a man can be 
subjected.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile: Or, On Education, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: 
Basic Books, 1979), pg. 334.  
274 Quoted in Sweetser, pg. 365.  
275 Laqueur, pp. 42-44.  
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. . . where his life was wasting itself away, amid lamp-light, or obstructed day-
beams, and the musty fragrance, be it sensual or moral, that exhales from 
books.  
          (pg. 83) 
With characteristic ambiguity, Hawthorne insinuates, without stating certainly, that 
the “musty fragrance” that “exhales” from those books might be “sensual” and, 
therefore, a contributing factor in Dimmesdale’s “bodily infirmity.” Of course, 
Hawthorne also leaves unclear the precise nature of Dimmesdale’s reading – though 
he certainly would not have possessed novels. The same suspicion of “sensual” 
gratification, however, is at work in Sweetser’s more unambiguous remarks on 
Rousseau’s passion “in his youth” for “read[ing]” “novels”:  
In sensitive and secluded individuals, this sort of reading, when carried to 
excess, has sometimes so wrought upon and disturbed the fancy as to bring 
on actual insanity . . . [it] incites in the mind a precocious activity and 
premature desires, with the imagination of excellences never to be realized; 
276 
Sweetser’s victims of pathological reading, “sensitive and secluded” . . . 
“individuals” prone to a “disturbed fancy,” are quite similar to the “morbidly self-
contemplative” Dimmesdale. Sweetser even goes on to inveigh against the very 
tradition of “romance” that Hawthorne self-consciously writes in, evoking precisely 
the moral reservations and anxieties we discovered Hawthorne had about his own 
novel.  He associates them, among other things, with “Erotic melancholy” and 
“monomania.”277 
As is typical of the literature by psychiatrists and asylum superintendents in 
America at this time, Sweetser goes on not to pathologize Shakespeare himself, but 
to appeal to him as an authority on the diseased imagination: “Shakespeare,” 
Sweetser affirms, as if Shakespeare were a psychiatrist and not a dramatic artist, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 Sweetser, pg. 366.  
277 Ibid.  
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“classes all lovers with lunatics.” He then quotes Theseus’s oft-cited passage from A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream on “The lunatic, the lover, and the poet” of “imagination all 
compact.” (MND. V. i. 7-8) Like the psychiatrists, Hawthorne, as we have seen, can 
regard Shakespeare as a source of moral authority, but more persistently, the plays 
themselves evoke dangerous, amoral sexual desires and anxieties.   
 
 
FORBIDDEN SYMPATHIES 
 
If Dimmesdale possesses an “active” . . . “imagination,” Hester Prynne 
possesses a “rich, voluptuous,” “abundant,” “Oriental”  imagination, with a “taste 
for the gorgeously beautiful.” She uses this in the “exquisite productions of her 
needle” which fetch high prices among the townsfolk who otherwise scorn her for 
the ignominy of her disgraceful letter (pg. 58). This imagination, Hawthorne hints, is 
also diseased by “the red ignominy” which perverts her gift into a “morbid 
ingenuity” intent upon turning her daughter’s dress into “the scarlet letter in 
another form” (pg. 69).  
Like Wakefield’s betrayal of hearth and home, Hester’s letter, the visible 
symbol of her sexual transgression, turns her into a living “ghost” and exiles her 
from the sympathy of human kind:  
She stood apart from mortal interests, yet close beside them, like a ghost that 
revisits the familiar fireside, and can no longer make itself seen or felt; no more 
smile with the household joy, nor mourn with the kindred sorrow; or, should it 
succeed in manifesting its forbidden sympathy, awakening only terror and 
horrible repugnance.  
 (pg. 59) 
	   135	  
Contrary to Adam Smith’s optimistic view of the moral correction that the 
withdrawal of sympathy affords, exile makes Hester vulnerable to a world of 
“forbidden sympathy.” It leads her inexorably towards an amoral, deviant 
“sympathetic knowledge of the hidden sin in other hearts”:  
Sometimes, the red infamy upon her breast would give a sympathetic throb, as 
she passed near a venerable minister or magistrate, the model of piety and 
justice, to whom that age of antique reverence looked up, as to a mortal man 
in fellowship with angels. "What evil thing is at hand?" would Hester say to 
herself.  
            (pg. 60)  
 
Like the protagonist from Hawthorne’s great short-story, “Young Goodman 
Brown,” who is led by the devil into the forest, there to discover the pillars of his 
community, “the minister,” “good old Deacon Gookin,” and even “Goody Cloyse,” 
. . . “the old woman who taught [him his] catechism,” gathered for a black mass, 
Hester’s “sympathetic knowledge” gives her access to a community, each of whose 
members is only more intensely isolated for their recognition of one another.278 
Without the positive sympathy cultivated, Hawthorne suggests, by social middle-
class domestic life, Hester’s diseased imagination feeds upon dangerous ideas and, 
like the ironically mentioned “Sainted Anne Hutchinson,”  whom Hawthorne 
describes in a separate essay as “a woman of extraordinary talent  and strong 
imagination” . . . who “showed symptoms of irregular and daring thought” and 
expressed “strange and dangerous opinions,” Hester is plunged into a perverse 
“labyrinth of mind”:279  
Thus, Hester Prynne, whose heart had lost its regular and healthy throb, 
wandered without clew in the dark labyrinth of mind; now turned aside an 
insurmountable precipice; now startling back from a deep chasm. There was 
wild and ghastly scenery around her, and a home and comfort nowhere.             
           (pg. 108) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 Hawthorne, Tales, pg. 286.  
279 “Mrs. Hutchinson” in Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, pg. 168.  
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The “wild and ghastly scenery” of Hester’s imagination recalls the Byronic hero, 
Manfred, who “had no sympathy with breathing flesh,” but whose “joy was in the 
wilderness.” For Hawthorne, this Gothic internal landscape, in which “home and 
comfort” is “nowhere,” gives rise to an unnaturally subversive consciousness:  
In her lonesome cottage, by the sea-shore, thoughts visited her, such as dared 
to enter no other dwelling in New England; shadowy guests, that would have 
been as perilous as demons to their entertainer, could they have been seen so 
much as knocking at her door.  
(pp. 107-108) 
While Lady Macbeth pleads perversely to “you spirits that tend on mortal thoughts” 
to “unsex me here;” (I. v. 38-39) and, we recall, Coleridge referred to the witches 
themselves as the “fearfully anomalous of physical nature” . . . “without sex or 
kin,”280 Hester involuntarily loses what Hawthorne regards as her womanhood to 
“forbidden sympathies” that arise from the scarlet letter’s “revelations”: “some 
attribute had departed from her, the permanence of which had been essential to 
keep her a woman” (pg. 107).  
Dimmesdale too, possesses forbidden sympathies – most notably with the 
“weird old gentlewoman,” (pg. 154) Mistress Hibbins, the sister of Governor 
Bellingham, who, like the Weird Sisters in Macbeth seems to possess a bewildering 
but familiar and intimate connection with him. His encounter with her, as we find, 
“did but show [his] sympathy and fellowship with wicked mortals and the world of 
perverted spirits” (pg. 142). Like Hester, though, it is precisely through his forbidden 
sympathies that Dimmesdale’s pathological imagination produces such eloquence 
that he becomes famous throughout New England:  
But this very burden it was, that gave him sympathies so intimate with the sinful 
brotherhood of mankind; so that his heart vibrated in unison with theirs, and 
received their pain into itself, and sent its own throb of pain through a 
thousand other hearts, in gushes of sad, persuasive eloquence.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 Coleridge, Lectures.  
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(pg. 94, italics added)  
 
Of course, the most perverse forbidden sympathy of all is exhibited by Roger 
Chillingworth – who uses his illicit sympathy with Hester’s sexual transgression as a 
sort of extra-sensory-perception in order to find and torment Dimmesdale for seven 
years:  
“There is a sympathy that will make me conscious of him. I shall see him 
tremble. I shall feel myself shudder, suddenly and unawares. Sooner or later, 
he must needs be mine!” 
(p. 54, italics added)  
 
As Frederick Crews has observed, Chillingworth possesses Iago-like traits: “physical 
deformity,” “personal inferiority and impotence,” deviant “sexuality,” and 
“perverted craving for knowledge.” Moreover, Chillingworth’s unnatural 
“sympathy” for Dimmesdale possesses some of the homoerotic undertones of the 
diabolical marriage between Iago and Othello, consummated by Othello’s murder 
of Desdemona.281 
Underpinning this demonic “reign of fancy” with its amoral “forbidden 
sympathy,” that provides preternatural stimulus, but never gives “comfort,” is an 
Augustinian metaphysics of privative evil. For Hester’s secret dissident politics, 
Dimmesdale’s hypocritical denial of his act of adultery with Hester, and 
Chillingworth’s investigation into the “the interior” of Dimmesdale’s “heart,” gives 
rise to a universe that is founded upon nothingness. As the narrator explains, 
sounding both like a theologian and also like a 19th century psychiatrist: “It is the 
unspeakable misery of a life so false as his, that it steals the pith and substance.” (pg. 
97) He goes on to affirm even more unequivocally:  
To the untrue man, the whole universe is false, – it is impalpable, – it shrinks 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 Fredrick C. Crews, “The Ruined Wall,” ed. Rita K. Gollin, in The Scarlet Letter: Complete 
Text With Introduction, Historical Contexts, Critical Essays (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002), pg. 
317.  
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to nothing within his grasp. And he himself, in so far as he shows himself in a 
false light, becomes a shadow, or, indeed, ceases to exist.  
(pg. 97)  
 
Dimmesdale, whose name recalls a Dim Dale, the Valley of the Shadow of Death, 
has himself become “a shadow” . . . has “ceased to exist.” He is Hawthorne’s most 
chilling figure for what Freud would call the Death Drive. As Chillingworth 
observes of Hester – in a remark applicable to Dimmesdale too: they “are here 
wandering together in this gloomy maze of evil,” (p. 113) and there seems no escape. 
As such, the hope of the novel depends upon the socialization of Pearl, the “elf 
child,” who is born of Hester and Dimmesdale’s sin. As Hester observes, “she is the 
scarlet letter, only capable of being loved, and so endowed with a million-fold the 
power of retribution for my sin” (p. 76).  
Unlike Hester, whose womanhood has become corrupted by her “forbidden 
sympathies” with demonic powers, Pearl has the capacity to become “softened and 
subdued, and made capable of a woman’s gentle happiness” (p. 165). What hangs in 
the balance is either the victory of the demonic world of Macbeth or the triumphant 
world of Protestant New England with its optimistic destiny.   
Yet this grand overarching narrative is, of course, belied by the ambiguity of 
the novel’s discourse on sympathy. For it is Hester’s very curse to know the “the 
hidden sin in other hearts” that reveals the complacency and hypocrisy of the 
supposedly pious townsfolk who shun her. Like Reverend Hooper in “The 
Minister’s Black Veil,” it is Hester’s very forbidden sympathy which makes her 
indispensible to those suffering from a private grief that they cannot share with 
others, and called for by the sick and the dying: for those in anguish, “the scarlet 
letter had the effect of the cross on a nun's bosom” (p. 106). More, Hawthorne’s very 
emphasis on a woman finding her true place at the center of the New England 
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hearth and home, to develop her “sympathies,” undermines the narrative’s claim for 
eternal verity. It also historicizes the tale as a drama in which a specific kind of view 
of middle class domesticity is destined to triumph. All of this powerfully undercuts 
the simple Augustinian dichotomy that Hawthorne, along with 19th century 
psychiatrists propounded – which equated asocial imagination with “non-being” 
(privative evil) and social emotion with “Being.”282 
Moreover, Hawthorne qualifies Hester’s “sin” of adultery (the word is, of 
course, famously never used in the novel) by making it clear that: 1) Chillingworth is 
elderly and deformed by a hunch-back, and Hester is very young, when they are 
married; 2) Hester is forced into the marriage against her will; 3) Hester is honest 
with Dimmesdale, telling him from the start that she never loved him; 4) there had 
been no word from Chillingworth for two years as Hester waited for him to follow 
her on the journey from England to Massachusetts, and it was presumed that 
Hester’s husband, during the time of her affair, “may be at the bottom of the sea” 
(p. 46); 5) the punishment of wearing the letter is bestowed by a grim and draconian 
Puritan law.   
This foregrounds the question as to whether the letter itself – with the 
attendant isolation, asocial sympathy, and perverse imagination, is not merely a 
social construct. With this in mind, I find Michael Pringle’s Foucauldian reading, 
“The Scarlet Lever: Hester’s Civil Disobedience,” very persuasive; I also am 
mindful that the “lever” of power exerted to punish Hester does not merely have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 “Hester's strange demonic musings produce no trace on her saintly person; Dimmesdale 
suffers from an inner malaise which is never fully externalized; Chillingworth, 
demonstrating the obverse of this process, becomes externally the very type of caricature of 
revenge, yet his motivation may be pure. The darkest, most disturbing, insight in the book, 
both for the reader and for the text, is that there may be 'no' law of connection between 
outer and inner worlds." Norman Bryson, "Hawthorne's Illegible Letter," ed. Harold 
Bloom, in Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1986), 
pg. 93. 
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one handle. Moreover, texts are never reducible to a single authorial narrative – 
especially not one as polyvalent as The Scarlet Letter. However, it is clear to me that, 
despite its complexity, The Scarlet Letter does possess, as Sacvan Bercovitch argues in 
The Office of the Scarlet Letter, a unifying narrative, what Bercovitch calls “the devious 
pattern of national history,”283 and that is especially pertinent to the discourse of the 
Shakespearean perverse. As I will argue, though, Shakespearean perversity is not so 
easily dispelled – and the character upon whom the novel’s narrative of redemption 
most hinges, Pearl, acts as an “infant pestilence,” carrying dissident Shakespearean 
themes that Hawthorne seeks to repress.  
The predominant way that moral conflict is framed in The Scarlet Letter is 
through the Pauline wayward will – which would become so important in 
Augustine. The passage of particular importance is (KJ) Romans 7:19:    
For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do. 
Now if I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth 
in me.284 
 
In Paul’s account the “sin that dwelleth in me” constitutes another alternate will – 
one that seeks to undermine the sovereign will. It is this will that possesses, in 
Hawthorne’s account, the “forbidden sympathies” that trap the wayward soul 
deeper and deeper into its “labyrinth.” The ultimate litmus test of this occurs at the 
novel’s pivotal moment in the forest when Dimmesdale and Hester move from 
merely suffering the consequences of their transgression towards embracing it – with 
Hester’s famous blasphemous declaration: "What we did had a consecration of its 
own. We felt it so! We said so to each other! Hast thou forgotten it?" (p. 126). This 
manifestation of a sin, not impetuous, but freely chosen by consent to the sinful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 Sacvan Bercovitch, The Office of the Scarlet Letter (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1991), pg. 45.  
284 Bruce Manning. Metzger, The Holy Bible: Containing the Old and New Testaments (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989).  
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“will,” hauntingly echoes “Wakefield.” We recall that in “Wakefield” it is “the 
magic of a single night” that “wrought” a “transformation”: “The minister's own 
will, and Hester's will, and the fate that grew between them, had wrought this 
transformation” (p. 138, italics added).  
 This threshold moment, like Macbeth’s murder of Duncan and Wakefield’s 
betrayal of hearth and home, causes an upheaval within Dimmesdale that strongly 
mirrors that in Macbeth:  
Before Mr. Dimmesdale reached home, his inner man gave him other 
evidences of a revolution in the sphere of thought and feeling. In truth, 
nothing short of a total change of dynasty and moral code, in that interior kingdom, was 
adequate to account for the impulses now communicated to the unfortunate 
and startled minister. At every step he was incited to do some strange, wild, 
wicked thing or other, with a sense that it would be at once involuntary and 
intentional; in spite of himself, yet growing out of a profounder self than that 
which opposed the impulse. For instance, he met one of his own deacons. 
         (italics added, pp. 138-139)  
 
The verbal echo is from Brutus in Julius Caesar when he is contemplating the 
conspiracy to murder Caesar:  
The genius and the mortal instruments 
Are then in council; and the state of man, 
Like to a little kingdom, suffers then  
The nature of an insurrection.  
(II. i. 67-70)  
 
The “state of man, / Like to a little kingdom” suffering “an insurrection” is very 
similar to Hawthorne’s “interior kingdom” in which a “total change of dynasty and 
moral code” takes place. Julius Caesar is a play that, like The Scarlet Letter, is deeply 
concerned with the wayward will bewildered by “error” into choosing “things that 
are not.” In Julius Caesar, of course, it is the treasonous murder of Caesar that 
Messala laments: 
O hateful Error, Melancholy's child,  
Why dost thou show to the apt thoughts of men 
The Things that are not? O error, soon conceived,  
Thou never com'st unto a happy birth,  
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But kill'st the mother that engendered thee.  
(italics added, V. iii. 66-71)  
 
Shakespeare picks up the same theme in Macbeth and uses it to convey the Pauline 
wayward will that so transfixed Hawthorne in a way that was much more 
psychologically penetrating. There is no simple declaration, for example, of the 
terrible consequences of the wayward will. Instead, when Macbeth meets Banquo, 
who compliments him for being an ideal host to Duncan, and brings a “diamond” 
from the king as a token of his “measureless content,” he stumbles in his speech, 
inadvertently betraying his murderous intentions:   
  Being unprepared 
 Our will became the servant of defect 
 Which else should free have wrought.  
         (italics added, II. i. 17.2-19.1) 
 
Macbeth wants to apologize for his hasty preparations on behalf of Duncan, but 
what he inadvertently reveals is that his “will” has become “the servant of defect.” 
He is in thrall to the error of the wayward will. Had he chosen, like Banquo, when 
he himself had indirectly tempted his friend with complicity in the murder of 
Duncan, to “lose none” (“honour”) “in seeking to augment it,” (II. i. 25-28)  
Macbeth would also have kept his “bosom franchised and allegiance clear.”  
Curiously, the Pauline wayward will is also, in Shakespeare, coupled with 
precisely the logic of bottomless solipsism that we find in Hawthorne and the 
psychiatric literature about masturbation of the time. Sweetser, as we have 
discovered, evokes Rousseau’s childhood which the philosopher recounted in his 
autobiographical Confessions. Though Sweetser doesn’t mention it directly, his 
reference to “the unhealthy character of” Rousseau’s “imagination,” his compulsive 
novel reading, his “morbid excess of sensibility,” and his “unhappy nervous 
infirmities,” evokes the symptoms of what Rousseau called “the dangerous 
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supplement.” What makes “the dangerous supplement” so terrible is not merely its 
false epistemology, but the logic whereby an imaginary romantic object 
“supplements” a real one.285 
Such a supplement is, as Banquo understands, a form of “augment”[tation] 
that causes a spiral of “los”[ing] even as it seeks to gain. As the narrator of 
Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece observes:  
 And this ambitious foul infirmity  
In having much torments us with defect 
The thing we have, and all for want of wit 
Make something nothing by augmenting it.  
(italics added, 150-154)   
 
The “defect” of perpetual “augment”[tation] is that it becomes a kind of 
preternatural machine that converts “something” into “nothing.” It is this “nothing” 
that is converted by the antebellum democratic subject, into a metaphor for the 
boundless amoral horrors of the pathological masturbatory imagination.  
             Though Dimmesdale’s transgression is clearly adultery, he possesses much 
in common with the subjectivity of the pathological Jacksonian masturbator. The 
oath which has consecrated Dimmesdale’s “sympathy and fellowship” with 
“perverted spirits,” is a revelation of this amoral imagination and the illicit sympathy 
that has developed throughout the novel.  
             To return to Macbeth, observe, for example, the way that Hawthorne’s 
description of Dimmesdale’s “interior kingdom” with its “change of dynasty,” 
echoes Macbeth’s soliloquy upon the “supernatural soliciting” of the witches, with 
its combination of active and passive verbs:  
   If good, why do I yield to that suggestion 
 Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair,  
 And make my seated heart knock at my ribs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 Kant argues that the masturbator, “himself creates its [desire’s] object. For in this way 
the imagination brings forth an appetite contrary to nature’s purpose.” Quoted in Laqueur, 
pg. 214.  
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 Against the use of nature? Present fears 
 Are less than horrible imaginings.  
 My thought, whose murder yet is but fantastical 
 Shakes so my single state of man 
 That function is smothered in surmise, 
 And nothing is but what is not.  
 (I. iii. 133-140)  
 
Whereas Macbeth cries out in genuine surprise at his erring will, “Why do I yield to 
that suggestion / Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair,” Dimmesdale cries, 
"What is it that haunts and tempts me thus?" (p. 140). Later, upon meeting the 
witch, Mistress Hibbins, Dimmesdale is tempted to destroy the faith of an elderly 
widow with a “poisonous infusion” of “a brief, pithy,” . . . “unanswerable argument 
against the immortality of the human soul;” he is tempted to sew a “germ of evil” in 
the bosom of a “maiden newly won” to the faith;” and he has the irrepressible urge 
to share “heaven-defying oaths” with “dissolute sailors” (pp. 139-140). After he 
successfully navigates these freakish impulses, Dimmesdale encounters the witch, 
Mistress Hibbins, who possesses a familiar and disturbing intimacy with him. He 
asks himself, in wonder, "have I then sold myself,” . . . "to the fiend whom, if men 
say true, this yellow-starched and velveted old hag has chosen for her prince and 
master?" (pp. 141). As admittedly tame as Dimmesdale’s temptations seem in 
comparison with Macbeth’s, his alien will acts precisely like Macbeth’s: “growing 
out of a profounder self than that which opposed the impulse” (pg. 139). As the 
theologians and psychiatrists of the 19th century argued, Macbeth’s commitment to 
the perverse imagination is based upon a false epistemology. He has traded “what is 
not” for what “is.” More, Dimmesdale’s “change of dynasty and moral code” is “at 
once involuntary and intentional.”  
Contrary to Shakespeare’s Macbeth, though - notwithstanding Dimmesdale’s 
death on the scaffold – The Scarlet Letter  is not intended to be a tragedy. Hawthorne, 
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I would argue, self-consciously attempts to correct Macbeth’s spiral into nothingness 
by revealing the positive triumph of the Christian will over the wayward and 
defective one. Notice, for example, that Dimmesdale, in his speech on the scaffold 
not only attempts to fit his suffering from tragedy into a conversion narrative, but his 
last words are a relinquishment of his own will to God’s: “Had either of these 
agonies been wanting, I had been lost for ever! Praised be his name! His will be done! 
Farewell!" (p. 162).    
It is Dimmesdale’s final “His will be done! Farewell!” that is, in my view, 
despite the undoubted egotism that Agnes McNeill Donohue believes damns him, 
for Hawthorne, the seal of his salvation.286 As we will see later, this triumph is 
profoundly qualified by the Shakespearean perverse. Hester too, in her choice to 
return, “of her own free will,” to the location of her suffering and her punishment, 
and to “resume[]  the symbol of which we have related so dark a tale,” strongly 
suggests the ultimate redemption of her sin.  
It is my view, though, that Macbeth’s powerful negativity not only haunts the 
language of sexual pathology in The Scarlet Letter, but that it presented for Hawthorne 
– in the context of the sexual panic of his time – an uncanny image of the 
unredeemed perverse imagination. This posed a direct threat to the vision of a 
redeemed New England that so preoccupied Hawthorne. The Scarlet Letter was 
Hawthorne’s attempt to dispel this dystopian nightmare.  
 
 
WITCHCRAFT IN THE BEAST  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 “To presume knowledge of election is what Calvin called the ‘immense abyss’.” Agnes 
McNeill. Donohue, Hawthorne: Calvin's Ironic Stepchild (Kent, OH: Kent State University 
Press, 1985), pg. 60.  
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In order, though, to get a sense of the scope and depth of the Shakespearean 
association with Hawthorne’s national vision, we will have to take a brief detour to 
his early story, “The Maypole of Merry Mount,” in which a confrontation between 
America’s national destiny and Shakespeare’s perverse Old England is explicitly 
staged.  
In “May-Pole” (as it shall be referred to henceforward) Hawthorne 
dramatizes a conflict between an early group of American colonists, whose “chief” 
symbol is the “Maypole” celebrations of “merry old England”, and a group of 
Puritans led by the iron-fisted “zealot” Endicott. Just as in The Scarlet Letter, 
Hawthorne’s narrator here states quite explicitly that: “[t]he future complexion of 
New England was involved in this important quarrel”:  
Should the grizzly saints establish their jurisdiction over the gay sinners, then 
would their spirits darken all the clime, and make it a land of clouded 
visages, of hard toil, of sermon and psalm forever. But should the banner 
staff of Merry Mount be fortunate, sunshine would break upon the hills, and 
flowers would beautify the forest, and late posterity do homage to the 
Maypole.287  
(p. 366) 
 
Despite Hawthorne’s carefully balanced ironic treatment, reminiscent of The Scarlet 
Letter, offsetting the humorless cruelty of “these grim Puritans” with the feckless 
“light spirits” of the Merry Mount colony, who had “sworn allegiance to the May 
Pole,” Hawthorne structures the tale as an allegory of lost innocence, through the 
pastoral wedding of the Lord and Lady of the May Pole, ruined by the sad and 
inexorable revelations of maturity, represented by the unprovoked Puritan attack 
upon the colony in the midst of their revelry:   
There they stood, in the first hour of wedlock, while the idle pleasures, of 
which their companions were the emblems, had given place to the sternest 
cares of life, personified by the dark Puritans.  
(p. 369)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 Hawthorne, Tales. 
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The narrator’s uncanny irony seems to offset the position of the Puritans and the 
Merry Mount colonists against one another, while refusing himself to take sides. 
However, such a structure, as Sacvan Bercovitch observes, in fact closes off the 
narrative, leading the reader to view the Puritan usurpation of Merry Mount as 
inevitable. More, the Merry Mount colonists are explicitly associated with 
Shakespeare’s pastoral England, best evoked in A Midsummer Night’s Dream – which is 
alluded to throughout. The Merry Mount colony, the narrator informs us, was a 
place where “Erring Thought and perverted Wisdom were made to put on masques 
and play the fool”:  
They gathered followers from all that giddy tribe whose whole life is like the 
festal days of soberer men. In their train were minstrels, not unknown in 
London streets: wandering players, whose theatres had been the halls of 
noblemen; mummers, rope-dancers, and mountebanks, who would long be 
missed at wakes, church ales, and fairs; in a word, mirth makers of every 
sort, such as abounded in that age, but now began to be discountenanced by 
the rapid growth of Puritanism.  
(p. 364)  
 
In Hawthorne’s story, Merry Mount specifically singles out “wandering players, 
whose theaters had been the halls of noblemen” along with the “mummers, rope-
dancers, and mountebanks.” Earlier, we hear that the revelers possess a “dreamlike 
smile” amidst a “world of toil and care.”  
Although Hawthorne cites the “curious history of the early settlement of 
Mount Wollaston, or Merry Mount” as the origin of his story, he also makes 
reference to Joseph Strutt’s Book of English Sports and Pastimes (p. 360). 288 Strutt’s 
account of the Maypole celebration features a famous and extended quote from 
Philip Stubbes’ damning critique of the annual May Day celebrations in the Anatomy 
of Abuses (1583). Stubbes’ diatribe, is, of course, also a diatribe against the theaters – 
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including what would be, just a few years later, Shakespeare’s – and it is now 
traditionally evoked to give a broader context for Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream. It is difficult not to see Stubbes’ vivid denunciation as providing the true 
inspiration for Hawthorne’s story. Here is the account Hawthorne would have read:   
. . . Oxen drawe home this May-pole (this stinking Idol rather) which is 
covered all ouer with flowres, and herbs bound round about with strings 
from the top to the bottome, and sometime painted with variable colours, 
with two or three hundred men following it with great devotion. And thus 
being dressed up with handkerchiefs and flags hovering on the top, they 
strew the ground rounde about, binde green boughes about it, set up 
summer bowers and arbors hard by it. And then fall they to dancing about it 
like as the heathen people did at the dedication of the Idols. I have heard it 
crediblie reported, by men of great credite, and reputation, that of fourtie, 
threescore, of an hundred maids going to the wood, there have scarcely a 
third part of them returned home againe ‘as they went’. 289 290[sic, originally 
“undefiled”]  
 
Stubbes’ characterization of the Mayday celebrations possesses precisely the 
combination of vivid, pastoral description combined with outraged moral 
indignation that characterizes Hawthorne’s story. The narrator calls the masked 
revelers, who are dressed like “beasts,” . . . “Gothic monsters”:   
These were Gothic monsters, though perhaps of Grecian ancestry. On the 
shoulders of a comely youth uprose the head and branching antlers of a stag; a 
second, human in all other points, had the grim visage of a wolf; a third, still 
with the trunk and limbs of a mortal man, showed the beard and horns of a 
venerable he-goat. There was the likeness of a bear erect, brute in all but his 
hind legs, which were adorned with pink silk stockings. And here again, almost 
as wondrous, stood a real bear of the dark forest, lending each of his fore paws 
to the grasp of a human hand, and as ready for the dance as any in that circle.  
             (pg. 361)  
 
Hawthorne’s explicit literary associations are not with Shakespeare, but with 
Milton’s Comus. Though Milton’s Comus includes a seductive necromancer 
accompanied by a “wild rout of Monsters, headed like sundry sorts of wild beasts,” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 Quoted in: Joseph Strutt, The Sports and Pastimes of the People of England (London: Methuen 
&, 1801), pp. 276-277.  
290 See original text for comparison: Stubbes, Phillip, Gervase Babington, Thomas 
Naogeorg, Barnabe Googe, and Frederick James Furnivall. Phillip Stubbes's Anatomy of the 
Abuses in England in Shakspere's Youth, A.D. 1583 .. London: Pub. for the New Shakspere 
Society, by N. Trübner &, 1877, pp. 148-149.  
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who tempt Lady with the sins of flesh – while she resists with virtuous reason. 
Milton’s Comus, though, does not quite fit the wild May-Day festival mood that the 
Puritans in Hawthorne’s story so object to.291 Hawthorne’s “monsters,” with human 
limbs and the heads of animals, distinctly recall the metamorphosis of Bottom, who 
possesses the legs of a human and the head of an ass, in A Midsummer Night’s Dream. 
However, there is a tone here, not of romantic comedy, but of satire and menace – 
which evokes tragic metamorphoses in Shakespeare, such as Othello’s “exchange 
me for a goat” (V. v. 136), or “A horned man’s a monster and a beast” (IV. i. 162). 
On the one hand, Shakespeare is distanced, associated with a pastoral “Old 
England” that is too naïve to survive the somber adulthood of the American 
republic; on the other hand, Shakespeare’s tragic transformations are an intimate 
and haunting threat. Though Hawthorne describes his Puritans as “zealots,” it is 
Shakespeare’s Old England that is associated with the “dream” of youthful illusions 
– that must be dispelled. This is captured in the moment the Puritans infiltrate to 
destroy the Maypole celebration:  
Their darksome figures [of the Puritans] were intermixed with the wild 
shapes of their foes, and made the scene a picture of the moment, when 
waking thoughts start up amid the scattered fantasies of a dream. 
 (p. 367, italics added)   
 
The Puritans who bestow “a small matter of stripes apiece” along with “further 
penalties such as branding and cropping the ears” (p. 368) upon the erring revelers 
suggest a grim reality far less threatening than the intensities suggested by 
“perverted wisdom” (pg. 364) and Shakespearean metamorphosis. Further, there is 
a strange parallel between the way that Hawthorne’s Endicott “assault[s] the 
hallowed Maypole” and the way that he assaults the flag of England in the later 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 John Milton et al., The Complete Poetry and Essential Prose of John Milton (New York: Modern 
Library, 2007), lines 92-93.  
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story, “Endicott and the Red Cross,” (the story in which we first glimpse the “young 
woman whose doom it was to wear the letter A on her breast,”):   
    “Officer, lower your banner!” said he. 
The officer obeyed; and, brandishing his sword, Endicott thrust it through 
the cloth, and, with his left hand, rent the Red Cross completely out of the 
banner. He then waved the tattered ensign above his head.  
(pg. 548)  
Endicott, in “Maypole” is even more violent:  
“And this dancing bear,” resumed the officer. “Must he share the stripes of 
his fellows?” 
“Shoot him through the head!” said the energetic Puritan. “I suspect 
witchcraft in the beast.” 
(pp. 368-369)  
 
For Hawthorne, it seems that the banishment of Old England – the England that he 
associated with the pastoral genre and the threatening permissiveness of 
Shakespeare’s world - was a germinal act of violence: it meant the creation of the 
republic. For it is Shakespeare’s England that is associated with that which must be 
repressed and distanced in order for America to be born – or, more broadly, for 
civilization itself to occur - but that desire is all the more omnipresent for being 
repressed.  
 
A PROPHESY OF DECAY  
If, in “May-Pole,” Hawthorne produced a legend that predicates America’s 
maturity upon its vanquishing of the Shakespearean perverse, he did so on a much 
grander scale in The Scarlet Letter. This is the purpose for Dimmesdale’s climactic 
Election Sermon and it is the reason why it is so important for the novel to exorcise 
the Shakespearean perverse. For, to put it bluntly, if Dimmesdale is a sexual pervert 
and if his offspring, Pearl, cannot be socialized, than the whole of New England’s 
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destiny is potentially heir, as we recall from Julius Caesar, to an “unhappy birth,” a 
demonic progeny that “kill’st the mother that engendered thee.” In The Scarlet Letter, 
recall, for example, that Dimmesdale “beheld,” on the night of Governor 
Winthrop’s death – which will provide the occasion for the election Election sermon 
for the new governor  – “the appearance of an immense letter, – A, – marked out in 
lines of dull red light” (the same “crimson” color reserved for an omen of 
“Pestilence”). Though the narrator ironically marks Dimmesdale’s “egotism,” the 
“portent” is also seen, the sexton observes, by the townspeople, who interpret it to 
mean “Angel.” The two potential futures for New England, angelic or demonic, 
hang in the balance.  
Here, we recall the anxieties voiced by Emerson and the sexual reformers. 
Recall, also Whitman’s unfortunate lines from By Blue Ontario’s Shore:  
I lead the present with friendly hand toward the future. 
Bravas to states whose semitic impulses send wholesome children to the next 
age!  
 
For it is not merely a metaphysical contagion, but a pathological one that 
Hawthorne fears. Sweetser, for example, subscribed to another common belief of 
the era, that mental illness could be transmitted to “Unborn Offspring” (xiv, Moral 
Hygiene). Hawthorne himself subscribed to this belief. Years after publishing The 
Scarlet Letter, when Hawthorne lived in England and visited an orphanage, he was 
horrified by the spectacle of a dying infant:  
The governor whispered me, apart, that, like nearly all the rest of them, it 
was the child of unhealthy parents. Ah, yes! There was the mischief. This 
spectral infant, a hideous mockery of the visible link which Love creates 
between man and woman, was born of disease and sin. Diseased Sin was its 
father, and Sinful Disease its mother, and their offspring lay in the woman’s 
arms like a nursing Pestilence, which, could it live and grow up, would make 
the world a more accursed abode than ever heretofore;292 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Nathaniel Hawthorne, Our Old Home (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1901), pp. 515-516.  
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Remember that not only does the “crimson” light Dimmesdale sees in the sky recall 
“Pestilence,” but Pearl herself is referred to as an “infant pestilence,” a “scarlet 
fever”:  
She resembled, in her fierce pursuit of them, an infant pestilence, – the 
scarlet fever, or some such half-fledged angel of judgment, – whose mission 
was to punish the sins of the rising generation.  
(p. 69)  
 
The mind and body were, in the antebellum period, so inextricably connected, that 
it is not preposterous to assume that sexual disease acquired through the parents 
could be cured by their moral transformation. Nor is it improbable that 
Dimmesdale’s sexual transgression could, through “sympathy,” pass on to the future 
generations of New England. Hawthorne merely extends Whitman’s vulgarized 
Lamarckian view of inheritance into more subtle territory. For Dimmesdale’s 
Election Sermon is informed by a “spirit of prophesy,” while his own physical and 
mental illness proclaims a more dubious “melancholy prophesy of decay”:  
His subject, it appeared, had been the relation between the Deity and the 
communities of mankind, with a special reference to the New England which 
they were here planting in the wilderness. And, as he drew towards the close, a 
spirit as of prophecy had come upon him, constraining him to its purpose as 
mightily as the old prophets of Israel were constrained; only with this 
difference, that, whereas the Jewish seers had denounced judgments and ruin 
on their country, it was his mission to foretell a high and glorious destiny for 
the newly gathered people of the Lord.  
            (p. 157) 
  
Dimmesdale’s “prophesy” is with specific reference “to the New England which they 
were here planting in the wilderness,” and he is “foretell[ing] a high and glorious 
destiny” for its people. Yet, Dimmesdale’s sermon is written in “haste and ecstasy,” 
(pg. 143) inspired by the unholy “consecration” of his sin with Hester – which also 
confirms his “sympathy and fellowship with wicked mortals and perverse spirits,” 
even as it inflames his prurient imagination and intensifies his “bodily infirmity.” 
Dimmesdale is in awe that “Heaven should see fit to transmit the grand and solemn 
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music of its oracles through so foul an organ-pipe as he” (pg. 143) – and yet the very 
phrase “foul an organ-pipe,” with its comical phallic connotation, suggests that the 
speech he plans, whatever its immediate effect, might not only desecrate, but 
contaminate his listeners with the venereal disease he suffers. If his own sermon 
could be so inspired by forbidden desire, then it is also possible that a moral and 
sexual “Pestilence,” could be inflamed by means of his “prophesy of decay.”  
This may well be the reason that Hawthorne neglects to include the speech 
itself. We are left, though, with Hawthorne’s ironic commentary on the state of bliss 
that he leaves his audience with:  
This idea of his transitory stay on earth gave the last emphasis to the effect 
which the preacher had produced; it was as if an angel, in his passage to the 
skies, had shaken his bright wings over the people for an instant,--at once a 
shadow and a splendor,--and had shed down a shower of golden truths upon them.   
            (pg. 157)  
 
More than merely contamination, Hawthorne hints that Dimmesdale has defiled by 
urination (“shed down a shower of golden truths”) those who have entrusted him to 
lead them to the New Jerusalem.  
 
THE RANK LUXURIANCE OF A GUILTY PASSION  
 
The contamination and defilement of New England’s destiny is conveyed through 
powerful imagery that suggests a transmission of Dimmesdale’s imaginative disease 
and bodily infirmity to Pearl. Although Pearl’s antisocial imagination is engendered 
by her parents’ sexual transgression, Hawthorne’s description of her is ambivalent. 
Though the Puritans regard Pearl as a “demon offspring,” (pg. 164) she is called a 
“witch-baby” (pg. 156) by an uncouth sailor; and, we recall that Hester’s “morbid 
ingenuity,” unfortunately, turns Pearl’s dress into “the emblem of her guilt and 
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torture,” . . . “the scarlet letter only capable of being loved.” Pearl is associated with 
potentially Shakespearean spirits of the forest: she is a “nymph-child,” and an 
“infant dryad” (pg. 132). Governor Bellingham asks her quite directly: “art thou one 
of those naughty elfs or fairies, whom we thought to have left behind us, with other 
relics of Papistry, in merry old England?" (pg. 74) Pearl is also associated, as 
Shakespeare himself was traditionally, with nature. Governor Bellingham, 
attempting to find out if Pearl has been instructed in the Westminster Catechism, 
asks Pearl who made her, she announces that she was “plucked by her mother off 
the bush of wild roses, that grew by the prison-door” (pg. 76). As such, Pearl has 
associations with the pastoral Old England that Hawthorne evokes in “May-Pole.”  
Just as in “May-Pole,” Hawthorne treats the romantic view of 
Shakespearean nature with irony, so does he in The Scarlet Letter. For the forest is the 
domain of the Black Man who makes a “contract” with wayward Puritans there at 
midnight, where they “sign” their name in “blood” (pg. 140); it is associated with the 
supposedly morally suspect wild Indians; it is where Chillingworth gathers his herbs 
that can “quicken[] to an evil purpose” with “poisonous shrubs,” “converting” . . . 
“every wholesome growth . . . into something deleterious and malignant” (pg. 114). 
While the associations with Mistress Hibbins and the Black Man evoke connotations 
of Macbeth, the forest also conjures connotations of disease from Hamlet. For the 
question is not merely whether Pearl will succumb, like her parents, to the agency of 
demonic powers, but to their moral and psychological disease. Besides being 
described as an “infant pestilence,” Pearl is described not as “possessing the disease 
of sadness,” as “almost all children, in these latter days, inherit scrofula, from the 
troubles of their ancestors,” but her very “unfailing vivacity of spirit” might itself 
“too [be] a disease” . . . “the reflex of the wild energy” (pg. 119): the deviant sexual 
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affair that resulted in Pearl’s birth.  
 Pearl becomes, on the one hand, the “pearl of great price” (pg. 61), (KJ 
Matthew 13:45-46), from Matthew’s Gospel, suggesting that she has the power to 
absolve her parents’ sins and open up the kingdom of heaven for them; at the same 
time, though, she becomes the symbol not just of her parents’ iniquity, but of their 
raw, deviant sexual desire. As such, adult sexual imagery recalling the guilty passion 
that resulted in her birth is obsessively displaced upon her. So, for example, the 
symbol of “the pearl” also recalls Desdemona, an adult Shakespearean heroine 
whose function as a redeemer goes tragically wrong – when Othello, like the “base 
Indian” who “threw a pearl away / Richer than all his tribe” (V. ii. 343-344) – 
murders her. Dimmesdale and Hester can, at times, recall a jealous Othello – for 
Pearl, like Desdemona, is suspected of concealing hidden demonic wickedness. This 
speaks not only to the antebellum notion that sexual disease could be transmitted to 
offspring, but to more intimate anxieties about the destruction of gender roles that 
sexual deviance supposedly brought about.  
 Even more importantly, if Dimmesdale and Hester’s sexual disease, as we 
have seen, threatens their gender, Pearl’s disease threatens to blur the distinction 
between childhood and adulthood. The potential for sexual disease makes her 
disturbingly precocious, overturning the power relation between adult and child. 
This is why she becomes such a powerful symbol of the destabilizing power of sexual 
illness in antebellum America. It also suggests the possibility that the Shakespearean 
perverse may have gotten the upper hand of Hawthorne after all. Even if it is 
Hawthorne’s wish that Dimmesdale and Hester be redeemed and Pearl socialized 
into comfortable domesticity, this happy ending may be thwarted, after all, by the 
tragedy of Pearl’s story.  
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Surrounding Pearl, we find a powerful cluster of imagery that recalls Hamlet:  
We have as yet hardly spoken of the infant; that little creature, whose 
innocent life had sprung, by the inscrutable decree of Providence, a lovely 
and immortal flower, out of the rank luxuriance of a guilty passion. 
 (pg. 61, italics added)  
 
The narrator’s description recalls immediately and disturbingly Hamlet’s reference 
to Gertrude’s “rank sweat of an enseamed bed” (III. vi 100-101). Hamlet here 
imagines Gertrude as a kind of adultress, betraying his dead father. One might go so 
far as to say that Hamlet’s own revenge for his father is, somehow, engendered in 
this primal scene – the nauseating and unacceptable image of his mother, Gertrude, 
having sex with his father’s brother, Claudius. There is yet another important use of 
the word “rank,” though, in Othello, that is hinted above. It is Iago’s in lines 
insinuating Desdemona’s infidelity: “one may smell in such, a will most rank, foul 
disproportion, thoughts unnatural” (III. iii. 230-231). And certainly the word in 
Hawthorne is used to evoke the provocative and nauseating odor of the sexual act 
that went into creating the “immortal flower” Pearl.  
The result of these juxtapositions is to create an anxious drama in which a 
perverse child is in need of being saved, first from herself and secondly from her 
parents – through their reform of their own sexual transgression. At the same time, 
Pearl is, paradoxically, the potential source of salvation. In one scenario, she is a 
kind of child, lured into a world of adult sin, but she is also, at the same time, quite 
horribly, the adult-child willfully reveling in sin. In another scenario, she is an adult-
child who redeems her parent-children. All of these possibilities are at play here.  
Pearl, for example, during the secret meeting between Dimmesdale and 
Hester Prynne, has one of her tantrums – and runs off into the woods. During her 
hiatus in the woods, the narrator makes this observation:  
 
	   157	  
A wolf, it is said, – but here the tale has surely lapsed into the improbable, – 
came up, and smelt of Pearl's robe, and offered his savage head to be patted 
by her hand.  
(pg. 131)  
 
Is Pearl, here, the child who can humanize the “savage” . . . “wolf” – or is she 
herself recognized by the wolf as its kindred?  
This is developed further in the chapter, “The Leech and His Patient.” 
Chillingworth, in disguise as Dimmesdale’s friend and doctor, describes a trip to 
gather medicinal herbs to heal the sick man. Continuing the Hamlet imagery, 
Hawthorne describes the medicinal herbs, “converted” to “drugs of potency” by 
Chillingworth, as themselves “weeds”:  
He therefore still kept up a familiar intercourse with him, daily receiving the 
old physician in his study; or visiting the laboratory, and, for recreation's 
sake, watching the processes by which weeds were converted into drugs of potency.  
            (italics added, pg. 87)    
 
We recall that Hamlet’s rebuke to Gertrude is “do not “spread the compost on the 
weeds to make them ranker” (Ham. III. vi. 166). This paragraph oddly creates an 
image of Chillingworth as a Claudius using the very “rank” weeds of the “enseamed 
bed” to make the poison that he pours into King Hamlet (Dimmesdale’s) ear: 
“where, my kind doctor, did you gather those herbs, with such a dark, flabby 
leaf?"  "Even in the grave-yard, here at hand," answered the physician, 
continuing his employment. "They are new to me. I found them growing on 
a grave, which bore no tombstone, no other memorial of the dead man, save 
these ugly weeds that have taken upon themselves to keep him in 
remembrance. They grew out of his heart, and typify, it may be, some 
hideous secret that was buried with him, and which he had done better to 
confess during his lifetime."  "Perchance," said Mr. Dimmesdale, "he 
earnestly desired it, but could not."  "And wherefore?" rejoined the 
physician. "Wherefore not; since all the powers of nature call so earnestly for 
the confession of sin, that these black weeds have sprung up out of a buried 
heart, to make manifest an outspoken crime?"   
(pp. 87-88)  
 
Dimmesdale is given a vision in which the very bodies of the dead are pierced by the 
crimes buried in their hearts – poison indeed. Yet, again, Dimmesdale and 
	   158	  
Chillingworth are interrupted in the midst of their chilling dialog, not by Hester, but 
by Pearl:   
Before Roger Chillingworth could answer, they heard the clear, wild 
laughter of a young child's voice, proceeding from the adjacent burial-
ground . . . Pearl looked as beautiful as the day, but was in one of those 
moods of perverse merriment which, whenever they occurred, seemed to remove 
her entirely out of the sphere of sympathy or human contact. She now 
skipped irreverently from one grave to another; until, coming to the broad, 
flat, armorial tombstone of a departed worthy, – perhaps of Isaac Johnson 
himself, – she began to dance upon it . . .  Roger Chillingworth had by this 
time approached the window, and smiled grimly down.  "There is no law, 
nor reverence for authority, no regard for human ordinances or opinions, 
right or wrong, mixed up with that child's composition," remarked he, as much to 
himself as to his companion.  
(pg. 89, italics added)  
 
When Pearl “irreverent”[ly] “skip[s] from one grave to another, she literally dances 
upon the graves of the deceased that Dimmesdale has imagined tormented like 
himself. When she “decorat”[es] “the maternal bosom” with “burrs,” she is the 
divine agent of suffering, but she might also be an imp – whose transformation from 
redeemer to “savage” child of the “rank luxuriance of a guilty passion” makes her 
oddly “mixed up with” the wild “black weeds” that grow out of the hypothetical 
deceased man’s heart.  
She is the symbol not only of a kind of original perversity, but, she suggests, 
an odd reversal of roles between child and adult. For not only does Pearl attract a 
comparison to imagery from Hamlet, but also to Shakespeare’s most famous 
adulteress, Cleopatra:  
Pearl's aspect was imbued with a spell of infinite variety; in this one child there 
were many children, comprehending the full scope between the wild-flower 
prettiness of a peasant-baby, and the pomp, in little, of an infant princess.  
(p. 62)  
 
Of course, Hawthorne is recalling the description of Cleopatra: “Age cannot wither 
her, nor custom stale / Her infinite variety.” (AC II. ii. 240-241) But if, in some 
sense, Pearl is, in Dimmesdale’s imagination already grown up, Dimmesdale's true 
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horror may be that, by contrast, he himself is, childishly powerless. For, like King 
Lear, Dimmesdale may need to convert the wayward and “perverse” Pearl – to save 
himself from King Lear’s predicament – which is, of course, that he has made his 
“daughters” his “mother.” (Lear. I. iv. 4, 10) 
It is finally through Dimmesdale’s death on the scaffold - whose purpose is, 
as Sophia Hawthorne famously said, “to show that the Law cannot be broken”293 – 
that Pearl is converted from the dangerous, but free, “infinite variety” – the 
“perverse merriment” - of her childhood to an adulthood whose “rich nature will be 
softened and subdued.” And, so Pearl can be regarded as inheriting the curse of 
Dimmesdale’s sterility – while Dimmesdale, the child-man, converts, in death, into 
the patriarchal father – the Law, the Moral Authority – who sadistically demands 
obedience. Or is it not the Law at all, but Arthur Dimmesdale whose final act of 
revenge is Othello-like to throw “a pearl away / Richer than all his tribe”?  
The irony is that the very destiny that Hawthorne wishes for America is its 
truly tragic one: “conversion” as a means to rid the land of the contamination of the 
“perversion” of the middle class domestic values of hearth and home so threatened 
by Pearl’s anarchic childhood, by Hester’s subversive intellect, and by Dimmesdale’s 
desire to raise a family outside of the jurisdiction of the grim New England law. 
However, it is also my view, as we have seen, that Hawthorne’s employment of 
Shakespearean imagery is a double-edged sword that offers a subversive perverse 
critique of the very vision of America that he intends. We will discover a more 
deliberate and anarchic version of this critique in Emily Dickinson.  
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HEROIC CUNNING: MELVILLE’S DOOMED QUEST 
TO CONQUER THE WHITENESS OF MACBETH 
 
 
OVERVIEW 
 
Melville exhibits the most extensive, heroic, and self-riven struggle of all of the 
American authors in this study. Shakespeare was a lightning rod for the anarchic 
force of perverse sexuality that was already roiling in Melville’s psyche. This chapter 
will delineate Melville’s quest to exorcise the perverse, like Hawthorne, through 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth and The Tempest, linking Melville’s reading of these plays with 
what I regard, contrary to most critics, as his unlikely jeremiad against the solitary 
vice. I will then turn to Billy Budd and Othello to uncover what I regard to be the 
duplicity that both allowed Melville to finish his masterpiece, and that committed 
him to the redemptive narrative of the perverse jeremiad.  
I leave Melville’s most powerful chapter, “The Whiteness of the Whale,” for 
last. In this chapter, Melville’s structuring narrative breaks down, and he surrenders 
to the pure terrors of the perverse. It is my hypothesis that Melville’s “whiteness” is, 
in part, animated by the dramatic energy of non-being that becomes, itself, a 
palpable presence in Macbeth, evoking audience complicity. I contend that Melville 
was not only influenced by Shakespeare, but reproduced, as a reading experience, 
something very close to the experience Shakespeare intended for the audience of 
Macbeth. I call the dramatic technique that Melville developed “perverse reading.” 
This will lead us to Dickinson, who looks Shakespeare directly in the eye. 
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DARK CHARACTERS  
 
While there are glimmerings of Shakespeare in Melville's earlier work, he didn't 
truly come to read Shakespeare until the age when he wrote Moby Dick. It was at this 
point that an avalanche occurred in Melville's mind:   
Dolt & ass that I am I have lived more than 29 years, & until a few days ago, 
never made close acquaintance with the divine William. Ah, he's full of 
sermons-on-the-mount, and gentle, aye, almost as Jesus. 294 
 
As Markels argues, “Pierre (1852) in places and Moby-Dick (1851) throughout are 
functionally produced by the ferment of Melville’s mind in response to 
Shakespeare’s plays.”295 Markels’ notion is, of course, as old as Melville criticism 
itself. Charles Olson was the first to assert this, “Above all, in the ferment, 
Shakespeare the cause.”296 F. O. Matthiessen’s account in The American Renaissance 
turned Shakespeare’s influence upon Melville into a legend. According to 
Matthiessen, Melville was “hypnotized” by Shakespeare and “unconsciously 
impelled towards emulation.”297 How else could one account for the “bold, nervous, 
lofty”298 language of Melville’s characters aboard a whaling ship or the daring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 Herman Melville, The Letters of Herman Melville (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), 
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295 “In the succession of his novels the Shakespearean echoes become far more frequent and 
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Mosses review discussed in the preceding chapter, and this quantitative increase also reflects 
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creative departure in chapter 36, “The Quarter-Deck,” in which the progress of a 
novel is suddenly transfigured, with these famous stage directions:  
 (Enter Ahab: Then, all.)  
(pg. 303)  
In addition to stage directions, Matthiessen notes that Melville’s characters deliver 
soliloquies and speak in prose lines that often scan as blank verse:  
 I leave a white and turbid wake; pale waters 
 Paler cheeks, where’er I sail. The envious 
 Billows sidelong swell to whelm my track; let them;  
 But first I pass.  
(pg. 142)  
 
Melville even manages to reproduce Shakespeare’s difficult syntax, with its 
functional shifts, such as his conversion of the noun "tornado" into an adjective in 
the marvelous phrase “tornadoed Atlantic of my being.” As one would expect, Moby-
Dick has proved to be a gold mine for critics who have searched for allusions to 
Shakespeare plays. The language in Moby-Dick echoes all of Shakespeare’s major 
tragedies. As Julian Markels observes, “In his tragic stature, character, and 
progression, Ahab can remind us severally of Othello, Macbeth, and Lear.” 299  
Obscure scenes, such as Romeo’s visit to the apothecary in the depiction of the bar 
in The Spouter-Inn (pg. 27), and iconic ones such as Hamlet’s speech to the skull, with 
Ahab’s soliloquy in the presence of the decapitated head of the whale, are re-
envisioned on a grand scale. 
Among Shakespeare scholars, it is Markels, in his book Melville And the Politics 
of Identity, From King Lear to Moby-Dick, who best demonstrates the dynamic between 
the Shakespeare of New England Protestantism and what he calls Melville’s 
“demonic Shakespeare.” This “demonic” Shakespeare, for Markels, is revealed in 
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Melville’s letters to Evert Duyckinck and in his review of Hawthorne’s book of short 
stories, entitled, “Hawthorne And His Mosses.” For Melville, what “makes 
Shakespeare Shakespeare” is precisely that which is not caught by the domesticated 
image of the playwright as a national symbol:   
Through the mouths of the dark characters of Hamlet, Timon, Lear, and 
Iago, he craftily says, or sometimes insinuates the things, which we feel to be 
so terrifically true, that it were all but madness for any good man, in his own 
proper character, to utter, or even hint of them. Tormented into 
desperation, Lear the frantic King tears off the mask, and speaks the sane 
madness of vital truth . . . For in this world of lies, Truth is forced to fly like a 
scared white doe in the woodlands; and only by cunning glimpses will she 
reveal herself, as in Shakespeare and other masters of the great Art of Telling 
the Truth, – even though it be covertly, and by snatches.300 
 
For Markels, the “sane madness of vital truth” lies in Lear’s question: “is there any 
cause in nature that makes these hard hearts?” This question, Markels contends, 
plunges Melville into the heretical exploration of the Hobbsian universe of 
“magnified force and fraud”301 through the voyage of the Pequod. The attempt to 
answer this question also forces him to confront the demonic underbelly of the 
emerging republic, with its threat of demagoguery, religious fanaticism, capitalist 
expansion, and robber barons. Markels’ Melville, therefore, finds within 
Shakespeare the national symbol of American culture, a seething underbelly filled 
with questions about the underlying forces that were shaping the new nation.  
It is my contention, though, that Markels’ cogent study gives the face behind 
the mask that Melville wanted us to find. His study is as neatly philosophical and 
metaphysical as Melville tried to be. I find a perverse Shakespeare inhering within 
Melville’s work, one that is linked to Augustinian non-being, but also explicitly 
sexual, intimately connected to America’s reform movements, which were 
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themselves a product of economic and social anxieties, and the messianic project of 
America’s Second Great Awakening.   
For Melville not only intuits a shattering power within Shakespeare’s plays 
that erupts through the mask of his tragic protagonists, like Lear, but he evokes this 
process in a language that suggests deviousness: “craftily,” “cunning,” “covertly,” 
“by snatches.” This disjunction between Shakespeare as a heroic, but embittered 
and estranged Jeremiah telling the truth “though he pluck it out from under the 
robes of Senators and Judges” (pg. 54), and a more devious playwright whose 
perverse identifications need to be masked, is the one that I think Melville’s 
marginalia supports. Mediating these is the playwright interested in the dramatic 
effect of striking through the mask of outward piety or innocence to reveal hidden 
and disturbing depths.  
 
 
A TOUCH SHAKESPEAREAN 
 
Despite the obvious scope and depth of Shakespeare’s influence on Moby-Dick, it is 
curious that even Markels, who undertakes a complete reading of Moby-Dick through 
the lens of King Lear, neglects to take into account Melville’s Shakespeare marginalia, 
his frequent scores, and the many passages he underlined in the plays. Markels’ 
predecessor, F. O. Matthiessen, in The American Renaissance, did not offer a 
thoroughly Shakespearean reading, but he effectively used Melville’s scores and 
underlined passages to provide perceptive insights into Melville’s character during 
the composition of Moby-Dick.  
Admittedly, I am taking a risk in giving Melville’s copious underlines and 
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scores the weigh that I do, and suggesting that they reflect his own personal views. 
Many of his marks, after all, may simply be passages that evoked his curiosity or 
helped him to follow Shakespeare’s themes. But Melville’s personality as a reader, 
like William Blake’s, is forceful and distinct. At times, in fact, his marks can seem as 
monomaniacal as Ahab’s might be. There is also a distinction in emphasis in his 
underlined and scored passages. Some of the passages receive multiple scores and 
single phrases are underlined with a thick, heavy mark indicating the importance 
Melville attributes to it.  
For example, here is a passage in which Melville’s Jeremiah reading persona 
surfaces. He underlines with a thick pencil mark this phrase from the Fool in King 
Lear: “Truth’s a dog that must to kennel” (I. IV. 110).302 He also scores this passage 
from Hamlet:  
    Forgive me this my virtue,  
 For in the fatness of these pursy times, 
 Virtue itself of vice must pardon beg;  
Yea, curb and woo, for leave to do him good. (III. iv. 153-6)303 
 
Melville frequently identifies with passages that expose hypocrisy. He places a thick 
pencil mark under “scurvy politician” in Lear’s mad improvisation, which 
culminates in the politicized image, inspired by Gloucester’s blindness, “Get thee 
glass eyes; / And like a scurvy politician, seem / To see the things thou dost not” 
(IV. vi. 172).   
Melville is also concerned with moments when a sinister truth erupts from 
behind the mask of appearances. He is so preoccupied by this theme that, at times, 
he neglects passages that one would expect would be far more relevant to him. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 Melville, Herman. "Melville's Marginalia in Shakespeare’s King Lear.” Melville's Marginalia 
Online. Ed. Steven Olsen-Smith, Peter Norberg, and Dennis C. Marnon. February 4, 2014. 
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Pericles, for example, a play Melville could have pillaged for its remarkable ocean 
passages, he double scores this rather lacklustre line, contrasting the “visor” of 
“villainy” with its outward appearance of sycophancy: “No visor does become black 
villany (sic), / So well as soft and tender flattery” (Per. IV. iv. 44).304 In Hamlet, 
Melville was keen to score the passage in Claudius’s speech:  
In the corrupted currents of this world, 
Offence’s gilded hand may shove by justice;  
And oft ‘tis seen, the wicked prize itself  
Buys out the law.  
(III. iii. 57)305 
 
In The Tempest, Melville placed a score and an “x” next to the famous 
passage in which Miranda, for the first time, encounters human beings, and – 
unusually for Melville – he circles Prospero’s ironic retort.  The passage begins with 
Miranda exclaiming:   
 MIRA  
      O! wonder!  
 How many goodly creatures are there here!  
 How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world, 
 That has such people in’t!  
 
 PRO     
‘Tis new to thee (V. i. 181-4) 
 
In the margin, Melville writes, “Consider the character of the persons concerning 
whom Miranda says this – Then Prospero’s quiet words in comment – how terrible! 
In ‘Timon’ itself there is nothing like it.”306 Again, Melville is acutely aware of that 
moment when surface appearance is belied by a more disturbing and intractable 
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reality. He is especially aware of how these are structured as dramatic exchanges on 
stage.  
Still another voice emerges from Melville’s Shakespearean reading, one far 
more in alliance with Shakespeare’s dark energies. Melville scores and places an “x” 
next to the passage in King Lear, just after Albany charges Edmund with treason. He 
singles out the passage:  
What in the world he is  
That names me a traitor, villain-like he lies. 
Call by thy trumpet; he that dares approach, 
On him, on you, (who not?) I will maintain  
My truth and honor firmly. (V. iii. 98-102.1)  
 
In the margin, Melville writes somberly, “The infernal nature has a valor often 
denied to innocence.” Upon the occasion of Gloucester’s blinding by Cornwall, 
Melville thickly underlines “See it shall thou never” (III. vii. 66). In the margin, 
Melville writes, “Terrific!”307 Melville double scores the passage when Regan and 
Cornwall usher in Gloucester for interrogation, and Regan exclaims, “Ingrateful 
fox!” (III. vii. 28). In the margin, Melville writes, “Here’s a touch Shakespearean – 
Regan talks of ingratitude!”308 
Unfortunately Melville left Macbeth without any scores or marginalia. This 
may be because he was already familiar with the play. In a single letter from 1843 
Melville’s sister Helen remembered seeing the tragedian Charles Macready in 
Boston:  
The witch scenes were admirably got up, and when, dancing about the 
‘cauldron of hell-broth,’ one of the horrid creatures, puts in some terrible 
contribution; and enjoins it ‘to make the gruel thick & slab,’, I could not help 
thinking of poor Herman, who made it a favorite quotation, and talked 	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about the ‘pilot’s thumb, wrecked as homeward he did come,’ eye of newt, 
toe of frog,&c.”309 
 
This brief window into Melville’s childhood may yet be apposite. In Macbeth, which I 
believe to be one of Moby-Dick’s most important influences, child-like horror is 
central: for example, "my fell of hair would at a dismal treatise rouse and stir as life 
were in it" (V. v. 11-12); or that curiously childlike image "the eye wink at the hand" 
(I. iv. 53); or the fantastic image from a child's hallucination, of a "moving grove" (V. 
v. 38.1). Intriguingly, Melville also completed the circle by accepting his sister 
Augusta’s suggestion to name his first son Malcolm, perhaps not only symbolizing 
his high hopes that his child would one day have the destiny of a future king, but a 
covert attempt to ward off Macbeth’s curse.310 Ishmael, recall, is also promised by 
God that he will “make him a great nation” (KJ Gen. 17:20).  
Perhaps most suggestive of all, though, is that with all Melville’s righteous ire 
about hypocrisy and superficiality, there is a hint that he responded with duplicity to 
Shakespeare’s dangerous sexuality. Melville quadruple scored Shakespeare’s 
famously homoerotic Sonnet 20, “A woman’s face with Nature’s own hand 
painted;” then, perhaps anxious about his own enthusiasm, he erased three of the 
four scores.311 
In Melville’s marginalia, I find a series of reading personas: wounded 
Jeremiah, railing against the world’s hypocrisy, communing with Shakespeare, a 
fellow truth-teller; a reader fascinated when a sinister force erupts through 
apparently calm surfaces; a dissident who could himself identify with the dramatic 
genius of perhaps Shakespeare’s darkest moment on stage, Gloucester’s blinding; a 	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reader who could express sober admiration for the powerful negativity of an 
Edmund, even going so far as to prefer his “valor” over (presumably) Cordelia’s 
“innocence.”  
It was precisely the conflict between these reading personas that we find in 
Melville’s engagement with Shakespeare in Moby-Dick. It is my contention that the 
self-righteous Jeremiah persona led him to develop an elaborate structure in Moby-
Dick, heroically to exorcise and disavow his own enthusiastically perverse 
identifications. Unfortunately, the perverse cannot be so exorcised. Its powerful, self-
undermining energy is merely displaced onto another figure or group. Moby-Dick’s 
very ethical center is where this process of displacement is structured.  
 
 
PISTOL AND BALL 
 
If Ahab’s monomaniacal pursuit of a white whale “round the Norway maelstrom, 
and round Perdition’s flames” (pg. 139), is the most obvious form of Shakespearean 
perversion in Moby-Dick, it is Ishmael’s smoldering passive-aggressive desire that is 
much more evasive and easy to overlook. It is Ishmael’s deviant sexual subjectivity, 
as it is displaced through Ahab, that I contend most reverberates with Shakespeare’s 
perverse energies.  
Ishmael’s sexual deviance hinges on what he calls his “wild, mystical 
sympathetical feeling;” (pg. 152) it is this “sympathy” that makes Ahab’s “feud seem 
mine.” Yet, what is the basis for Ishmael’s “sympathy” with a feud that he seems to 
find at times grandly tragic and, at other times, ludicrous? What is it about Ahab’s 
will to conquer that so compels Ishmael that he evokes Ahab’s quest as a Gothic tale 
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of possession that is analogous to Macbeth’s seduction by the queer, androgynous 
witches?  
Perhaps even more importantly, what is it that compels Ishmael to wander in 
exile – as his namesake suggests – like Hester into a “labyrinth of mind,” through 
what Melville has called “ontological heroics?”312 For just as Hester struggled with 
the illicit sympathy brought on by the burden of wearing the Scarlet Letter, Ishmael 
struggles with the temptation of Ahab’s hunt for the white whale – and he 
specifically figures this temptation as “whiteness” itself, an animated presence of 
non-being that swallows the world of the “milk and sperm of human kindness,” (pg. 
323) with the “maw and gulf of the ravenous salt-sea shark.” (IV. i. 23-24)  
Ishmael’s name is itself a scarlet letter, willingly put on for the reader. 
Ishmael, Abraham’s illegitimate son, forced to wander in exile in the desert to found 
a new nation, will be a “wild man”; like Hester, “his hand will be against every other 
man, and every man’s hand against him.” (KJ, Genesis 16:12) Yet unlike Hester, the  
circumstances of Ishmael’s exile are not clear without some detective work.  
We have already seen how the metaphysical void that was feared to be 
behind the mask of paper currency was dramatized through the ghost of Banquo 
(“Bank-Oh”) upon the precipitation of the 1837 Bank Panic. Paradoxically, it was 
Andrew Jackson’s attempt to return to the gold standard that destroyed the 
economy – and plunged the Melville family into financial ruin. Herman Melville’s 
older brother, Gansevoort, was hit hardest. The boom in canals and railroads had 
encouraged Gansevoort to speculate using his mother’s inheritance on western 
lands. 313 When the Bank Panic hit, western land prices plummeted, New York City 
banks suspended payment in gold and silver, paid only in “depreciated bank notes, ” 	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and “factories failed all over the country.”314  
The Melvilles were forced to move from their handsome house in Clinton 
Square, “away from the state capital,” to a village where the rents were cheaper. 
Gansevoort suffered a nervous collapse as a result of this, and Herman Melville had 
to leave for Pittsfield “to run the farm.” Like Ishmael, Melville was from an “old 
established family in the land” and was forced by economic circumstances, to take 
up, among other things, a poorly paying job “lording it as a country schoolmaster” 
before eventually shipping out to sea. To add to this, Ishmael has also worked as a 
“stone-mason,” . . . “a great digger of ditches, canals and wells, wine-vaults, cellars, 
and cisterns of all sorts” (p. 349). 
There is an almost contemporary account of a young man, from an upper 
middle-class background, who was forced into a sea-faring life due to the financial 
ruin of his family. His name is Philip C. Buskirk, and his plight uncannily mirrors 
that of the young Herman Melville. Like Melville’s father, who died, leaving the 
family in dire financial straits that were compounded by the Bank Panic of 1837, 
Buskirk’s father committed suicide by shooting himself in the head after he was 
financially ruined in 1845.315 Buskirk was forced that year to leave Georgetown 
College and enter the US Marine Corps at the age of twelve, and became a sailor, 
keeping a meticulous diary throughout his tenure. Buskirk’s diary dramatizes the 
unsupportable clash between his middle class upbringing and this life with the 
working class sailors on board ship, whose sexual practices – most especially their 
homosexual liaisons (which were quite common and were not punished by the 
officers who could otherwise be sadistic) – became both the occasion for his sexual 
awakening and an ongoing jeremiad against masturbation, “the withering hand of 	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disease,” and sodomy that lasted for nineteen years. 316 
While Melville’s ribald sense of humor, exemplified in his chapter, “The 
Cassock,” about the whale’s penis (“what a candidate for an archbishoprick,” he 
exclaims), and Whitmanesque valorization of mutual masturbation seem to be light-
years away from Buskirk’s grim Puritanical jeremiads against the solitary vice, it is 
important to note that Ishmael employs a Gothic narrative mode, filled with dread 
and despair, in order to describe his emotions concerning Ahab. These have a 
parallel not only in Buskirk, but, as we have seen, in the innumerable Jacksonian 
jeremiads against masturbation. Buskirk’s narrative suggests the very real sense of 
terror that ship-board sexuality could evoke in a middle-class sensibility. This is a 
feature of Melville’s novel that is often underestimated. It also suggests the way that 
a middle-class sensibility could maintain its sense of class identity through the 
structure of a jeremiad against masturbation in the midst of a varied career.  
On board the Pequod, Ishmael receives the pittance of the “seven hundred 
and seventy-seventh” (pg. 76) lay as a common sailor. While Ishmael claims that 
“common sailor” is precisely the job that he relishes most, it is also quite clear that 
he would never have been in a position to take such a lowly position had he not 
already been compromised financially. “It touches one’s sense of honour,” he 
admits, “and requires a strong decoction of Seneca and the Stoics to enable you to 
grin and bear it” (pg. 20).   
On shore, Ishmael is subject to what he calls “hypos,” (pg. 18) a combination 
of depression and nervous anxiety, that cause him to become filled with grim 
apprehensions of death:  
whenever I find myself growing grim about the mouth; whenever it is a 
damp, drizzly November in my soul; whenever I find myself involuntarily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 Burg, pg. 31. 
	   173	  
pausing before coffin warehouses, and bringing up the rear of every funeral I 
meet . . .  
(pg. 18)  
The sea is hardly an adventure for him, in the conventional sense of the term. It is a 
substitute for “pistol and ball” (pg. 18) – an image that fuses suicide with an explicit 
suggestion of sexual aggression turned against the self. In his onshore life, Ishmael is 
threatened by a void that is impossible to extricate from the capitalist alienation and 
economic insecurity that characterize his position in antebellum society. In this 
respect Ishmael resembles the “pallid hopelessness” of Bartleby the Scrivener, the 
subordinate clerk in the “Dead Letter office in Washington.” Ishmael laments that 
“all landsmen” share a plight similar to Bartleby’s: their “week days” are “pent up in 
lath and plaster—tied to counters, nailed to benches, clinched to desks. How then is 
this? Are the green fields gone? What do they here?” (p. 19).  
Melville’s paragraph about the ill-fated blacksmith, who shares Bartleby’s 
nihilism, could just as easily have been written about Ishmael:  
Death seems the only desirable sequel for a career like this; but Death is only 
a launching into the region of the strange Untried; it is but the first salutation 
to the possibilities of the immense Remote, the Wild, the Watery, the 
Unshored; therefore, to the death-longing eyes of such men, who still have 
left in them some interior compunctions against suicide, does the all-
contributed and all-receptive ocean alluringly spread forth his whole plain of 
unimaginable, taking terrors, and wonderful, new-life adventures; and from 
the hearts of infinite Pacifics . . .  
(pg. 369)  
What Ishmael flees is a kind of living death on shore. That living death is poised 
between the oppression of an impersonal industrialized economy and the haunting 
prospect that such prosperity as can be won is, in fact, merely an illusion that will 
disintegrate.  
The impossible burden of self-reliant manhood, which defined virility based 
upon the ownership of property in a world in which fortunes were made and lost 
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with frightening rapidity, was, for Ishmael, compensated for by a Gothic masculine 
persona characterized by histrionic, mercurial passivity. Despite the fact that this 
persona evokes perverse sexuality, it functions, paradoxically, as a form of identity 
politics that solidifies rather than subverting American self-reliance. Its very descent 
into abjection and Gothic excess evokes pity and solidarity rather than contempt, 
and it feeds budding capitalist ideology rather than subverting it.  
As such, Ishmael’s entrance into the underworld of what David Anthony 
calls “debtor masculinity” is both a vehicle for exploration of the perverse sexuality 
that so appalled the moral reformers of the antebellum era and it is also a story of 
his purification from this sexuality.317 Like Hester, Ishmael’s quest is to learn what 
he calls “attainable felicity” that is conspicuously “not” . . . “anywhere in the 
intellect or the fancy,” but in “the wife, the heart, the bed, the table, the saddle, the 
fireside, the country”  (pg. 323). Such felicity will purge Ishmael of his own Young 
Goodman Brown type communion of evil, embodied in Ahab. 
Such a narrative structure is consistent with the way that Americans attempt 
to dispense with Shakespearean perversity – particularly in Macbeth, but also with 
Hamlet, Othello, and King Lear – though Moby-Dick is, as I have argued, the most 
heroic attempt to do so. The novel presents Ishmael with the project of finding a 
solution for the haunted world of Shakespearean tragedy and, in the process, 
exorcising Shakespearean perversity, and at the same time, presenting a vision of 
middle class America redeemed by a unique form of evasive identity politics. 
Ishmael, like Hester, is the American pervert who has made good. He has, 
ostensibly, exorcised the anti-social aspect of his perversion, figured in Ahab, and 
gone on to become incorporated into the status quo, as a hero of progressive 	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American middle class values. Ishmael is the precursor of American progress, as 
signified by gay marriage, and the right of homosexuals to enter the military. 
 
  
MAW AND GULF 
 
And yet, Melville’s heroic attempt at containment is undermined at every 
turn by his uncanny ability to animate the void, which culminates in the dramatic 
reproduction of Shakespearean perversity in the “Whiteness of The Whale” chapter.  
It is the tension between two opposite impulses: the valiant effort at containment 
through the perverse jeremiad and the contaminating dread of perverse reading that 
gives Moby-Dick such a terrible power to communicate the complexities of America’s 
response to Shakespearean perversity.  
The “Counterpane” flashback occurs during Ishmael’s disquieting and 
ultimately smolderingly homoerotic stay at the Spouter Inn with the Queequeg, the 
Cannibal and South Pacific islander from Kokovoco. Ishmael falls asleep in 
Queequeg’s arms, and awakens with his eerily tattooed hand on the quilt next to 
him. The nightmare image dissolves into an image of democratic homoerotic 
fraternity, reminiscent of Whitman.  
Queequeg’s hand, though, recalls, for Ishmael, a childhood punishment he 
received from his stepmother for “cutting up some caper or other,” he thinks 
vaguely that it was “trying to crawl up the chimney.” Several critics have pointed 
out the phallic imagery of the chimney, and the fact that it evokes “another sexual 
crime, linked to darkness and dirt,” (p. 78, Martin) namely masturbation – though 
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the sexual frisson with Queequeg clearly evokes sodomy for Ishmael as well. Melville 
later made abundantly clear that he understood the phallic potential of the chimney 
metaphor in his short-story, “I And My Chimney.” This early childhood image of 
the sooty chimney is complimented by Queequego’s phallic “ebony idol,” Yojo, that 
is compared quite explicitly later to the whale’s penis in “The Cassock.” Ishmael’s 
step-mother does not beat him, but locks him in his room for sixteen hours on the 
longest day of the year:  
Instantly I felt a shock running through all my frame; nothing was to be 
seen, and nothing was to be heard; but a supernatural hand seemed placed in 
mine. My arm hung over the counterpane, and the nameless, unimaginable, 
silent form or phantom, to which the hand belonged, seemed closely seated by 
my bed-side. For what seemed ages piled on ages, I lay there, frozen with the 
most awful fears, not daring to drag away my hand; yet ever thinking that if I 
could but stir it one single inch, the horrid spell would be broken.  
(pg. 37) 
As Paul Brodkorb argues, the insubstantial, beckoning presence of the  
“supernatural hand,” mirrors the boundless phantom of the whale that compels 
Ahab’s monomaniacal quest.  
Ishmael’s recollection of that phantom hand, on the eve of his journey with 
Ahab vividly hints at the “supernatural soliciting” of Macbeth when he is granted 
the title of Thane of Cawdor, as prophesied by the witches. This isn’t surprising, as 
Ishmael has set up the Spouter Inn with allusions to the witches in Macbeth. As he is 
staring at the large oil painting “so besmoked and every way defaced” that it was 
only through “diligent study” that it appeared that an ambitious young artist had, 
“in the time of the New England hags” . . . “endeavored to delineate chaos 
bewitched” (pg. 26). Among the many metaphors Ishmael conjures to evoke the 
painting, it is described as a “blasted heath.” The “blasted heath,” (I. iii. 76) in 
Macbeth, we will recall, is the place where the “imperfect speakers” . . . “so wild and 
withered in their attire, / That look not like the inhabitants of the earth” (I. iii. 39-
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40) first greet Macbeth and Banquo.  
The “supernatural hand” picks up the Macbeth imagery, evoking precisely the 
moment that Macbeth yields to the temptation to murder Duncan. Macbeth 
responds in a way that will be mirrored in Ishmael’s narrative, with histrionic 
passivity and dread: “why do I yield to that suggestion (temptation) / Whose horrid 
image doth unfix my hair / And make my seated heart knock at my ribs / Against 
the use of nature?” (Mac. I. iii. 133-136). Macbeth does not struggle with 
temptation. Rather, he inadvertently “yield,”[s] and is genuinely shocked at himself, 
as if the one succumbing to temptation were an alien being. This is also the moment 
in Macbeth in which the world of dream and imagination is infiltrated by the 
ontology of Augustinian non-being: “nothing is but what is not” (I. iii. 141). As G. 
Wilson Knight observes succinctly, “reality and unreality change places.”318 
Likewise, in Moby-Dick, the “supernatural hand” acquires the metaphysical 
heft of Augustinian non-being while, at the same time, carrying the sexual 
connotation of masturbatory desire. It is the first hint of the ontology of Augustinian 
non-being, and it is linked directly to Ishmael’s early sexual transgression. As 
Brodkorb argues:  
the supernatural hand as it is experienced grows out of nothing visible, absolute 
strangeness, nothing itself. In short, the earlier event contains the essence of the 
later: if it is characteristic of the strange to be only relatively explicable, it is 
characteristic of nothingness to resist any explanation whatever. 
Nothingness: the void, absence, non-meaning, nonform, noncoherence – this 
is what secretly underlies the present experience of Queequeg's arm 
concealed beneath the present's merely relative strangeness.  
         (pg. 111) 
 
In Shakespeare’s Hamlet, criminal agency is associated with “offence’s gilded hand” 
that may “shove by the justice” ( III. iii. 38); In Clarence’s dream in Richard III 
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fortelling Richard’s betrayal, Richard “struck me, tipping Clarence into the 
“tumbling billows of the main” (I. iv. 19-20) where he imagines himself drowning; 
but, it is in Macbeth that the “hand” imagery is most urgent and most intimately 
arrestingly connected to personal agency. Macbeth’s curious phrase, “the eye wink 
at the hand” (I. iv. 53), suggests an unsettling conspiracy that prevents the eye from 
“knowing” the “deed” of the hand. At the same time, Macbeth’s “wink” also 
suggests a child’s fear of a hand that has become, suddenly, utterly alien and seems 
to be acting independently – as Ishmael’s disembodied “supernatural hand” does.  
             And the hand imagery, as it develops in Moby-Dick leads again back to 
Macbeth and questions about agency and ontology:  
When by chance these precious parts in a nursing whale are cut by the 
hunter's lance, the mother's pouring milk and blood rivallingly discolour the 
sea for rods. The milk is very sweet and rich; it has been tasted by man; it 
might do well with strawberries. When overflowing with mutual esteem, the 
whales salute MORE HOMINUM.  
(pg. 303)  
 
In this passage from the later chapter, “The Grand Armada,” the sharp disjunction 
between Ishmael’s amiable tone and the “mother’s pouring milk and blood” that 
“discolour the sea for rods” recalls Ishmael’s childhood experience of the 
“supernatural hand,” his own agency, as alien. It continues the allusion to Macbeth’s 
most famous hand imagery, mixing his hallucination with the milk of human 
kindness: “This my hand will rather / the multitudinous seas incarnadine, / making 
the green one red” (II. ii. 61-3).   
            Macbeth’s hand, staining the sea “red” suggests guilt, but it also suggests, as 
with Ishmael’s “supernatural hand,” disassociation from guilt. There is also a 
disturbing disjunction between the jaunty tone and the allusion to the English naval 
victory against the Spanish in “The Grand Armada.” The Macbeth allusion, though, 
suggests a more deeply agonized subjection. Is it guilt at buried agency? Or is a 
	   179	  
more difficult problem surfacing within Ishmael’s Macbeth allusions?  
            For Brodtkorb, Ishmael’s “supernatural hand” is a dreadful image that isn’t 
just connected to, but emanates from the tormented boredom that he experiences as 
punishment by his step-mother. For Brodtkorb, the dynamic between Ishmael’s 
childhood boredom and the experience of dread mirrors his adult dynamic between 
the emotions of despair and dread. As Kierkegaard argues, the dialectical movement 
between boredom or despair and dread is associated with the phenomenological 
experience of non-being. As such, it is intimately connected to the Augustinian 
problem of the perverse error that drives the will away from being towards non-
being. Regarding the alluring fascination of dread and its relation to sin, 
Kierkegaard writes:  
Dread is an alien power which lays hold of an individual, and yet one cannot 
tear oneself away, nor has the will to do so; for one fears, but what one fears 
one desires.319  
 
As Kierkegaard understood, dread makes a guilty person sympathetic because he or 
she is genuinely frightened by the deed that tempts them; yet, it also intensifies the 
temptation and contributes to the subjective feeling that transgression is inevitable:  
. . . he who through dread becomes guilty is innocent, for it was not himself 
but dread, an alien power, which laid hold of him, a power he did not love 
but dreaded - and yet he is guilty, for he sank in the dread which he loved 
even while he feared it.320  
 
It is the psychological dynamic between the state of emptiness and despair and 
fascinated dread defined by Ishmael’s encounter, as a child, with the “supernatural 
hand,” that characterizes Ishmael’s haunted allusions to Macbeth. In addition to 
Ishmael’s supernatural solicitation, what evokes the mood of dread is his choice of 
vocabulary, a vocabulary of incantation that is intimately linked to Moby-Dick’s 	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Macbeth allusions. The hand is “supernatural;” it casts a “horrid spell;” it causes an 
“awful fear”: Ishmael is “frozen” . . . for “ages piled on ages.” Ishmael’s 
psychological response to the “supernatural hand” will be alluded to again and 
again throughout Moby-Dick. And Ishmael’s particular psychological dialectic, 
between dread and despair, is intimately connected with questions of agency that 
are directly related to Macbeth’s theatrical space of tortured, despairing confusion 
about ontology and epistemology.   
            Yet, there are more troubling implications to Ishmael’s “supernatural hand” 
episode. For, as Ishmael’s hand imagery develops, in the novel, it is intimately 
intertwined with its deeper philosophical speculation about ontology and 
epistemology. As Richard Moore writes:  
Ishmael goes to sea, in Peleg's words, 'to find out by experience what whaling 
is' (p. 71), and he takes the fact that he has 'had to do with whales with these 
visible hands' (p. 123) as exclusive warrant to speak the truth of the experience 
of whales and whaling.321 
 
For Ishmael, it is the empirical experience of his “visible hands” that gives him the 
authority to speak the truth, not just about whaling, but epistemology and its 
relation to ontology. On one level, Ishmael’s “visible hands” simply remind us that 
he is testifying to an adventure that he has already experienced. Yet, in an important 
way, Ishmael’s “visible hands” evoke a Lockean epistemology of empirical 
experience – even as the “supernatural hand” suggests a dreadful, impalpable, alien 
fatality controlling events that controverts Ishmael’s reassuringly robust Lockean 
epistemology. Ishmael’s agonized space vacillating between the “visible hand” and 
the “supernatural hand” evokes a dramatic sequence in Macbeth which transfigures 
the empirical truth of the senses into a supernatural one. Macbeth addresses the 
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dagger:  
Thou marshall'st me the way that I was going,  
And such an instrument I was to use. -  
Mine eyes are made the fools o' the other senses,  
Or else worth all the rest;  
    (II. i. 42) 
Macbeth’s surreal, almost oxymoronic use of the verb “marshallst,” to lead, with its 
military connotations of discipline and obedience, in contrast to the past progressive, 
“the way that I was going,” which suggests that Macbeth is following the course of a 
plan he himself has made in the past. Is he commanded by the dagger to murder 
Duncan, or is he carrying out a premeditated plan? The ambiguity suggests a 
fundamental inability to know the status of his action. It is the supernatural dagger, 
after all, that is seen through the sense that traditionally delivers the most 
trustworthy empirical information, “the eyes.” Yet, Ishmael might say that 
Macbeth’s empirical experience of the dagger is precisely what calls into question 
the validity of empiricism. Does the dagger, then, emerge from an ideal realm that 
calls Macbeth’s murder into being? This cannot be certain either, for Macbeth 
recognizes that the dagger might be a result of “the bloody business” . . . “a false 
creation of the heat-oppressed brain.” Macbeth’s bubble of confusion occurs 
because the empirical and the ideal are both called into question. Referring to 
Ishmael, Brodtkorb calls this an “irony that conceals its direction of reference.” It is 
worth quoting Brodtkorb in full on this crucial concept:   
. . . rhetorical irony presents without comment a contrariety between a 
phenomenon in the real or fictive worlds (or both) and what is said about it. 
Such irony has two broad purposes: to undercut the phenomenon, or, by 
silently noting the falsity of what the speaker says, to undercut the speaker's 
judgment. But Ishmaelean irony often blurs the necessary contrariety, 
because what is said is about phenomena that are in themselves ambiguous. 
Radically divergent opinions of them may be held by intelligent men, with 
the result that virtually anything Ishmael says about such phenomena will 
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strike certain readers as plausible and others as not.322  
 
Using the example of Macbeth, one could simply claim, as Macbeth does, that he is 
fooling himself: “It is the bloody business which informs thus to mine eyes.” Yet, if 
we accept, as Brodtkorb would, that the dagger represents an accurate 
phenomenological account of Macbeth’s state of mind, it is impossible to determine 
whether Macbeth’s senses lie, spurred on by the “bloody business,” or if they tell the 
truth. As Moby-Dick implies, an even darker irony might be at work. Neither version 
of events might be true - and Macbeth’s dagger might actually be a “mystic sign” of 
an even darker principle, an ontology of “non-being.”   
Non-being, Brodtkorb contends, extends to every aspect of Ishmael’s irony – 
so that his parables do not imply a moral, but, rather the negation of a moral. This 
leads Ishmael to a place of dangerous Shakespearean negation that could, 
conceivably, turn the orthodox structure of the perverse upside down.  
In “The Mast Head,” for example, the hypothetical stander on the mast-
head drops, due to his pantheist dreaminess, through Descartian vortices into the 
sea:  
There is no life in thee, now, except that rocking life imparted by a gently 
rolling ship; by her, borrowed from the sea; by the sea, from the inscrutable 
tides of God. But while this sleep, this dream is on ye, move your foot or hand 
an inch; slip your hold at all; and your identity comes back in horror. Over 
Descartian vortices you hover. And perhaps, at mid-day, in the fairest 
weather, with one half-throttled shriek you drop through that transparent air 
into the summer sea, no more to rise for ever. Heed it well, ye Pantheists! 
(pg. 136)  
 
As we will observe in a later chapter examining Dickinson’s lyric poetry, Ishmael’s 
use of a hypothetical “mast-head-stander” as a figure in his parable produces a 
space of mobile fantasy. A hypothetical figure exists in what I will call in Macbeth a 
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space of “not” or non-being. It is an absent presence. He is a figure generalized out of 
Ishmael’s experience. The image of the material reality of a character with a specific 
history would anchor the figure. With a hypothetical figure, though, the aggressive, 
threatening fantasy of a being that, as Ahab says, “puts forth the mouldings of its 
features from behind the unreasoning mask” (pg. 140), suddenly seems weirdly 
plausible.  
In a hypothetical example, one is in a place of non-being , where character is 
removed and the ultimate state of truth is indeterminate. Are the Descartian vortices 
that claim the mast-head stander a kind of Carlylean justice acting through the mask,  
appealing to a higher reality that the mast-head stander has, somehow, insulted with 
his dreaminess? Melville uses the clinical scientific term, “Descartian vortices” to 
suggest that the “summer sea” is merely an empirical reality. Yet the image is of the 
mast-head stander “hovering” over the Descartian vortices, as if over the jaws 
prepared to swallow the mast-head stander. As Richard Moore observes, Ishmael’s 
“broaching of the Cartesian vortex” has critical implications for “both metaphysical 
and epistemological fronts”:  
the fall from the masthead exposes at once the disunity of the soul and the 
body's exigencies of survival and also the horrific possibility that the material 
world is itself primarily a spiritless, mechanistic void.323  
 
At the end of the novel, the white whale will surface through the mask of the sea to 
annihilate the Pequod’s “only-god-bullying hull” and drag it to the bottom of the 
ocean:  
And now, concentric circles seized the lone boat itself, and all its crew, and 
each floating oar, and every lance-pole, and spinning, animate and 
inanimate, all round and round in one vortex, carried the smallest chip of the 
Pequod out of sight.  
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Is the Pequod dragged down by an avenging god – or does the vortex of nonbeing 
simply swallow it? Ishmael’s irony makes it impossible to tell. The result, though, is 
to inculcate the reader into the terrible sense that non-being itself is a persecuting 
figure. It becomes what, in Dickinson criticism, is called a “tableau vivant.”  Ishmael 
calls it “whiteness.” In Macbeth’s terms, the ideality that swallows the mast-head 
stander is like the “maw and gulf of the ravin’d salt sea shark[s]” (IV i. 23-4).  
Though they are not explicitly perverse, Ishamel's ironic parables already 
produce the dynamic of passive aggressive fantasy exemplified by the truly fertile and 
subversive perverse reading that Dickinson will develop.  
 
 
 
QUEEQUEG AS PROSPERO   
 
Yet, Ishmael is not left immured in a nightmare. For, Queequeg’s fraternal hand 
foreshadows the “Squeeze of the Hand” chapter in which the squeezing by the 
sailors of spermaceti becomes a Whitmanesque symbol of fraternal democracy. 
Paradoxically, it is mutual masturbation that evokes the quintessentially American 
symbols of the “attainable felicity” of hearth and home. If the solitary vice evokes a 
community of evil, such as Ishmael experiences in relation to Ahab, a “mystical 
sympathy” that, at the same time, intensifies his own isolation and bars any mutual 
recognition, how is it that mutual masturbation can carry utopian ideals?  
             Melville’s sexual politics, in this respect, can seem bewildering – and have, 
in my view, frequently been misread. What is important to remember is that just as 
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prostitution was regarded as the social vice, masturbation was regarded as the solitary 
vice. Melville establishes a clear distinction between social and antisocial desire.  
As bizarre as it may seem, given the sexual prejudices of the time period, he 
clearly suggests that deleterious consequences of homoerotic mutual masturbation 
are mitigated by its fraternal and social nature, whereas Ishmael’s solitary vice is the 
counterpart of Ahab’s dangerous, narcissistic, “self-consuming” and 
“misanthrop[ic]” (pg. 326) desire for conquest. While the moralists of the time 
would have rejected Melville’s sexual categories, they were perfectly consistent with 
the antebellum logic which pitted constructive and social desires against antisocial 
desires. It is not ironic then that Melville evokes  “the wife, the heart, the bed, the 
table, the saddle, the fireside, the country” in the same passage that he celebrates 
“the milk and sperm of human kindness.” Such an equivalence would not have 
gotten past the censors, if it was stated explicitly, but it was perfectly consistent with 
the cultural logic that defined perverse sexual desire.  
It is important to add that Queequeg’s fraternal hand initiates another 
powerful Shakespearean theme in the novel. Queequeg has, rightly, been called the 
“reconciling principle” . . . “to offset the Romantic quest of Ahab.”324 Not only are 
Queequeg and Ishmael symbolically wedded in “The Counterpane” chapter, they 
become a kind of married couple through Queequeg’s job, which requires him to 
insert the blubber hook into the whale’s back. In order to carry out this duty, 
Queequeg and Ishmael must be tied together by a “monkey-rope,” which binds 
their fates together:  
So that for better or for worse, we two, for the time, were wedded; and 
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demanded, that instead of cutting the cord, it should drag me down in his 
wake. So, then, an elongated Siamese ligature united us. Queequeg was my 
own inseparable twin brother; nor could I any way get rid of the dangerous 
liabilities which the hempen bond entailed. 
(pg. 255) 
The “Siamese ligature” represents the mutual responsibility between people very 
different and, perhaps, quite far apart, that is the material counterpart of the 
fraternal “milk and sperm of human kindness.” This is precisely the bond that Ahab 
curses when he must rely on the carpenter for his new ivory leg:  
Cursed be that mortal inter-indebtedness . . . I would be free as air; and I'm 
down in the whole world's books. I am so rich, I could have given bid for bid 
with the wealthiest Praetorians at the auction of the Roman empire (which 
was the world's); and yet I owe for the flesh in the tongue I brag with.  
(pg. 360)  
 
Ishmael’s fraternal bond with Queequeg suggests the utopian possibility of 
regeneration through kinship. Yet, it is important to remember that Melville does 
not evoke revolutionary politics through this bond, but the familiar tropes of the 
“attainable felicity” of the middle class home. Also Ishmael’s bond with queer 
Queequeg is on sea: on land, it is “country matters” (Ham. III. ii. 125) that count 
most.  
Steve Mentz is right to associate Queequeg with Shakespeare’s late 
romances, specifically The Tempest and Pericles. Mentz reads Queequeg, most 
persuasively, as a figure analogous to Marina, “a maritime human,” born of the sea, 
who is part of a narrative of resurrection.325 This is most powerfully illustrated in 
Queequeg’s feat of “obstetrics” in “delivery of Tashtego” from the head of a sperm 
whale that has plunged overboard. Likewise, it is Queequeg’s coffin that saves 
Ishmael from the vortex of the Pequod – and it is also notable that “resurrection” is 
what Ishmael awaits, as a child, when he is locked in his bedroom for sixteen hours 
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by his stepmother.   
Yet Queequeg is a mystical figure with a quasi-magical power, like that of 
Prospero. As such, Queequeg embodies that utopian strain from Shakespeare’s 
romances that we discovered in Emerson. Recall, for example, that Prospero 
possesses the power to resurrect the dead:  
    graves at my command 
Have waked their sleepers, oped, and let 'em forth 
By my so potent art  
(V. i. 48-50)   
 
In “Queequeg in his Coffin,” Queequeg takes on some of Prospero’s symbolic 
power to command the dead to rise. He is stricken by a terrible fever and wastes 
away to a shadow of himself. He even orders a coffin made for him. Yet he rallies, 
not out of a natural process, but through a mysterious act of will:  
They asked him, then, whether to live or die was a matter of his own 
sovereign will and pleasure. He answered, certainly. In a word, it was 
Queequeg's conceit, that if a man made up his mind to live, mere sickness 
could not kill him: nothing but a whale, or a gale, or some violent, 
ungovernable, unintelligent destroyer of that sort.  
(pg. 366)  
 
Ishmael’s power to deliver Tashtego from death in the head of a sperm whale; his 
power to resurrect himself from certain death; and his fraternal hand that effects 
Ishmael’s “resurrection” twice, once from the nightmarish solipsism of the 
“phantom hand,” brought on by his stepmother’s punishment, and from the colossal 
wreck of the Pequod precipitated by Ahab’s quest, gives him a quasi-magical power 
that hints at Prospero’s. Remember, for example, that Queequeg’s “tattooing” is the 
work “of a departed prophet and seer of his island”:  
who, by those hieroglyphic marks, had written out on his body a complete 
theory of the heavens and the earth, and a mystical treatise on the art of 
attaining truth; so that Queequeg in his own proper person was a riddle to 
unfold …  
(pp. 366-7) 
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Queequeg’s very tattoos recall Emerson’s phrase in Nature:  “Every man’s condition 
is a solution in hieroglyphic to those inquiries he would put.”326 If the Prospero-like 
“prophet” and “seer” who wrote the hieroglyphics on Queequeg’s body can – as 
Emerson claimed to be able to - read the mysterious cipher with its “complete 
theory of the heavens and earth,” it is Queequeg who has internalized this wisdom 
in the novel. Yet, as we have seen, Queequeg’s fraternal hand does not lead to a 
politics of revolution, but to the accommodation of “attainable felicity.” It doesn’t 
lead to homoerotic union between the two, but to Queequeg’s death. It doesn’t lead 
to a reconciliation with Ahab’s deviant desire, but to a disavowal of it. Melville, at 
the end of Moby-Dick can write, “I have written a wicked book and feel spotless as a 
lamb.”327 He can write those words largely because he has displaced Ishmael’s 
perverse sexuality onto Ahab and has given the queer Cannibal Queequeg the 
project of rehabilitating Ishmael’s wounded heterosexual masculinity.  
Yet as compelling as the Gothic Macbeth narrative is in Moby-Dick, a complete 
reading of it leads to a blind alley. As the novel progresses, it becomes less evocative 
and more of a contrived Gothic apparatus. Ahab’s demonic Parsee companion, the 
mysterious Fedalah, who evokes the “ghostly aboriginalness of earth's primal 
generations” (pg. 191) leads him through a series of all too predictable prophesies 
that echo those of the witches in Macbeth. The most spectacular prophesy is that only 
hemp can kill Ahab:  
"Drive, drive in your nails, oh ye waves! to their utmost heads drive them in! 
ye but strike a thing without a lid; and no coffin and no hearse can be mine: 
– hemp only can kill me! Ha! ha!" 
(pg. 422)  
 
Of course, it is the hempen harpoon line that seizes Ahab around the neck “and 	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voicelessly as Turkish mutes bowstring their victim, he was shot out of the boat, ere 
the crew knew he was gone” (pg. 422). This rather contrived ending to the Macbeth 
allusions, though, is, in my view, an evasive blind alley.  It attempts to distract with 
Macbeth’s Gothic trappings from the animated void of “Whiteness” that Melville 
could not exorcise. Melville’s Shakespeare allusions lead us to another massive 
struggle to impose the perverse jeremiad, and, ultimately, to an evasion and 
displacement of Ishmael’s deviant sexuality upon Queequeg and Ahab, concealed 
by the novel’s spectacular conclusion.  
 
 
THE DEADLY SPACE BETWEEN  
 
Melville’s struggle to impose the perverse jeremiad on his wayward Shakespearean 
identifications leads us to Othello and the “The Try Works” chapter, but to 
understand how courageously evasive the “The Try Works” chapter is, we must first 
grapple with Billy Budd, the novel he wrote thirty seven years later, just prior to his 
death, in which Melville addresses the newly emergent perverse sexual category, the 
homosexual. What we find is a specific pattern of cunning rhetorical evasion that 
recurs again in “The Try Works.”  
 Although the “homosexual,” did not exist as a sexological classification 
when Melville wrote Moby-Dick, it certainly did when he wrote Billy Budd – and he 
embodied one in the figure of the novel’s charismatic villain, Claggart:  
But for the adequate comprehending of Claggart by a normal nature, these 
hints are insufficient. To pass from a normal nature to him one must cross 
"the deadly space between." And this is best done by indirection.  
   Long ago an honest scholar my senior, said to me in reference to one who 
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like himself is now no more, a man so unimpeachably respectable that 
against him nothing was ever openly said tho' among the few something was 
whispered, "Yes, X – – is a nut not to be cracked by the tap of a lady's fan. 
You are aware that I am the adherent of no organized religion much less of 
any philosophy built into a system. Well, for all that, I think that to try and 
get into X – – , enter his labyrinth, and get out again, without a clue derived 
from some source other than what is known as knowledge of the world – that 
were hardly possible, at least for me."328 
 
This line, about the villain Claggart, exhibits, as Eve Sedgwick has observed, a 
striking ambiguity.329 Ewan Fernie draws on Sedgwick for his richly detailed  close-
reading of Claggart’s compelling and possessive desire.330 My interest, though, is to 
zero in on the rhetoric of evasion in the above passage. For it is not simply the 
nature of “the homosexual” that is at issue here, but the “indirection” with which 
such information can be communicated to the reader. On one level, the difference 
between a “normal nature” and that of Claggart is depicted, evoking Thomas 
Campbell’s line from “Battle of the Baltic” to depict “the deadly space between” two 
warships. The line also evokes, for Melville, Milton’s phrase “dreadful interval” (VI. 
105) for the distance between Heaven and Hell in the battle between the angels in 
Milton’s Paradise Lost.  
The first paragraph suggests a communication so fissile that it must be 
conveyed via “indirection.” However, the second paragraph introduces the  
alternate figure of those who have “knowledge of the world.” For these figures, X 
(knowledge of whom is so quarantined that he cannot even be named) is the familiar 
punch-line of a bawdy sexual joke: he is a “nut not to be cracked by the tap of a 
lady’s fan.” Yet, again, this atmosphere of jovial familiarity with X is undercut by 	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the image of the “labyrinth.” If one is not properly initiated into the “knowledge of 
the world,” one might “enter” but implicitly one might never “get out again.” In 
other words, without the proper inoculation, one might be irreversibly corrupted by 
the “labyrinth” presented by Claggart’s sexuality. Yet, to gain “knowledge of the 
world” requires the danger of placing oneself at risk of perversion by that very 
knowledge. For the reader, then, who cannot be trusted with the dangerous 
communication, the only answer is the “indirection” of a self-authorizing code. The 
initiated will smile knowingly – catching the jovial pun – but the dangerous 
knowledge will be inaccessible, hermetically sealed from those not eligible for the 
knowledge.  
What Melville is attempting to ward off here is the suspicion that his 
purpose, as an author, is the transformation of the presumably “normal nature” of 
his reader into a perverse one. The dangerous potential is for the reader to traverse 
the “dreadful interval,” the “deadly space between” heaven and hell – and to 
become immured in the hell of homosexuality forever.  
Like the perverse knowledge of homosexuality, Ahab’s monomania is 
specifically described as being a threat to Ishmael, both intellectual and moral.  In 
“The Try-Works” chapter, the Pequod is described rushing into the darkness on her 
quest:  
freighted with savages, and laden with fire, and burning a corpse, and 
plunging into that blackness of darkness, seemed the material counterpart of 
her monomaniac commander's soul. 
        (pg. 327)  
 
In a passage that foreshadows the description of Claggart and recalls the description 
of Jonah in his attempt to flee from God, Ishmael describes his own perversion by 
the “monomaniac commander”:  
Lo! in my brief sleep I had turned myself about, and was fronting the ship's 
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stern, with my back to her prow and the compass. In an instant I faced back, 
just in time to prevent the vessel from flying up into the wind, and very 
probably capsizing her. How glad and how grateful the relief from this 
unnatural hallucination of the night, and the fatal contingency of being 
brought by the lee!  
        (pg. 327-8) 
 
Like Jonah, who attempts to flee from God, Ishmael is caught in a strange 
conundrum while steering the ship. He is almost possessed by the “hell” – lost in the 
“labyrinth” of Ahab’s perversion, never to be extricated again. The passage almost 
turns into a repetition of the homily by Father Mapple, who tells the story of Jonah, 
who, in fleeing from God, comes to repent after realizing the “crooked chambers of 
his soul.” Yet, in Melville’s earlier novel, the author rejects the Augustinian binary 
view that he later embraces in his characterization of Claggart in Billy Budd.  
Here, Melville voices the traditional Christian rhetoric that “the fire” 
represented by Captain Ahab’s “monomaniac commander’s soul” . . . “invert[s]” 
and “deaden”[s]. Just as Ishmael, while he has dozed and lapsed into a dream, has 
steered the ship off course, so he has been perverted by Ahab. Here, quite contrary 
to a “knowledge of the world” that ends in a bawdy pun, Melville dramatizes 
precisely the “dreadful interval,” the “deadly space between” that he avoids 
describing in Billy Budd – that terminates in his “unnatural hallucination.” Earlier, 
Ishmael describes the ascendency of Ahab over his soul, echoing the phrase “greedy 
ear” from Othello:  
I, Ishmael, was one of that crew; my shouts had gone up with the rest; my 
oath had been welded with theirs; and stronger I shouted, and more did I 
hammer and clinch my oath, because of the dread in my soul. A wild, 
mystical, sympathetical feeling was in me; Ahab's quenchless feud seemed 
mine. With greedy ears I learned the history of that murderous monster against 
whom I and all the others had taken our oaths of violence and revenge.  
(my italics, pg. 152)   
 
In that passage from Othello, Desdemona is impressed by Othello’s adventures:  
 Wherein antres vast and deserts idle,  
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Rough quarries, rocks, and hills whose heads touch heaven,  
It was my hint to speak – such was my process –  
And of the Cannibals that each other eat,  
And the Anthropophagi, and men whose heads 
Do grow beneath their shoulders. These things to hear 
Would Desdemona seriously incline;  
But still the house affairs would draw her thence, 
Which ever as she could with haste dispatch,  
She'd come again, and with a greedy ear 
Devour up my discourse. 
(italics added, I. iii. 154-163)  
  
In Ishmael’s passage, which begins his recounting of the lore of Moby-Dick, there is 
a hint that he becomes a Desdemona captivated by Othello’s stories of monsters, 
“the Cannibals” and the “Anthropophagi.” More, Melville exhibited an explicit 
interest in the notion elaborated in Othello, that describes the contamination of 
“Dangerous conceits.” Of the two passages he scored in Othello, Iago’s boast in the 
soliloquy following his instructions to Emilia to steal Desdemona’s handkerchief is 
one of them:  
 This may do something.  
The Moor already changes with my poisons.  
Dangerous conceits are, in their natures, poisons,  
Which, at the first, are scarce found to distaste;  
But, with a little act upon the blood,  
Burn like the mines of sulphur. – I did say so;  
(III. iii. 361-365)  
 
If Ishmael is a Desdemona to Ahab’s Othello, he is also potentially an Othello 
tormented by the “dangerous conceit” of an Iago, or he might be a Hamlet 
maddened into “oaths of violence and revenge” (pg. 152) by a potentially malignant 
“king’s ghost in supernatural distress” (pg. 160).   
Later in the “The Try-Works,” Ishmael refers “indirectly” to his temptation 
by Ahab through the allegory of the inverted tiller. The “unaccountable drowsiness” 
he describes recalls the earlier parable of the Mast-head stander whose metaphysical 
dreams precipitate in his plunge “through Descartian Vortices” to the sea – never to 
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be heard of again. Far from “knowledge of the world” being something dreadful and 
jovial, in Moby-Dick Ishmael’s imbibing of Ahab’s knowledge of the perverse leads 
not towards annihilation or hell, but towards the wisdom of “unchristian Soloman.” 
Ishmael’s commands to “Look not too long into the face of the fire, O man!” give 
way to a series of negative locutions that certainly present a masterful “labyrinth” of 
perverse “indirection”:  
Nevertheless the sun hides not Virginia's Dismal Swamp, nor Rome's accursed 
Campagna, nor wide Sahara, nor all the millions of miles of deserts and of 
griefs beneath the moon. The sun hides not the ocean, which is the dark side 
of this earth, and which is two thirds of this earth.  
(pg. 328) 
The man who is not like “unchristian Solomon” is described as “undeveloped.” Yet 
through guarded indirection, Melville here continues to undercut the words of the 
homily – valorizing the very “unchristian” wisdom that he ostensibly warns against:  
But even Solomon, he says, "the man that wandereth out of the way of 
understanding shall remain" (I.E., even while living) "in the congregation of 
the dead." Give not thyself up, then, to fire, lest it invert thee, deaden thee; as for 
the time it did me. There is a wisdom that is woe; but there is a woe that is 
madness. And there is a Catskill eagle in some souls that can alike dive down 
into the blackest gorges, and soar out of them again and become invisible in 
the sunny spaces. And even if he for ever flies within the gorge, that gorge is in 
the mountains; so that even in his lowest swoop the mountain eagle is still 
higher than other birds upon the plain, even though they soar. 
(pg. 328) 
In an even more cryptic paragraph, Solomon is used now ostensibly to admonish 
against “wandering out of the way of understanding” . . . into “the congregation of 
the dead.” Yet, like the “man of the world,” he asserts, paradoxically, that he has 
both been “deadened” and “inverted” at one time, but is now mobile – a denizen of 
both worlds - able to extricate himself from the “blackest gorges.” Rather than 
becoming inextricably lost in a “labyrinth,” he becomes “invisible” . . . “in the sunny 
spaces.” The negations, reversals, and  paradoxes of this passage foreshadow the 
duplicity that we find in Melville’s depiction of Claggart.  
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They also position Ishmael in relation to Ahab in a way that is remarkably 
similar to Melville’s later description of the reader in relation to Claggart. He is 
potentially “deadened” and “inverted,” but in crossing the “dread interval,” 
Ishmael’s guarded, cryptic language oddly extracts Ahab’s wisdom, while leaving his 
perversion exiled in the “blackest gorges.” This cryptic language, with its richly 
balanced paradoxes, could suggest a courageous, humanistic psychological victory 
over Ahab’s demagoguery, but, it also suggests something more dubious: Ishmael’s 
conversion.  
The reversals, negation, and paradoxes suggest an Ahab whose influence 
within Ishmael has been sieved of its toxic influences. As with the successful “man of 
the world,” Ishmael has rendered innocuous Ahab’s threatening toxins.   Of course, 
Ahab is a fanatic, but Ishmael presents us a false choice: the fanatic or the man of 
“attainable felicity,” the immaculate conformist Starbuck or the monomaniacal 
Ahab, the “blackest gorges” or the “sunny spaces.” The reader is forced to traverse 
the “deadly space between” these radical polar opposites. John Bryant regards this 
as a position that interrogates ideology, but I suspect it is a position that attempts 
heroically to impose the perverse jeremiad that Ishmael’s deft irony has called into 
question. It is a dynamic that, as in the example of Billy Budd and Ahab, displaces 
aggression onto a scapegoat “tempter,” and requires sacrificial violence – rather 
than absorbing aggression into the self.  
While Melville’s imagery wreaks havoc on the binary of “straight” and 
“perverse,” giving us a Solomon who is both admonishing and exemplifying the 
perverse, he also so structures Ishmael’s “coming of age” story in relation to Ahab, 
making sure to establish a homiletic pattern in which the Pequod, captained by Ahab, 
represents the ship of America’s state headed towards Armageddon and Ishmael as 
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America’s potential salvation, so that Ishmael’s “development” is to purge Ahab’s 
toxic potential from himself. How else is this realized than through Ishmael, as a 
tragic dramatist, writing Ahab’s spectacular demise? The writer who understood 
Shakespeare’s “terrible” insoluble perversity, performs a sleight of hand, in the 
service of his Jeremiah persona, writing an ending that releases Ishmael from the 
terrible burden of Ahab, rather than putting out Ishmael’s eyes. He is resurrected 
from the sea by Queequeg’s coffin, but, we recall, the queer Queequeg has gone 
down into the vortex with Ahab, leaving Ishmael protected by his spirit, but free 
from the threat of his homoerotic feelings for him. Ahab’s ending is a catharsis for 
the reader, but it is a catharsis in the service of the conversion of Ishmael from the 
awful threat posed by Ahab and, in a more covert way, Queequeg. Ishmael is 
transfigured, then, into the immaculate straight hero who fulfills the promise of his 
name:  
As for Ishmael, I have heard you; behold, I will bless him, and will make him 
fruitful and will multiply him exceedingly. He shall become the father of 
twelve princes, and I will make him a great nation.  
(KJ Gen 17:20) 
That nation, “multiplying exceedingly,” with a “line that stretch[es] out to the crack 
of doom” (IV. i. 116), Melville hoped, would be America.  
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APPETITE AND RESISTANCE  
 
 
And yet . . . While the powerful structuring force of the perverse in Moby-Dick is 
dominant, Melville’s attempt to contain Shakespearean perversity is not wholly 
successful. His recourse to the perverse exceeds the pathological categories of the 
antebellum era, and opens up a dangerous experiential space of non-being for the 
reader that has the potential to destroy the structure of disavowal that attempts to 
contain it. For by evoking Shakespeare so forcefully, Melville also inadvertently 
reproduces a quasi-dramatic exchange between reader and text that mirrors 
fundamental elements of Shakespeare’s dramaturgy. This engagement is disavowed 
so successfully that it has led critics themselves into the same process of disavowal 
that the structure of the perverse itself produces.  
The publishing history of Moby-Dick makes this structure of disavowal even 
more apparent. For the closer one reads Moby-Dick, the more skeptical one becomes 
that Ishmael is, indeed, as distinct from Ahab as he claims to be. One central crux in 
the novel rests in the supposed typographical error in the original printing of Moby-
Dick, which left Ahab’s famous “grassy glades” speech (pg. 373) without quotations. 
What has baffled critics for two generations is the fact that the speech’s attribution is 
far from certain. Reasoning that the speech is a soliloquy, consistent with those 
spoken by Ahab, editors have added quotation marks. However, the speech can just 
as easily be attributed to Ishmael. John Bryant argues that this ambiguity is part of a 
dialectical tension between Ishmael and Ahab that places the reader in an 
unresolvable state of tension. Bryant is worth quoting in full:  
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Melville could not have foreseen this particular postmodern reading 
experience, but nevertheless it reinforces the established experience of the 
novel’s revolutionary conditioning of the reader. Tripped up by the text 
itself, an errant set of quotation marks, and caught in the quandary of having 
to assign voices to ideas, we find ourselves revolving in and out of variant 
worlds – pitting Ahab’s fears of nihility against Ishmael’s faith, the politics of 
supremacy rooted in sterility against the politics of inclusion, rooted in 
sexualized community, an ontology of self against other, and the rhetoric of 
Shakespearean theatrics against the poetics of transcendence. Surely these 
conflicting ideologies manifest an age of revolution; but the deeper 
revolution is in the revolving that readers must perform in reading.331   
Bryant’s argument implies that Ishmael’s indeterminate identity explodes the 
structure of the jeremiad, and by extension, the structuring power of the perverse. It 
does this through a unique and gripping engagement with the reader that prevents 
him or her from making precisely the move that sets up the perverse structure of 
disavowal and scapegoating that, as Dollimore argues, feeds the violence of history. 
Ultimately, I disagree with Bryant. As I have argued at length, the structuring force 
of Melville’s perverse jeremiad is very much anchored in place. It attempts not 
merely to emulate Shakespeare, but to bury him. I also don’t feel that there is any 
need to postulate Melville as a forebear of postmodernist criticism, though he may  
indeed be that. I argue that the matrix of Melville’s Macbeth allusions lead back to an 
anxious grappling with a volatile use of non-being within Shakespeare’s dramaturgy 
in that play. As Brodkorb argues, Melville experiments with this through Ishmael’s 
ironic parables; however, this irony merges into a gripping dramatic engagement 
with the reader in the “Whiteness” chapter.  
The use of non-being is intimately linked, as Ewan Fernie has shown, with 
Shakespeare’s gripping dramatic engagement with the audience in Macbeth. For 
Macbeth is not only “hollowed out by his demonic behavior,” but his “sin remains a 
sort of supercharged  moment of negativity which exceeds all forms of ordinary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 John Bryant, “Moby-Dick as Revolution,” ed. Robert S. Levine, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Herman Melville (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pg. 88.  
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existence.” 332 Augustinian non-being also functions, as Philip Davis has shown 
(referring more generally to the underpinning of Shakespeare’s dramatic structure), 
to create spaces of “appetite and resistance,” not only between characters on stage, 
but within the audience itself. Voids open up in Macbeth that collapse the distance 
between the murderous deeds on stage and the audience’s imagination. In my view, 
this is at the ethical core of Melville’s Gothic chapter on whiteness, which I have left, 
thus-far, without comment.   
 
 
THE WHITENESS OF MACBETH 
 
It is my contention that non-being itself is an animating, dramatic presence in 
Macbeth. This edgy, menacing void creates spaces of “appetite and resistance” which, 
as I have argued, make audience complicity inescapable.333 Melville seems to have 
done the impossible in Moby-Dick, which is to extract this absent presence and 
incorporate it into the dynamics between novel and reader.   
The witches in Macbeth are essentially absent presences: “what seemed corporal / 
melted as breath into the wind;” they make the material seem immaterial: “The 
earth hath bubbles as the water hath and these are of them” (I. iii. 78-9). As Terry 
Eagleton writes:  
Androgynous (bearded women), multiple (three-in-one) and ‘imperfect 
speakers’, the witches strike at the stable sexual and linguistic forms which 
the society of the play needs in order to survive . . . firm definitions are 
dissolved and binary opositions are eroded: fair is foul and foul is fair, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 Fernie, pg. 51.  
333 On reader complicity in Macbeth, see Ewan Fernie’s chapter, “Demonic Macbeth,” in 
The Demonic: Literature and Experience (London: Routledge, 2013), pg. 61.  
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nothing is but what is not.334  
 
Yet, the first instance of the dramatic dynamic of perverse reading occurs not when 
the witches first appear, but when Macbeth first hears that one of their prophesies 
has come true. He has become Thane of Cawdor:  
This supernatural soliciting 
Cannot be ill; cannot be good: – 
If ill, why hath it given me earnest of success, 
Commencing in a truth? I am Thane of Cawdor:  
If good, why do I yield to that suggestion  
Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair,  
And make my seated heart knock at my ribs,  
Against the use of nature? Present fears 
Are less than horrible imaginings. 
My thought, whose murther yet is but fantastical, 
Shakes so my single state of man,  
That function is smothered in surmise,  
 And nothing is but what is not.  
            (italics added, I. iii. 129-140)  
 
With those lines, “nothing is but what is not,” an extraordinary absent space opens 
up between Macbeth and an alien part of himself - and between the audience and 
Macbeth. G. Wilson Knight, as we have already seen, has written of those lines with 
devastating simplicity: “Reality and unreality change places.” Macbeth cries in 
horror, as he observes himself “yield”[ing]  to a temptation (“suggestion”) here, that 
he experiences as fantasy. The “murder” is “smothered” by all of Macbeth’s phrases 
designating it as “fantastical”: it is a “surmise”; a “horrid image,” “horrible 
imaginings.” This speech reverses our assumption that “function,” (“intellectual 
activity which is revealed in outward conduct”) is threatening and “surmise” non-
threatening. In fact, in the world of Macbeth, the opposite is true. “Surmise” acts with 
covert violence to “smother” function. Banquo, observing Macbeth in a trance, 
pointedly, observes: “Look, how our partner’s rapt” (I. iii. 142). That word  “rapt” 
perfectly describes the eruption of kinesthetic violence as “unreality” usurps reality.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 Terry Eagleton, William Shakespeare (Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell, 1987), pg. 2.  
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While it’s difficult to deny that the play suggests that Macbeth’s habitual 
method of self-description is a form of self-deceiving equivocation, Macbeth’s 
aggressive fantasy is not so easily isolated and localizable in his character. The play 
suggests, dramatically, rather than philosophically, the possibility explored by 
Ishmael that the world itself is haunted not only by an ontological insubstantiality at 
its core, but by what Malcolm will later call “Confusion”[’s] “Masterpiece”(II. iii. 
63), the possibility that the perverse aesthetic of non-being is at the heart of the 
theatrical experience of the play itself.  
For Macbeth’s speech invites audience and reader fantasy. When Macbeth 
distances the “murder” from himself, with all of those qualifying phrases, he creates 
a space for the reader / audience to remove themselves from the murder’s reality 
and identify with it as a voluptuous fantasy. More, while the reversal of the “real” 
and the “unreal,” the disclaimers, and the slippery syntax susceptible to reversal, 
invite us to toy with the difference between the “thought” of “murder” and the 
“murder” of a “thought,” the space of “not” is so constructed that it opens up a 
seemingly safe zone for the reader’s own passive aggressive fantasies - only 
simultaneously to infiltrate the reader with a sense of boundless guilt, of an 
impossible magnitude. So that the abstract “surmise” always potentially threatens to 
become the active “smother”[er] of the reader.  
In the scene in which Lady Macbeth overtly tempts Macbeth   
to murder Duncan, we find the same perverse reading and mobile fantasy solicited:  
 
 
MACB.     Pr’ythee, peace.  
  I dare do all that may become a man;  
 Who dares do more, is none.  
 
LADY M.      What beast was’t then, 
 That made you break this enterprise with me?  
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 When you durst do it, then you were a man;  
 And, to be more than what you were, you would 
 Be so much more the man. Nor time, nor place,  
 Did then adhere, and yet you would make both:  
 They have made themselves, and that their fitness now 
 Does unmake you. I have given suck, and know 
 How tender ‘tis to love the babe that milks me:  
 I would, while it was smiling in my face, 
 Have pluck’d my nipple from his boneless gums,  
 And dash’d the brains out, had I so sworn  
 As you have done to this.  
       (I. vii. 45-59)  
 
Macbeth uses the qualifier, “he who does more is none,” in his phrase, “I may do all 
that may become a man.” By using the word “none” or “not-man,” Macbeth has 
implicitly called into question the very stability of the category “man,” upon which 
he is staking his moral ground. At the same time, the space of doubt, signified by the 
word, “none,” creates a minute vacuum, filled, as all such absent spaces are in 
Shakespeare, with “appetite and resistance.” 
             For Lady Macbeth, augmentation simply means infinite expansion “to be 
more than what you were, you would / Be so much more the man.”  Yet, it is 
precisely “augmentation” that Banquo fears will threaten his honor: “So I lose none 
/ In seeking to augment it, but still keep / My bosom franchised and allegiance 
clear,” (II. i. 26.2-28).  
             “None” becomes, oddly, a gap that is synonymous with that equivocal space 
of passive aggressive fantasy where one can become what one is “not.” Here is 
Iago’s line, after Othello’s transformation into a similar kind of monster, “He is that 
he is; I may not breathe my censure what he might be; if what he might, he is not.” 
(Oth. IV. i. 272-4) It is to experience the horror of a fantasy seduction that reveals 
oneself to be alien to oneself, “a beast.” Yet, far from merely teaching an isolated 
lesson about ambition or greed, the play ceaselessly provokes the nothingness and 
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augmentation that it seems to be horrified of. It continually produces spaces for the 
aggressive fantasies that it decries.  
 For James Calderwood, the “deed,” Macbeth’s murder of Duncan, is itself 
one of the play’s absent spaces, filled up with audience fantasy:  
This imagery of sexual impotence, stimulation, and performance constitutes 
an erotic metaphor for murder, a kind of intermittent flashing onto the 
regicidal screen of a subliminal image of the sexual act. The effect is to 
confuse the two deeds in the audience's imagination and thus to "undo" the 
murder - that is, to contaminate its purity as an Aristotelean action that is 
whole and complete in itself. If the deed is both a murder and a sexual act, 
then it is neither a murder nor a sexual act but something monstrous and 
unnameable. 335  
 
The metaphors, in Lady Macbeth’s temptation speech to Macbeth connect alcohol 
and sexual performance with the murder of Duncan.  
When in swinish sleep  
Their drenched natures lie as in a death,   
What cannot you and I perform upon   
The unguarded Duncan? What not put upon  
 His spongy officers, who shall bear the guilt   
Of our great quell? (I. vii. 67-72)  
 
This imagery continues through the actual murder, (“I have done the deed”[II. ii. 
14]). The Porter recapitulates the theme in a comic mode, playing off of Macbeth’s 
equivocation: 
 Lechery, sir, it provokes, and unprovokes; 
it provokes the desire, but it takes 
away the performance: therefore, much drink 
may be said to be an equivocator with lechery: 
it makes him, and it mars him; it sets 
him on, and it takes him off; it persuades him, 
and disheartens him; makes him stand to, and 
not stand to; in conclusion, equivocates him 
in a sleep, and, giving him the lie, leaves him. 
(II. iii. 27-33)  
  
Yet, what the Porter, like a loyal subject, calls “equivocation,” Macbeth and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 James L. Calderwood, If It Were Done: Macbeth and Tragic Action (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1986), pg. 45. See also Ewan Fernie, “And in that context, the gash’d 
stabs for ruin’s wasteful entrance associate the King with rape.” The Demonic: Literature and 
Experience (London: Routledge, 2013), pg. 60. 
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audience have experienced as a dangerous state of transgressive fantasy. While the 
Porter’s speech seems a tonic designed to restore us to our senses, it actually plunges 
the audience into a deeper alienation because it is impossible fully to believe that we 
are not complicit either in Macbeth’s murderous fantasy or in the abyss of doubt 
that has opened up through his immediate, dramatic experience of non-being.  
“To know my deed, ‘twere best not know myself!” Macbeth cries. Macbeth 
can “know the deed,” but he must forget himself - or if he “know”[s]  . . . “himself,” 
he will, hypocritically, be concealing his deed. Yet, the questionable ontological 
status of the “deed” (it is described as “a new Gorgon” [III. ii. 69]; “the great 
doom’s image” [II. iii. 75]; “death itself” [II. iii. 74]; that which “tongue nor heart 
cannot conceive nor name”[II. iii. 61]) means that, in a very real sense, Macbeth 
cannot know the deed. And if, as the play suggests, the “deed” has ultimately, an 
unspecified ontological authority, then noumenal truth in the play may, literally, be 
obscene. As we recall, the echo (which has, according to the OED produced a folk 
etymology) of “scene” in “obscene” evokes “the stage of a Greek or Roman theatre, 
including the platform on which the actors stood.”336 The perverse cannot be shown 
on stage. Responding to what might be characterized as the ontological change in 
the play after Duncan’s murder, Donalbain observes, “there are daggers in men’s 
smiles/ the near in blood, the nearer bloody” (III. iii. 138.1). Just prior to this, 
Banquo observes:  
   And when we have our naked frailties hid 
   That suffer in exposure, let us meet 
   And question this most bloody piece of work.  
   (II. iii. 123-5)  
 
In a very real sense, Banquo, Donalbain, and Malcolm don’t “suffer in exposure” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 Oxford English Dictionary, “obscene, adj.” 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/129823?redirectedFrom=obscene.  	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only because of the fact that they are still in their night-clothes, since they have been 
roused from sleep, or even from fear of Macbeth’s treachery, but from an obscenity 
that must, like Iago’s “work,” Othello’s murder of Desdemona immediately be 
“hid.” As Lodovico cries, “The object poisons sight. / Let it be hid” (V.ii.373–375). 
What must immediately be hidden is that the murderous void makes meaning through 
a dangerous, transgressive experience by which “non-being” becomes a palpable 
absent presence that presents the audience with an existential risk: it may liberate 
them from murderous violence through tragic catharsis, but it also may realize an 
ontology, like that in Moby Dick, characterized by murder.  
              In the chapter, “The Spouter Inn,” as we have discovered, Ishmael 
observes a painting filled with “unaccountable masses of shades and shadows.” The 
painting seems to be from the time of the “New England hags” . . . it is a “blasted 
heath,” a “nameless yeast.” The painting finally resolves itself into an image of 
terrible horror that, if anything, is more shocking than any of the glimpses into “the 
seeds of time” that the witches in Macbeth afford:  
The picture represents a Cape-Horner in a great hurricane; the half-
foundered ship weltering there with its three dismantled masts alone visible; 
and an exasperated whale, purposing to spring clean over the craft, is in the 
enormous act of impaling himself upon the three mast-heads.  
          (pg. 26) 
 
When William Faulkner famously observed that Moby-Dick was a “Golgotha of the 
heart,” he must have had in mind these “three mast-heads” Ishmael sees the whale 
impaling himself upon.337 Yet if we follow the Macbeth echoes in Moby-Dick, the 
image of being transfixed and immobile like the whale is a re-presentation of 
Ishmael’s childhood response to the “supernatural hand” . . . in which he was frozen 
for “ages piled on ages.” The whale is also described, in “Loomings,” in spectral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 Quoted in Harold Bloom, William Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury (New York: Bloom's 
Literary Criticism, 2008), pg. 161.  
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terms, as a “hooded phantom;” Ishmael dreads the fact that his own deepest fate is 
intertwined in the horrible destiny depicted in the painting; yet, the ravished image 
of impaling suggests that an alien, unacknowledged, unrepresentable, sacred and 
obscene aspect of Ishmael’s self intensely desires this and wills it. It is this 
Shakespearean non-being, filled with menacing danger and existential risk that I 
think is the ethical core of Moby-Dick. It is a core that Melville succeeds in denying 
through the powerful structuring agency of the perverse: most effectively by the 
drowning of queer Queequeg and the perverse Ahab in the same vortex. Melville’s 
duplicitous plot device, though, does not succeed in closing the gap that he opened 
by evoking Shakespeare. To some extent, Melville reproduces the very dynamic in 
Macbeth that he later disavows in his chapter “The Whiteness of the Whale.” I now 
turn to that chapter.  
 
 
HERE IS A PLACE RESERVED  
  
In the narrative of Moby-Dick, “The Whiteness of the Whale” supplies the reader 
with a crucial piece of information. Ishmael has said that he “gave myself up to the 
abandonment of the time”:  
I, Ishmael, was one of that crew; my shouts had gone up with the rest; my 
oath had been welded with theirs; and stronger I shouted and more did I 
hammer and clinch my oath, because of the dread in my soul. A wild, 
mystical sympathetic feeling was in me; Ahab’s quenchless feud seemed 
mine.  
        (pg. 152) 
 
Yet this Ishmael, who becomes “one of that crew,” is largely alien to us. Whiteness, 
couched as Ishmael’s confession, where he purports to “explain myself” or else “all 
these chapters might be naught,” does not give us insight, but a blank space, a 
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“place reserved,” such as Macbeth’s place occupied by Banquo’s ghost, not for 
Ishmael, but for the reader. And, instead of gaining a comforting knowledge of 
Ishmael, the reader experiences the theatrical ghost of perverse reading.  
             At the very start of the chapter, the reader is already in the realm of perverse 
reading. 
It was the whiteness of the whale that above all things appalled me. But how 
can I hope to explain myself here; and yet, in some dim, random way, 
explain myself I must, else all these chapters might be naught.  
      (pg. 159, italics added) 
 
If the reader doesn’t understand the chapter on whiteness, “all these chapters might 
be naught;” if the reader does understand the chapter, as he or she will soon 
discover, the reader will  recognize  that he or she is naught. The chapter truly is a 
“white lead chapter on whiteness.” It presents us with a double-negation that is 
strangely familiar from our reading of Macbeth: “To know this chapter on whiteness, 
‘twere best not know ourselves.” This is the theatrical space of perverse reading.  
             The chapter begins by using the empirical principle of nineteenth century 
psychology, based upon Lockean associationism, offering a whole barrage of positive 
symbolic associations with “whiteness” stacked up behind a clause, “though” 
designed to fill those associations with doubt:  
Though in many natural objects, whiteness refiningly enhances beauty . . . in 
most august religions it has been made the symbol of divine spotlessness and 
power . . . yet, for all these accumulated associations, with whatever is sweet 
and honorable, and sublime, there yet lurks an elusive something in the 
innermost idea of this hue, which strikes more of panic to the soul than that 
redness which affrights in blood.  
        (pg. 159)  
 
The “kindly associations,” Melville suggests, are destroyed like a papier maché mask 
by an “innermost idea of this hue.” This writhes and menaces into being, out of 
nowhere, with a “panic to the soul.” As we witnessed earlier, Ishmael here subtly 
calls Locke’s epistemology of the “visible hand” into question with a mysterious, 
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impalpable ideality that carries associations with Macbeth.  
             Ishmael attempts to clarify why this whiteness that he posits possesses an 
idealized significance, “heightens terror to the utmost bounds.” Ishmael 
hypothesizes that perhaps it is the contrast between our expectation and the reality 
that truly startles and appalls; yet, even this explanation fails:  
That heightened hideousness, it might be said, only arises from the 
circumstance, that the irresponsible ferociousness of the creature stands 
invested in the fleece of celestial innocence and love; and hence, by bringing 
together two such opposite emotions in our minds, the Polar bear frightens 
us with so unnatural a contrast. But, even assuming all this to be true, yet, 
were it not for the whiteness, you would not have that intensified terror.  
        (pg. 160)  
 
What is truly frightening to Ishmael, though, is the sense that the horror comes from 
the violent force of transgression which makes whiteness of divinity indistinguishable 
from an imposter whiteness of the “irresponsible ferociousness” of the polar bear or 
the “abhorrent mildness” of the great white shark.  
             As we saw in Macbeth, this usurpation of whiteness (or, in Macbeth, 
nothingness) disrupts the binary opposition between good and evil, suggesting a 
dynamic power of murderous transgression and usurpation. More, like the murder 
of Duncan, this murderous transgression is not merely a feature of the novel’s 
semiotic system, but claims to be an actual account of the meaning of whiteness 
itself.  
             As Ishmael develops his case, citing the “white squall” and the “headland 
shoals of combed white bears” that frighten sailors, he attempts to imagine test-cases 
in which the “ideality” of whiteness can be proved. Ishmael is not just trying to posit 
a metaphysics of non-being, he posits a Macbeth-like murderous blank behind 
appearances. Whiteness is a “mystic sign;” it is a “nameless thing;” but, this 
impalpable thing is also the aggressive “demonism of the world,” rushing through 
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the mask with terrifying ferocity. He gives the example of a “strong young colt” who 
seems, without any prior conditioning, to possess “an instinct” for the horrible 
knowledge of whiteness:  
If one merely “shake”[s] a “fresh buffalo robe behind him so that he cannot 
see, but only smells its wild muskiness - why will he start, snort, and with 
bursting eyes paw the ground in phrensies of affright? There is no 
remembrance of any gorings of wild creatures in his green northern home? 
Though thousands of miles from Oregon, still when he smells that savage 
musk, the rending, goring bison herds are as present as to the deserted wild 
foal of the prarie which this instant they may be trampling to dust”  
        (pg. 164)   
 
The colt’s “phrensies of affright,” Ishmael reasons, must have a source. The quasi-
philosophical talk of ideality conjures the world of his childhood with its vocabulary 
of “incantation,” “enchantment,” “spell,” “legerdemain;” it evokes the mysterious 
“Spouter Inn” chapter where, as we recall, Ishmael peers at that painting of 
“shapeless masses” associated with a “blasted heath” and “New England hags.” Yet 
the “white lead chapter on whiteness” culminates in a variation on the biblical 
image of “whited sepulchers,” (KJ, Matthew 23:27) but Melville may also have 
picked up the Shakespearean technique of perverting that biblical image with sexual 
imagery: “Deified Nature absolutely paints like the harlot whose allurements cover 
nothing but the charnel house within” (pg. 165).  
             The echo may be from an aside in which Claudius responds to an 
observation by Polonius. Polonius, typically, offers a pious proverb that evokes in 
Claudius a very personal anguish:  
           ‘Tis too much prov’d - that with devotion’s visage 
           And pious action we do sugar o’er the devil himself.  
           (III. i. 47-48)  
 
Claudius cries to himself:  
The harlot’s cheek, beautied with plastering art,  
Is not more ugly to the thing that helps it 
Than is my deed to my most painted word.  
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(italics added, III. i. 51-53)  
In “Whiteness,” color itself becomes a hypocritical imposter. More, as the allusion to 
Hamlet’s Claudius suggests, colors might be themselves merely a “painted word.” For 
Emerson, who developed a semiotics based on the proposition that “particular 
natural facts correspond to particular spiritual facts,” this passage might be 
particularly devastating. Ishmael uses Locke, with his epistemology of the “visible 
hand” to point out a Macbeth -like revelation, that light does not “inhere in 
substances,” making the appearances of substances themselves impalpable. Or:  
The great principle of light, for ever remains white or colorless in itself, and 
if operating without medium upon matter, would touch all objects, even 
tulips and roses, with its own blank tinge. 
       (pg. 165)  
 
Only Ross’s statement in Macbeth approaches the devastating horror of Melville’s 
whiteness: “nothing / But who knows nothing is once seen to smile” (IV. iii. 166-7).   
             At the same time, the space of whiteness, like the haunted “space reserved” 
at Macbeth’s feast, cries out for a dangerous, haunted complicity with its readers. 
Are the “butterfly cheeks of young girls” horrifically disfigured by the revelation that 
they are merely the manifestation of Nature that “paints like the harlot” or have 
young girls themselves become harlot-like? Are the polar bears, with an  
“irresponsible ferociousness” that surfaces from beneath a “fleece of celestial 
innocence,” feared animals or are they identified with by Ishmael and, by implication, 
the reader? Ishmael imagines the young colt made mad with terror by the “savage 
musk” that conjures images of “rending goring bison herds;” whiteness itself by 
means of its “indefiniteness” . . . “stabs us from behind with thoughts of things 
unknown” (pg. 165); Yet, the images of “frenzy” in the space of whiteness that is 
perverse reading are reversible. Ishmael converts these images into murderous 
violence that, at the end of the chapter, springs into being. In the final Macbeth-like 
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sentence, converting persecution into aggression, Ishmael cries, “And of all these 
things, the Albino whale was the symbol. Wonder ye then at the fiery hunt?” (pg. 
165). His intent is not that the reader experiences sympathy with Ishmael’s 
aggression, but that the reader too cries with him with a similar murderous rage. His 
intent is also that the reader hears him or herself crying in murderous rage, and 
recoils in horror, not at Ishmael, but at him or herself. That self-overhearing is, 
perhaps, the only exit from the mad dilemma of perverse displacement that we have 
encountered in this reading. Yet, even to give it a humanistic meaning is to falsify it 
and, thereby, to diminish the existential risk it entails.  
             In the very next chapter, “The Chart,” the “independent being” of Ahab’s 
obsessive pursuit of the whale will be described as an “unfathered birth,” a 
“creature” that renders his soul a “blank.” This “blank”[ness] is the place of 
whiteness. And the “white room” is the obscene place of perverse reading.  
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EMILY DICKINSON, AMERICAN IAGO: 
PERVERSE READING  
 
I AM NOT WHAT I AM  
 
Emily Dickinson could well say with Iago, “I am not what I am.” Her gripping 
dramatic lyrics and deft irony present us with the great counter-tradition in the 
American tradition of the perverse that I have surveyed. Dickinson is the one true 
nay-sayer, whose corrosive irony presents the reader with a genuine “utopia,” a no-
place that doesn’t project identity into the future, but negates all identity whatsoever. 
While it is far from clear that Dickinson had any intention of challenging American 
ideology at its core, it is quite clear that she employed sexual politics against her male 
readers in such a way that deliberately disintegrated the very ground on which 
confident assertions of masculine ego – including assertions about the structure of 
history and America’s place in it – were possible.338  
 Rather than presenting American as the solution to the tragic history of the 
Old World on the back of Shakespeare’s great tragedies, Dickinson exuberantly 
identifies with Othello’s Iago, casting her shocked male reader in the uneasy position 
of a humiliated Othello.339 In doing so, Dickinson turns Augustinian non-being on its 
head by cultivating in her reader a positive, ironic, subversive non-being that cannot 
be subsumed into an identity politics.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 Robert McClure. Smith, The Seductions of Emily Dickinson (Tuscaloosa, Ala: University of 
Alabama, 1996). 
339 Recall, for example, Whitman’s hope that the “author of” Othello and Hamlet might be 
read as “putting on record the first full exposé” of the “political theory” that “America has 
come on earth to abnegate and replace.” Walt Whitman, November Boughs (Philadelphia: 
David McKay, 1888), pp. 53.  
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 Lee Edelman cites irony as the trope that establishes a critical distance for the 
critic of America’s seemingly irresistible rhetoric of reproductive futurism. Edelman 
quotes Paul de Man in a way that is applicable to Dickinson’s lyrics: “any theory of 
irony is the undoing, the necessary undoing, of any theory of narrative.”340 Edelman 
goes on to assert, “The corrosive force of irony thus carries a charge for de Man 
quite similar to that of the death drive.” Its purpose is to undo the ‘text machine” 
because irony “undoes any narrative consistency of lines” . . . “undoes the reflexive 
and dialectical model, both of which are, as you know, the basis of any narration.” 
Far from merely a habitual trope, though, Dickinson animates her irony by creating 
a Shakespearean dramatic persona and spaces that collapse the distance between 
narrator and reader, plunging her reader into an active experience of the very 
“Death-Drive” that Edelman evokes. Consistent with my argument, I suggest that 
the term Augustinian “non-being” is preferable to the “Death-Drive,” because it 
evokes the specific history that I have demonstrated plays such an active role in the 
shaping of American teleology (and consequently, ideology). Dickinson animates 
Augustinian non-being through the figure of Iago in order to create an active space 
of non-identity within her reader that makes such teleology impossible.  
 
 
PIERCÉD THROUGH THE EAR   
 
Emily Dickinson has become a legend in American literature. The story of the 
recluse, the “virgin spinster” who never left her father’s house, but wrote the greatest 
lyrical poetry in the history of the American canon is seared into the American 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 Quoted in Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004), pg. 23.  
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popular imagination. Many unfamiliar with Dickinson’s poetry have heard of the 
reclusive woman who disregarded the conventions of her time – and stubbornly 
discovered her own aesthetic vision by breaking all of the rules established by the 
leading literary authorities of her day. Her verse of uncanny power with 
unforgettable first lines like “I heard a Fly buzz when I died” (591) and “My Life had 
stood a Loaded Gun” (764)341 seem to dissolve conventions – and reach down to a 
level of primary reality that has exercised a permanent fascination on American 
readers.  
 With the publication in 2006 of Páraic Finnerty’s critically acclaimed book, 
Emily Dickinson’s Shakespeare, the crucial question has emerged again: what is the 
nature of the relationship between Dickinson’s poetry and Shakespeare’s plays? For 
years, critics have found a veritable treasure trove of suggestive allusions to 
Shakespeare throughout Dickinson’s poetry and letters: sunset described as 
“Cleopatra’s Company repeated in the sky” (696); a woman’s life - lost in a 
suffocating marriage - is mourned echoing Ariel’s song from The Tempest:  
It lay unmentioned – as the Sea 
Develop Pearl, and Weed, 
But only to Himself – be known 
The Fathoms they abide  
(857)  
 
Another poem begins, “If What we could – were what we would” (540) strangely 
echoing Ophelia’s “Lord, we know what we are, but know not what we may be.” 342 
(IV. v. 44) Critics have particularly delighted in Dickinson’s expressed preference for 
Antony and Cleopatra, observing Dickinson’s ability to flout gender conventions by 
identifying with both roles when it suited her – even, most suggestively, taking on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 Emily Dickinson and R. W. Franklin, The Poems of Emily Dickinson (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press, 1999). All future references to Emily Dickinson’s poetry will be from this edition. 
342 William Shakespeare, The Norton Shakespeare Based on the Oxford Edition, ed. Stephen 
Greenblatt (London: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
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the role of Antony in a note to her sister-in-law, Sue Bowles, “Egypt thou knew’st!” 
(from “Egypt, thou knew'st too well!”[III. xi. 56.2]).343 
 Finnerty’s recent book offers tantalizing details about Dickinson’s interest in 
Shakespeare’s Othello. In addition to being heavily marked in Dickinson’s family copy 
of Shakespeare, Othello is the only play that Dickinson may have seen in 
production.344 Relying on letters, poems, and theater history, Finnerty focuses on 
Dickinson’s controversial identification with Othello’s tragic protagonist. Finnerty’s 
study, with its emphasis on theater history, though, ignores far more intriguing 
parallels, between Dickinson’s unusual departures in syntax and word-selection and 
the language in Othello.  
 These structural parallels show that Dickinson mastered a technique intrinsic 
to the way that Shakespeare develops intense, intimate, and dangerous interpersonal 
relationships between characters on the stage. More than any other character in 
Shakespeare, Dickinson most often identified not with Othello’s protagonist, but 
Othello’s famous arch-villain: Iago. Dickinson and Iago use hypothetical cases, 
ambiguous pronouns, the subjunctive mood, and infinitive clauses that dislocate from 
time and place, to create a dangerously remote, ambiguous interpersonal space 
between listener (Othello) and speaker (Iago), reader and poem, that is, then, 
“piercéd”345 (I. iii. 217) by metaphor with alarming, intimate implications. What is 
created is a language filled with a scintillating sense of dramatic suspense – as the 
audience’s ear (and the reader’s eye) learn that droningly remote hypotheticals can 
quickly reverse to become the site of immediate danger.  
 The capacity of Dickinson’s poetry seemingly to reach from the page and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 Páraic Finnerty, Emily Dickinson’s Shakespeare (Amherst and Boston, University of 
Massachusetts, 2006), pg. 147.  
344 Finnerty, Emily Dickinson’s Shakespeare, pg. 161.  
345 William Shakespeare, Othello, the Moor of Venice, ed. Michael Neill, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). All future references to Othello will be to this edition.  
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seize the reader, embroiling her in the agonized crisis of belief that is their central 
theme – has been well documented. Susan Juhasz, among others, has long argued 
that Dickinson’s poetry engages its readers in a performance.346 Indeed, she has given 
live performances of improvised “readings” of Dickinson poems – with great 
success.347  
 Part of what has made Dickinson’s poems so successful as performance-pieces 
is the way that they wreak havoc on normative categories. Dickinson’s poems 
“queer” their subject matter by “press[ing] upon systems of classification . . . to 
torture their lines of demarcation.”348  
 This tendency has been called “Queer” because it destabilizes normative 
dichotomies such as male / female, heterosexual / homosexual, and natural / 
unnatural. 349 Susan Juhasz defines “Queer” like this:  
"Queer" is a verb, an adjective, and a noun. The verb means to skew or 
thwart. The adjective means unconventional, strange, suspicious. Queer as a 
noun was originally a derogatory term for male homosexuals. It has been 
reclaimed in academic theory as a tool to question and disarrange normative 
systems of behavior and identity in our culture, especially as they regulate 
gender, sexuality, and desire.350 
 
What “Queer” Dickinson misses, though, is that the havoc Dickinson wreaks on 
normative conceptual boundaries is inseparable from the fact that her lyrics act upon 
the reader in ways that are inescapably associated with drama. As quasi-dramatic 
rhetoric, they do not “disarrange normative systems” in the neat way that “academic 
theory” suggests they do. Rather, as self-consciously dramatic rhetoric they act upon 
the reader in ways that are evasive, manipulative, insincere and often profoundly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 Juhasz, Susan, Cristanne Millar, Martha Nell Smith, Comic Power in Emily Dickinson 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993).  
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348 Juhasz, Susan, ‘Amplitude of Queer Desire in Dickinson’s Erotic Language’, The Emily 
Dickinson Journal, 14.2 (2005), pg. 8.   
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immoral. Although this is part of the dynamic fiction that Dickinson’s poems create 
in conjunction with her reader, the poems also produce a kind of thinking that has 
real form and substance, embodied in rhetorical structures, syntax and word 
selection that produce a particular form of  “unconventional” thought that I call by 
the name of “perverse reading.” Perverse reading is the spontaneous reader response 
to the solicitation of Dickinson’s dramatic language. It is a “building” of meaning 
that occurs within a context defined by uninflected verb moods that are without 
present, past, or future, but that are pregnant with concepts both murderous and 
fertile.  
 
  
THE SURFACE OF POETIC DRAMA  
 
 Emily Dickinson’s poetry appears, on the surface, to be lyric poetry, written 
in the Romantic tradition; but this is misleading. As Dickinson herself has written in 
her famous letter to Higginson, she perceived herself as “Representative of the 
Verse” and her figures as “supposed persons”351 (L269). Dickinson’s poetry is related 
to the dramatic monologue, but it is principally a drama of ideas: 
[Dickinson’s poems] suspend conclusions, undermine the positions from which 
they start, balance different and often antithetical attitudes, play them off 
against one another. Assertions clash, and leave each other weakened and 
frail.352  
 
Although Dickinson was not concerned with representing character, her attention to 
these “antithetical attitudes” creates the kind of “self-effacement we associate with a 
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dramatic art.”353 Certainly, a drama of ideas that Gibson calls the “poetry of 
hypothesis” is at work, but Dickinson’s poetry has unique features which involve her 
reader in a truly unique form of engagement. Robert Weisbuch isolates one of these 
features when he observes that Dickinson’s poems often seem on the surface to report 
events, but, in fact, they lack the basic “situational matrix” 354 that constitutes lyric 
poetry: a protagonist, a setting, a clearly defined event. Instead, an elaborate analogy 
takes the place of the poem’s “scene”:  
When Dickinson’s poems pose as reportorial, the speaker does not proclaim, 
“I was there – this is what happened to me”; instead, he implies, “I was 
somewhere – the exact place doesn’t matter – and this analogy will constitute 
the meaning of that experience, minus the experiential trimmings.355 
 
As a result of this “scenelessness,” Dickinson’s readers rush to fill the vacuum with 
interpretation. Interestingly, much of the debate about Dickinson’s signature poems, 
“It was not Death, for I stood up,” (355), “I felt a Funeral in my Brain” (280), “My 
Life had stood -- a Loaded Gun” (764), is based on the vast difference in “scenes” 
supplied by readers who are compelled to engage in what Iago calls “build”[ing] 
from “scattering and unsure observances” (III. iii. 150).  
 While critical interpretation is always a form of performance, Dickinson’s 
apparently static and opaque poems actually incite the reader into the dynamism of 
the performance that they seem reticently to eschew. The reader does not just gain 
an aesthetic view of the whole, but is an intimate co-creator who supplies the 
building blocks of the aesthetic event. As Susan Juhasz observes, Dickinson’s poetry 
becomes a site at which a “performance” of the reader’s “subjectivity” takes place:  
Dickinson’s poems take to an extreme the inclination of the lyric genre 
towards the constructed liminality of its subjective presence, the outline of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 Gibson, ‘Poetry of Hypothesis’, pg. 227. 
 
354 Robert Weisbuch, Emily Dickinson’s Poetry (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 
1972), pg. 19.  
355 Ibid.  
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self in an unplaced moment. Hence the reader is even more than usually 
required to enact the contours of the speech-act or moment in interpretation, 
an enactment that constitutes performance in that the poem provides the only 
text for that implied subjectivity.356 
 
Juhasz, McClure Smith, and Noble, quite legitimately, see these performative acts by 
the reader as opportunities to challenge the normative patterns of engagement 
according to gender and sexual orientation. Many of Dickinson’s best poems, 
though, have specific features, such as ambiguous pronouns, the subjunctive mood, 
clauses modifying two sentences, that direct the reader’s performance in a way that I 
would argue is best described as perverse.  
 
DRAMATIC REVERSAL  
 
At the same time that Dickinson’s “sceneless” poems have a unique way of collapsing 
the distance between reader and text, Dickinson makes the act of deciphering her 
poetry into an experience infused with drama. This drama is based upon a power 
dynamics that Gary Lee Stonum has called “the structure of mastery”:  
Mastery is a pervasive structure in [Dickinson’s] work . . . and it appears 
variously as a predicament, a temptation, and a threat . . . conflict between 
self and other is basic to the romantic sublime and a similarly jealous 
competition produces and sustains the structure of mastery.357 
 
Stonum goes to great lengths to demonstrate the way that Dickinson distances herself 
from the tradition of the structure of mastery constructed between poem and reader, 
typical of the Romantic sublime; but, I would argue that what Stonum calls 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 Juhasz, Suzanne and Cristanne Miller. ‘Performances of gender in Dickinson’s poetry.’ 
The Cambridge Companion to Emily Dickinson. Ed. Wendy Martin. Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. Cambridge Collections Online. Cambridge University Press. 30 
April 2010, pg. 110.   
357 Stonum, The Dickinson Sublime, pg. 149.  
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Dickinsons’ reticence, her attitude of “hesitation” and “deferral”358 towards the 
structure of mastery, is actually evidence of her mastery of a dramatic tension 
between poem and reader that is more effective because it is so reticently concealed.  
 Dickinson’s poems gain vitality by dramatizing vast disparities in size and 
power, (“The Brain -- is wider than the Sky” [598]). Gnats and Giants (444), 
“Daisy” and the “Himmaleh” (460), a schoolboy and Mount “Vesuvius” (1691): 
these vast power disparities charge the interpretive space between reader and poem. 
A poem’s narrator can, for example, retain an attitude of obsequious servitude to a 
“Master” (427) reader only to subject the reader to a shocking status reversal. 359  
 Andrew Gibson isolates Dickinson’s use of the “subjunctive mood” as the 
most important formal feature in her work that contributes to her moments of 
explosive dramatic reversal:  
 The effect of the troubling subjunctive is to make the point  
seem conditional  . . . Once we recognize that a corrosive scepticism has 
entered the poem, then, as is so often the case with Dickinson, the very shape 
of the poem begins to change, and uncertainties proliferate.360  
 
David Porter has observed that, in addition to the subjunctive mood, Dickinson also 
uses ambiguous subjects, the passive voice, negations, and dropped articles.361 For 
Porter, these techniques produce a poetry that possesses no “final reality” . . . “intent 
on saying itself and not on signifying a specific world.”362 It is the lack of a “specific 
world,” though, that gives Dickinson’s poetry that peculiarly vital and menacing 
dramatic intensity.  
 In “Sunset at Night – is natural –” Dickinson’s combines dramatic reversal of 
power roles with the use of the hypothetical subjunctive mood in order to create a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 Ibid. 
359 Robert McClure Smith, ‘Dickinson and the Masochistic Aesthetic’, The Emily Dickinson 
Journal, 7.2, (1998), pg. 2.   
360 Gibson, ‘Poetry of Hypothesis’ pg. 227. 
361 Porter, Dickinson, the modern idiom, pp. 39-58. 
362 Ibid., pg. 55.  
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quasi-dramatic space that threatens with dreadful  possibilities:  
 
Sunset at Night—is natural— 
But Sunset on the Dawn 
Reverses Nature—Master— 
So Midnight's—due—at Noon. 
 
Eclipses be  – predicted  – 
And Science bows them in  – 
But do one face us suddenly  – 
   Jehovah's Watch  – is wrong. (427) 
 
In the first stanza, Dickinson assigns the reader the title of “Master”; then, she 
“Reverses Nature” imagining the world where “Midnight” displaces the sun. This 
coy usurpation of the reader’s power creates a tense struggle between reader and 
poem. It is not that Dickinson’s speaker has claimed superiority over the reader; she 
has revealed a tragically disordered world where the very term “Master” is rendered 
ridiculous. As we will later see, polarization and reversal of power dynamics are 
characteristic features of Iago’s rhetoric. These allow him to create an intense, 
dramatic interpersonal space between himself and Othello – while remaining hidden 
behind a veneer of obsequious formality.  
 Another feature present here that we will later discover in Iago’s rhetoric is 
Dickinson’s use of the subjunctive mood, “Eclipses be predicted.” The subjunctive 
mood functions here precisely as Gibson has suggested. It allows Dickinson to make 
the “Eclipse”[] seem both distant, because it is not tied to a particular person, place 
or time, and also intimately menacing at the same time. When Dickinson personifies 
“Eclipse”[] in line 3 of the second stanza, “Do one face us suddenly,” the remoteness 
is pierced with dangerous intimacy. Dickinson’s reversal is so mesmerizing we may 
forget that it is based upon a polarized power imbalance that the poem itself has 
produced. The moment at which the “eclipse”[] seems to turn towards us 
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“face”[ing] us, has a theatrical flare, the surprise of a lived experience – but, this 
rabbit (or eclipse) that the poem has pulled out of a hat is one that is half-created by 
the reader’s own anxiety, prompted by the poet’s use of the subjunctive.  
In “Sunset at Night—is natural –”, Dickinson creates a closed, intimate, 
interpersonal space with the reader in which “noon” becomes blotted out, replaced 
by a dreadful “Midnight.” This ominous “Midnight” is emblematic of the perilous 
vacant, hypothetical space Dickinson’s poems repeatedly produce. It is a theatrical 
space very familiar to those who have engaged in Shakespearean tragedy,  where 
“nothing is but what is not.” Like one of the “bubbles” (I. iii. 78) where the Weird 
Sisters appear in Macbeth, Dickinson’s poems, with their gnomic abstraction, 
cheerfully eschewing referential reality while, at the same time, turning metaphysical 
reality upside down, open up a menacingly intimate, concealed space between 
reader and poem, where past and present are lost – and the most sacred truth 
becomes hypothetical: it is the very space, as we will see, that Iago thrives in.  
 
THE SUGGESTION SINISTER 
 
Emily Dickinson’s family owned a copy of Shakespeare’s Complete Works, edited by the 
English publisher and author, Charles Knight. In his introduction to Othello, Knight 
offers a dryly didactic, schematic reading of the play. While Knight’s propensity 
towards Victorian moralizing may have grated against Dickinson’s subtle, complex 
understanding of Shakespeare, Knight’s introduction to Othello offers something that 
Dickinson always looked for in Shakespeare’s plays: characters turned into types 
that represent ideas in conflict. As we have seen, Dickinson’s poetry has narrating 
figures and situations described by analogy, but the drama in Dickinson’s poetry 
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often lies in her ability to transgress the boundaries between seemingly antithetical 
ideas. Dickinson scholars have long understood the way that Dickinson schematized 
the dichotomy between Egypt and Rome upon which Antony and Cleopatra is built 
with her exotic “Wild Nights” and her austere “New Englandly,” 363  but her 
engagement with Othello  is so intrinsic to her own poetic style that it has been 
missed. “Whoever disenchants” has so effectively absorbed Iago’s rhetoric that it has 
become just as Iago would have liked it: nearly invisible. A close examination of the 
poem, however, reveals startling affinities with Iago’s rhetoric. “Whoever 
disenchants” uses a proverbial form, ambiguous pronouns, dropped articles, 
negation, and the subjunctive mood to create an intimate, personal space equal in 
its undeniable anarchic power and concentrated menace to that created by Iago in 
the temptation scene in Othello.  Like Iago, Dickinson attacks the most fundamental 
unit of meaning: individual words.  
 In Knight’s reading, Iago becomes a “Man of the World”, a principle of 
skepticism who tempts an “enthusiastic” Othello into doubt of the “truth purity” not 
only of Desdemona, but of a metaphysical Christian ideal of truth itself:  
When the innocent and the high-minded submit themselves to the 
tutelage of the man of the world, as he is called, the process of mental 
change is precisely that produced in the mind of Othello. The poetry 
of life is gone. On them never more, "The freshness of the heart can 
fall like dew." They abandon themselves to the betrayer, and they 
prostrate themselves before the energy of his 'gain'd knowledge.'.364  
 
Where Knight sees “poetry” only in the frothy idealism that is ruined by Iago, 
Dickinson sees an electrical tension in the surprise infiltration of doubt by her own 
“Man of the world” figure that she calls “experience” (910). In “Whoever 	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disenchants”, Dickinson presents a dramatic tension reminiscent of the “temptation” 
that Knight describes in Othello:  
 Whoever disenchants 
 A single Human soul 
 By failure of irreverence 
 Is guilty of the whole. 
 
 As guileless as a Bird 
 As graphic as a star 
 Till the suggestion sinister 
 Things are not what they are  –  (1475)  
 
“Whoever disenchants”, at first, seems an indictment of the Iago-like “Man of the 
World” that Knight decries in his introduction to Othello. The narrator suggests that 
anyone who  “disenchants,” whose hard-edged realism steals what Knight calls 
earlier the “poetry of life,” bears the same responsibility as Lucifer for original sin, 
“Is guilty of the whole.” This figure appears “guileless” and “graphic.” As readers, 
we prepare ourselves for the poem to deliver a satisfying revelation of the evil nature 
of the figure who corrupts innocent “Human soul”[s] with his “suggestion sinister.” 
Instead of delivering a predictable moral pacifier at the end, Dickinson does 
something quite startling, she inserts a line that echoes the moment when Othello’s 
villain, Iago, declares his hypocrisy, “I am not what I am” (I. i. 66), but Dickinson 
alters the line to read “Things are not what they are”;  so that the reader hears the 
echo of Iago’s confession of guile and hypocrisy transposed upon a declaration about 
the philosophical nature of “Things” themselves, the object world. At the same time, 
Dickinson’s alteration of Iago’s line in the middle of her poem about the corruption 
of innocence by those who “disenchant” actually succeeds in accomplishing with the 
reader what Iago accomplishes with Othello: it splits the object world from its 
signifier, producing a form of knowledge that cannot be trusted. At a primary level, 
the reader’s relationship to the object world and, as we will see, to language  itself, is 
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altered by the poem.  
 “Whoever disenchants” is in the conditional mood. It presents the 
hypothetical, general case of an ambiguous "Whoever" who is condemned for the 
practice of “disenchant”[ing]  "Human soul" [s]. If the poem had simply remained 
abstract and proverbial, it would be indistinguishable from other didactic poetry of 
the nineteenth century. Stanza two, though, enacts what has been called a “tableau 
vivant.” 365  It describes this “Whoever” engaged in an intimate transgressive, 
personal action that contradicts the abstract, proverbial form that the first stanza is 
couched in:  
 As guileless as a Bird 
 As graphic as a star 
 Till the suggestion sinister 
   Things are not what they are – 
 
As we have seen, the final line of the poem pertains to the nature of “Thing”[s] 
themselves, implicitly altering the way that the reader views the universe; the 
hypothetical case becomes, suddenly, intensely personal without explicitly indicating 
that it is doing so.  
 In the scene popularly known as the Temptation Scene (Act III, scene 3), Iago 
teases Othello with what appears to be a sinister, unspeakable secret about 
Desdemona, resorting to the indirect language of proverbs. Like Dickinson, Iago 
parries with proverbs and stabs with pointed words. Like Dickinson, he begins with 
ambiguous, abstract proverbs. Dickinson herself underlined this one:   
 Poor and content is rich, and rich enough, 
 But riches fineless is as poor as winter 
 To him that ever fears he shall be poor. (III. iii. 174-175)  
 
Soon, though, the proverbial wisdom, matched with what appears to be stock 	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allegorical imagery, conveys “tableau vivants” that register cannibalistic violence. 
Jealousy ceases to be a static figure and assumes startling specificity. It becomes a 
“green eye’d monster which doth mock/ The meat it feeds on.” (III. iii. 170-72). 
Iago’s insinuation, like Dickinson’s exists in the half-light of innuendo. Iago doesn’t 
acknowledge the savage intensity of the image; yet, Iago’s figure of Jealousy is so 
menacing because of the way that it animates dead abstraction, so that it becomes a 
vivid, embodied, imminent threat.  
 Dickinson’s own proverbial “Whoever” transforms, in her final lines, into an 
unnamed “disenchant”[er] precisely because the figure is so ambiguous. Dickinson’s 
ability to move from a pose of monumentalremote traditional knowledge to startling, 
intimate specificity is a tactic that she may have learned from Iago.  
 Negation is a technique that Dickinson frequently uses in order to precipitate 
her quasi-dramatic reversals. Negations encourage a perverse reading by eroding 
our confidence in assertions they purport to signify. In “Whoever disenchants”, the 
final negation, “things are not what they are,” cues the reader to begin reversing 
both negative and positive terms, one by one: “disenchants,” “failure of irreverence,” 
“guileless” and “graphic.” In the process of doing this, the entire landscape of the 
poem changes. The person who “disenchants” may not be like Knight’s “Man of the 
World” who poisons, stealing the “poetry of life.” In fact, as we have seen,  he or she 
suddenly seems like a lone, misunderstood prophet who recognizes that what passes 
for “reverence” has become so profoundly hypocritical that the only way to 
approach reverence is a “failure of irreverence.” In stanza two, the poet introduces 
two clauses: “As guileless as a Bird /As graphic as a star.” These clauses appear to 
refer to all those who “disenchant”; but, once the magnetic poles of the poem have 
shifted, not only does the one who “disenchant”[s] begin to seem an embattled 
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innocent – but entire clusters of associated images alter: the “Whole” who were, 
apparently, “graphic as a star,” suddenly seem disquietingly menacing; they become 
suspiciously associated with “Birds” disturbingly corrupt and full of “guile.” By the 
time we hear the “suggestion sinister,” there is a sense that this “suggestion” may be 
“sinister” (or destructive) to the “Whole,” but, for the reader, the poem’s deliberate 
use of the cipher of negation suggests a fissile communication more important 
because it must be kept hidden from the prying eyes of the uninitiated.  
 More, the phrase, “the suggestion sinister” is in the subjunctive mood. The 
subjunctive mood creates a “suggestion sinister” that is not restricted to its ostensible 
subject, those who “disenchant”; it could be connected to the subject of the 
hypothetical case that the poem explores, but the visceral punch in that phrase “the 
suggestion sinister” suggests that the one delivering the message to the reader, 
encoded in “the suggestion sinister,” might actually be the narrator of the poem 
herself. In fact, the entire perverse reading is directed by this concealed narrator who 
“is not what” [she] “is,” just as she alters the universe for the reader into a place 
where “Things are not what they are.”  
          Iago also plays this semiotic game of reversal with Othello, using negation and 
the subjunctive. Here is Iago at a crucial moment of reversal during the Temptation 
Scene in Act III:  
 IAGO     
     For Michael Cassio, 
    I dare be sworn, I think, that he is honest, 
  
 OTHELLO 
  
 I think so too. 
  
 IAGO 
 
 Men should be what they seem, 
 Or those that be not, would they might seem none. 
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 OTHELLO 
  
 Certain, men should be what they seem. 
  
 IAGO 
 
 Why then I think Cassio's an honest man.  
  
 OTHELLO 
  
 Nay, there's more in this . . .  
(I. iii. 127-132)  
 
Iago’s crucial lines here resemble a two stanza Dickinson poem. His first comment 
seems to be a direct, unqualified declaration, “For Michael Cassio, I dare be sworn, 
I think, that he is honest.” Then, in response to Othello’s slightly ambiguous, “I 
think so,” Iago becomes positively Dickinsonian:  
 
 Men should be what they seem, 
 Or those that be not, would they might seem none.  
(II. iii. 125.2-126)  
 
Iago’s hypothetical, “Men should be what they seem,” turns to the equivocating 
subjunctive mood when he offers an alternative scenario that writhes with dangerous 
possibilities locked in the coded language of negation: “those that be not, would they 
might seem none.”  
 Iago’s formulation of deceptive men, “those that be not,” is a negation of a 
negation. He is expressing the wish that all hollow men would “seem” as empty as 
they actually are. The audience, aware of Iago’s deception, know that this would 
make them as invisible, as hidden – as Iago himself is. To Othello, though, Iago 
suggests a form of deceptiveness that is so elusive it is impossible for an ordinary 
person to decipher on their own. Iago makes use of the power of negation and the 
subjunctive mood not only to plunge Othello into a sense of bottomless uncertainty 
about the status of “honest men,” but the subjunctive mood, combined with Iago’s 
	   229	  
coiled negations, suggests something hidden and menacing about the condition of 
“be”[ing]. In fact, Iago succeeds here in using the negation in combination with the 
subjunctive mood to garner a spurious, gnomic authority upon himself and, at the 
same time, to plunge Othello into anxiety about the nature of all signs.  
 Othello’s exclamation, “Nay, there’s more in this . . .” suggests that he reads 
Iago’s line exactly as Dickinson’s readers might read “Whoever disenchants.” He 
reads Iago perversely, drawing the conclusion not only that Cassio might not be an 
honest man, but that the entire object world that “seem”[s] “honest” might also be 
suspect. Our own postmodern bias privileges doubt over belief, but Othello makes 
clear that a state of imaginative construction pressured by the anxiety of semiotic 
uncertainty is actually a place where murder and chaos can be conceived as well as 
legitimate skepticism about a spurious order. Dickinson’s suspension of the moral 
order is not just intellectual; it isn’t even just a poetic fiction; it takes place in a real 
hypothetical space, using a verb mood that is not locked in the past, present, or 
future tense, but is pregnant with both benign and murderous possibilities.   
 
TRANSGRESSING THE BOUNDARIES  
 
 “The Malay—took the Pearl—” (451) (or “The Malay”, as I will refer to it from 
now on) offers us a striking glimpse of Dickinson’s mind in the process of 
incorporating some of the most elemental features of Shakespeare’s dramatic 
language in Othello. The premise behind “The Malay” is one that is familiar to those 
with even a cursory knowledge of Dickinson: it is a poem exploring an agonized 
struggle between figures that represent two perennial Dickinsonian categories: 
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“gain” and “loss.”366 Perhaps Dickinson’s most famous poem, “Success is counted 
sweetest” (67), explores a scenario in which the victorious “Purple Host” are barred 
from a knowledge the “defeated” possess: the knowledge of the “definition” of 
“Victory.” The victors are oddly displaced by the losers because their victory lacks 
the firm boundaries established by language’s power to “define”[]. As we will 
discover, this establishment of drama through drawing and transgressing clear 
conceptual boundaries is a crucial feature of Iago’s language. Dickinson returned to 
this scenario when she imagined a death-bed scene in “Upon Concluded Lives”:  
Upon Concluded Lives 
There's nothing cooler falls— 
Than Life's sweet Calculations— 
The mixing Bells and Palls—  
 
Make Lacerating Tune— 
To Ears the Dying Side— 
'Tis Coronal—and Funeral— 
Saluting—in the Road—  
(735) 
 
The moment of dying, here, is the moment of the “mixing” of categories; the 
“Lacerating tune” is the surreal conflation of “Bells and Palls,” “Coronal” and 
“Funeral.” The power to define is identified with the prostrate, passive dying person 
who witnesses the disintegration of categories; this unlikely privileged position that 
Dickinson compares in another poem to “being but an Ear” (340) is also the 
receptive place that anticipates ultimate transgression. Dickinson fit the act of 
reading and writing in her categories of “loss” and gain”; she felt that the gulf 
between reader and writer was as great as that between the dying and the living. 
That ultimate position of “loss,” in which the categories that define identity are 
erased, is the dramatic position that Dickinson sought for her reader in relation to 	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Dickinson’s own work – or its consequences for the relationship between reader and poem.  
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her poetry.  
 Some of Dickinson’s most unusual poems dramatize the relation between poet 
and reader. In “I would not paint a picture” (348), Dickinson describes the act of 
reading as a state of acutely conscious loss she calls “sumptuous despair.”  In “This 
was a Poet – It is That”, the poet is imagined as a thief who steals from the 
impoverished reader who has watched the pilfered “Images”  “perish[]” just within 
reach, “by the Door –”:  
This was a Poet — It is That 
Distills amazing sense 
From ordinary Meanings — 
And Attar so immense 
 
From the familiar species 
That perished by the Door — 
We wonder it was not Ourselves 
Arrested it — before — 
 
Of Pictures, the Discloser — 
The Poet — it is He — 
Entitles Us — by Contrast — 
To ceaseless Poverty — 
 
Of portion — so unconscious — 
The Robbing — could not harm — 
Himself — to Him — a Fortune — 
Exterior — to Time — (446)  
 
The despairing reader is left “wonder”[ing] why she did not “arrest” the precious 
images before the poet-thief nabbed them. In a whimsical conclusion, Dickinson’s 
fictional reader rules out the possibility of “Robbing” the Poet because she keeps her 
“Fortune” where it is safe: “Exterior – to Time –.”  
 Not only did Dickinson construct the relationship between reader and writer as 
a form of “Robbing,” but Dickinson was deeply interested in the theme of robbery in 
Othello. In her own version of Othello, these lines are underlined: 
For your sake, jewel,  
I am glad at soul I have no other child (I. iii. 195-6)  
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The robbed that smiles steals something from the thief; 
He robs himself that spends a bootless grief.  (I. iii. 206-7)367 
 
Dickinson knew the second quotation well enough to cite it in a letter: Beloved 
Shakespeare says, ‘He that is robbed and smiles, steals something from the thief’”368 
For Dickinson, it appears, “Robbing” was the key to unlock Othello’s themes of 
possession and sexual jealousy: “Robbing” was also the gritty, dramatic, displacing 
metaphor that Dickinson used to imagine the volatile interaction between Othello’s 
central characters. In her most accomplished exploration of the themes from Othello, 
she depicts an Earl who claims to be the victim of a “Pearl” theft:  
The Malay – took the Pearl – 
Not – I – the Earl – 
I – feared the Sea – too much 
Unsanctified – to touch – 
 
Praying that I might be 
Worthy – the Destiny – 
The Swarthy fellow swam – 
And bore my Jewel – Home – 
 
Home to the Hut! What lot 
Had I – the Jewel – got – 
Borne on a Dusky Breast – 
I had not deemed a Vest 
Of Amber – fit – 
 
The Negro never knew 
I – wooed it – too – 
To gain, or be undone – 
Alike to Him – One – 
(451)  
 
Páraic Finnerty has done path-breaking work in discovering how Dickinson engages 
Othello’s theme of jealousy in “The Malay.”369 The Earl is, according to Finnerty, an 
Iago-like figure who is seized by jealousy at the Othello-like Malay’s nabbing of his 
“Pearl,” an allusion to Desdemona:   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 Finnerty, Dickinson’s Shakespeare, pg. 173.  
368 Finnerty, pg. 131.  
369 Finnerty, Dickinson’s Shakespeare, 170-174. 
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 of one whose hand,  
 Like the base Indian, threw a pearl away 
 Richer than all his tribe; (V. ii. 345-48)  
 
This activates associations in Othello not just with jealousy, but with racial difference 
and the male conflation of sexual potency and what Othello calls “occupation” (III. 
iii. 354), Dickinson’s Webster’s would have clued Dickinson’s readers in to the fact 
that an “Earl” . . .““is now a mere title, unconnected with any territorial 
jurisdiction”;370 so that Dickinson creates in her Iago-like Earl an unbounded male 
racism that feeds both on his own voyeuristic wish to be the more assertive Malay – 
and also on his own half-acknowledged impotence. 
 What Finnerty and other critics haven’t understood is the way that “The 
Malay”[‘s] theme of gain, loss, and unintentional “Robbing” places it at the heart of 
a dramatic relationship between reader and poem in Dickinson - and, in 
Shakespeare’s play, between Iago and Othello. If one explores the polarization of 
figures and concepts in “The Malay” – and reads this backwards through Othello, one 
can find the ground for the conception of Othello suggested in “The Malay.” More 
importantly, though, through our glimpse of the way that Dickinson captures the 
dangerous transgression that takes place between Iago and Othello, we can better 
understand our own identity as readers with Othello – because, as Dickinson 
understood, to experience Iago’s language is to experience the loss of identity that 
she associated with her ideal reading experience.  
 Although it is not among those passages Dickinson underlined, Dickinson’s 
poem strongly suggests that she found this passage in Othello particularly intriguing:  
 Were I the Moor, I would not be Iago: 
 In following him, I follow but myself – (italics added, I. i. 57-58)  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 Emily Dickinson Lexicon project (EDL) at Brigham Young University (BYU). 
<http://edl.byu.edu/webster/term/2348536>. 
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Iago’s gnomic lines are embedded within a larger passage, but these lines have a 
force that requires our independent attention. Iago here offers a paradoxical 
Dickinsonian formula; he asserts his identity as distinct from Othello: Iago is a 
servant “follow”[er]; Othello is one to be followed; Iago is a Venetian, “The Moor” 
is an outsider; Othello is generous, Iago follows “but myself.” At the same time, 
Iago’s very proposition invites a Dickinsonian reversal. Iago asserts that he is 
separate from Othello, but the ambiguity of the second line, “In following him, I 
follow but myself,” foreshadows, for the audience, the appalling nature of the drama 
that will unfold: Iago will, literally, follow “but myself” by, impossibly, erasing the 
distinction between them – and swallowing up the noble “Moor” with “myself.” 
Iago’s lines would have had great interest for Dickinson – as, within a very tight 
space, with a gnomic, paradoxical resonance very similar to her own poetry, Iago’s 
lines polarize him and Othello into opposites, and present the paradox of the 
conflation of those opposites that he is planning to effect.  
 We have already seen the way that Dickinson imagines Iago and Othello, not 
only as representing opposite poles conceptually, but as fitting her own categories for 
reader and writer. Iago, as we saw, becomes the perverse inscriber; Othello becomes 
the apt pupil, for whom reading is a form of transgression that collapses the 
boundary between himself and Iago, even as it transgresses the conceptual boundary 
that defines the ideal he holds sacred. The audience’s dread and fascination is based, 
in part, upon observing Iago’s ingenuity at effecting the displacement of identity in 
Othello that he implicitly promises to effect in those early, paradoxical Dickinsonian 
lines. The disparity in ethnicity, in status, in character between Othello and Iago – 
all contribute to the appalling dread when Iago triumphantly collapses the 
distinction between them, suggesting, as Dickinson’s “Malay” poem also does – that 
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the boundary between basest and highest is something that can be transgressed with 
terrifying speed. Iago’s concise Dickinsonian lines in Act IV sum up the appalling 
reversal in positions he has effected:  
He is that he is: I may not breathe my censure 
What he might be; if what he might, he is not, 
I would to heaven he were. (IV. ii. 262-4)  
 
Iago’s observation about Othello “He is that he is” recalls his own earlier declaration 
of duplicity, “I am not what I am” (I. i. 66). Iago’s later phrasing triumphantly 
suggests an Othello as monstrously graphic – and visible as he is hidden and 
treacherous. Dickinson may have observed the way that, in a tiny space, Iago 
conveys dynamic power by feigning obsequiousness, “I may not breathe my 
censure/ What he might be” and quietly exults, with a gleeful sense of concealed 
power, at his ability entirely to displace Othello’s existence with “not”: “If what he 
might, he is not.” Iago’s genius at defining precise boundaries based upon his own 
polarized categories and hierarchies  – “Were I the Moor, I would not be Iago” (I. i. 
58) – and his giddy process of inverting these same hierarchies and categories  – “If 
what he might, he is not” – is a strategy that Dickinson’s own poem relies upon 
implicitly.  
 Dickinson’s Earl’s assertion at the start of “The Malay” is uncannily similar to 
Iago’s:  
 The Malay—took the Pearl—  
 Not—I—the Earl— 
 
Just as in Othello, we have here a polarization of the two central figures – though in 
Dickinson’s poem, the Iago and Othello figures are, characteristically, reversed. The 
Earl begins by asserting his noble status, with his title; he identifies “the Malay” as 
foreigner; he also suggests that the Malay has behaved the way that a savage might; 
he has violated common decency by taking a “Pearl” that the Earl’s noble, civilized 
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status would prevent him from doing “Not—I—the Earl.” As we learned earlier, by 
giving her noble a designation that “is now a mere title, unconnected with any 
territorial jurisdiction,” she gives her reader a cryptic clue that the Earl’s status may 
be overturned.   
 The Earl’s contrasts between himself and the Malay couldn’t be more extreme, 
but the disjunction between his descriptions of the Malay’s enjoyment of his “Pearl” 
and his own protests of  “Not – I – the Earl –,” never having a thought to do what he 
imagines the Malay has done with the Pearl, begin to cause a subtle, Dickinsonian 
sense of doubt to creep in regarding whether, indeed, the “Sea” was “too much/ 
Unsanctified” for the Earl “to touch” – or if the Malay had just done what he wished 
to do all along, namely behave like the “Swarthy fellow” and swim (“swam”), in the 
“Sea.” 
 At the same time as this suspicion creeps in, the Earl’s vocabulary, associated 
with European civilization and courtly love, “Pearl,” “feared,” “Unsanctified,” 
“Praying,” “Worthy,” “Destiny” – alongside “Swarthy fellow swam,” “Hut,” “Borne 
on a Dusky Breast,” “Vest/ Of Amber” – creates a sense of impending dread at the 
collapse in identity between the Earl and the man the Earl calls “Negro,” evoking 
the lowest scale on the racial register of Dickinson’s day, in stanza 4. Alongside the 
dramatic monologue, Dickinson has created a conceptual drama that parallels 
Shakespeare’s in Othello. The tension of the polar opposition she has established – 
along with her ironic hints that destabilize that tension – lead the reader into a form 
of perverse semiotics familiar to this study.  
 The reader who senses what seems like an avid identification between the 
“Praying” Earl and the Malay he reviles might suddenly latch onto a clause that 
seems promiscuously to refer to two sentences at once – and a personal pronoun that 
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seems to refer to both the Earl and the Malay at once. Regarding this feature of the 
poem, Weisbuch writes:  
Even the syntax contributes to the passive-active contrast: in the second 
stanza, the “I” of the gerundive subordinate clause is replaced in the 
main clause by the “Swarthy fellow.” (Obviously, the phrase does not 
mean that “the swarthy fellow prayed for me as he dove” but that “I 
prayed, while he performed.”)371   
Weisbuch astutely notes the fact that the pronoun “I” could modify either “Swarthy 
fellow” or the “Praying” Earl. Weisbuch discounts the inference a reader might 
make that the “Swarthy fellow” might be the one who ‘prayed for me as he dove’ – 
and yet this is precisely the kind of perverse reading that Dickinson encourages. 
What the image does is disconcertingly and jarringly to fuse the courtly Earl with the 
man who swims in the “Sea” that the Earl has only imagined – but, it is precisely the 
possibility that the Earl’s wild fantasy collapses the carefully constructed barrier 
between himself and the “Swarthy fellow” that the poem’s ambiguous pronoun – 
and clause – opens up for the reader. Just as we saw with “Whoever disenchants,” 
this feature also collapses distance between the reader and the poem – because it 
happens in the half-light of a poem that Dickinson compels the reader to “build.” 
The polar opposition is certainly there, but in order for the dangerous and perverse 
fantasy space to open up, the reader must make the perverse connection.  
When we look at Iago’s pivotal passage in the temptation scene, not only is 
Dickinson’s absorbed engagement in the dynamics of gain and loss in Othello quite 
clear, but something even more peculiar happens: Iago uses an ambiguous pronoun 
that is quite reminiscent of Dickinson’s. It also serves a similar purpose, to create a 
semiotic puzzle that produces dread by undoing a polarizing rhetoric that the passage 
itself creates:  
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OTH: And yet, how nature erring from itself . . .  
 
IAGO: Ay, there's the point: as, to be bold with you, 
Not to affect many proposed matches 
Of her own clime, complexion, and degree, 
Whereto we see in all things nature tends, 
Foh! One may smell in such a will most rank, 
Foul disproportion, thoughts unnatural. 
But, pardon me, I do not in position 
Distinctly speak of her, though I may fear 
Her will, recoiling to her better judgment, 
May fall to match you with her country forms, 
And happily repent.  
(III.iii.226-235)  
 
Like Dickinson, Iago seizes upon a form of syntax and word selection that succeeds 
in being precise while retaining the abstraction of a hypothetical. Iago does this by 
using several tricks at once. First, his interruption of Othello automatically creates 
ambiguity because it is unclear whether Iago is continuing Othello’s subject or 
starting a new one. At the same time, Iago interrupts with an infinitive clause (“not 
to affect”) with a reflexive pronoun “her own.” Although this infinitive clause with a 
reflexive pronoun doesn’t exactly present a hypothetical subject that Iago can, then, 
cast doubt upon, as he did with the subjunctive we saw in our earlier section, 
“Perverse Reading”, Iago’s infinitive clause here does something much more 
startling than that. 372 It seems precisely to describe Desdemona based upon “her own” 
. . . “clime, complexion, and degree.” The infinitive clause, dislocated in time and 
space passes by rapidly so that Othello may barely notice that Iago has said, “not to 
affect many proposed matches”; so Iago’s unexpressed subject, Desdemona, is solely 
defined according to a rigid hierarchy of country, race, and status (“clime, 
complexion, and degree”) and she is, at the same time, through that innocent 
infinitive, “not to affect,” suspiciously disassociated from the very markers that Iago 
has used to confer identity upon her. It hardly needs mentioning, in part, because 	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these rhetorical structures of gain and loss proliferate throughout Othello – though 
they are here most poignant - that Iago’s construction of Desdemona is suspect like 
Dickinson’s Earl. She has become, figuratively, a noble with a shadow of suspicion 
cast upon her.  
Even more interesting, though, is the way that, by being so specific about 
defining Desdemona according to “clime, complexion, and degree,” Iago has 
already painted Othello as the Malay figure whose victory (marriage) debases what 
he has gained. In order to blur the lines of demarcation between the courtly 
Desdemona and a Desdemona possessed by a “nature” that begins quickly to look 
very unnatural (“very nature will instruct her towards some second choice” [italics 
added, II. i. 227]), Iago finishes his clause by expressing, ostensibly, the subject of his 
comparison “nature”; but, “nature,” at the same time, serves as the grammatical 
subject of the reflexive pronoun, “her own.” It is only when Iago states, in the next 
line, “One may smell in such a will most rank”, that the strong parallel structure, 
“will” and “affect”, clarifies that it is not Desdemona’s, but “her own” “will” that is 
the expressed subject of the sentence. In causing Othello’s ear to hear “nature” as 
the grammatical subject of that earlier clause, though, Iago unlocks all of the 
ominous, portentous heft of Brabantio’s earlier lines that Othello has just repeated – 
and Iago’s clause has seemed to modify: 
For nature so preposterously to err,  
 Not being deficient, blind, or lame of sense, 
 Sans witchcraft could not.  
(italics added, I. iii. 62-64)  
 
So that when Iago finally hammers on that dreadful line, “One may smell in such, a 
will most rank,” that “will most rank” gains metaphorical power and disturbing 
pungency by the curious elision between the expressed subject of the previous 
clause, “nature” and the clarified subject of the sentence “a will most rank.” It is as if 
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erring nature itself writhes into being before Iago’s nauseatingly intimate verb 
“smell.” This is a metaphorical adultery that Othello (the “reader”) must half-create 
with his ear. Desdemona’s union with a malicious other whom, Iago implies cannot 
be mentioned because he is so threatening to Desdemona’s “clime, complexion, and 
degree” – described as a “foul disproportion” – is also a graphic “scene” that must 
be constructed in the perverse imagination of a listener. Like so many of Dickinson’s 
figures, the exact scene is precise with regard to hierarchy, “disproportion” being 
powerfully suggestive with regard to the action (recalling “the beast with two backs” 
[I. i. 117]), with the identity of the two figures determined by the hierarchy (Othello 
and Desdemona), but also indeterminate because one “foul disproportion” could 
beget an inconceivable number of similar acts. The dramatic effectiveness of Iago’s 
lines requires that Othello must be profoundly complicit, as a listener, not only in 
deciphering his ambiguous syntax, but also in committing the anarchical implosion 
of spurious distinctions that Iago establishes as the foundation of the passage. If 
Iago’s temptation is a stick of dynamite, Othello’s perverse deciphering ignites the 
fuse – and his agonized imagination detonates the explosive.   
 Dickinson’s dynamic and menacing reproduction of Shakespeare’s dramaturgy 
on the page is light-years from Whitman’s experiments in identity formation that 
require the displacement of diseased sexuality on the “cadavers” that “block up the 
passageway” on the road to America’s optimistic future; it is alien to the purification 
of little Pearl, who learns not to “fight constantly against the world but would be a 
woman in it;” it is quite different from Ishmael’s exorcism of Ahab and the drowning 
of the queer, but life-giving  Queequeg; it is, in fact, the no-place from which any 
true assessment of America’s seemingly irresistibly optimistic identity politics, 
attached to the label of an implacable “progress,” should spring.  
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     CONCLUSION 
 
AMERICA’S PERVERSE SHAKESPEARE  
 
With the commemoration of Shakespeare’s four hundred fiftieth birthday in 2014 
and the impending four hundredth anniversary of his death in 2016, the shadow of 
Shakespeare swerves again into view. As Emerson states, with inadvertent 
prescience, “His mind is the horizon beyond which, at present, we do not see.”373 Is 
the shadow destined to blind us with the self-enclosed predictability of America’s 
perverse jeremiad? This thesis has shown that such an ominously closed future 
doesn’t have to be.  
Each of the five American authors in my study had dissident, though mostly 
disavowed responses to Shakespeare. Emerson’s attempt to convert America into an 
enchanted island was haunted by harrowing intimations of perversity, disease, and 
death from Hamlet. His attempt to bleach his island paradise of Caliban seems to 
have evoked a living doppelgänger in Whitman whom he first embraced, but later 
attempted prudishly to evade for his remaining career.  
Whitman’s early attempt to confront the perverse in Caliban resulted in one 
of the most significant structures of disavowal in the history of homosexuality. As the 
unwilling father of gay liberation, Whitman’s decision to evade what he considered 
to be the prurient sexuality of Shakespeare and to identify his own heroic 
“unperverted” (“Memorandum at a Venture”) sexuality with women’s liberation 	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prefigured the identity politics that has bound gay rights irrevocably with the 
neoliberal economic agenda. Such an alliance has had unintended consequences.374 
Despite important historical differences, the gay rights movement, especially 
as it evolved in the 1980’s and 90’s, was predicated on the affirmation of middle 
class values similar to those advanced by the movement for women’s equality, 
advocated for by Whitman in the 1880’s. The understandable need to gain 
acceptance by affirming an “unperverted” form of sexuality succeeded in 
inadvertently legitimizing a structure of disavowal. What is at issue is not the 
legitimate demand by ostracized groups for equality under the law; it is that the 
discourse of the perverse has the capacity to naturalize violence so that it is nearly 
invisible. As Jonathan Dollimore argues:  
And yet it seems to me that liberation, far from eradicating the kind of sexual 
disgust felt by [André] Gide may have intensified it; certainly it has helped 
produce new ways of concealing or repressing it; and of encouraging people 
to displace and project their experience of it into politically acceptable forms 
of bigotry. We are still invited to express disgust publicly in relation to many 
things, most of all, perhaps paedophilia.375 
 
For Dollimore, homosexual liberation in the affirmative tradition of Gide did not 
eliminate homophobia; it created the opportunity for new displacements and 
projections. Lee Edelman concurs, arguing that “queerness” can only enter the 
“political sphere” once it has “shift[ed] the figural burden of queerness onto 
someone else”…“The structural position of queerness, after all” he adds, “and the need 
to fill it remain.”  376 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374 There has been a growing recognition among Queer theorists that the affirmative 
political stance of gay activists has been inadequate. See, for example, Judith Halberstam, 
The Queer Art of Failure (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); David M. Halperin and 
Valerie Traub, Gay Shame (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); and Heather Love, 
Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2007).	  
375 Jonathan Dollimore, Sex, Literature, and Censorship (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), pg. 50. 
376 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2004), pg. 27. 	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Anthropologist Roger Lancaster, in his detailed analysis of the relationship 
between what he calls America’s current “sex panic” and its carceral system, 
describes the way that America’s prison population has quadrupled in the last thirty 
years to 753 per 100,000 in 2010, five to ten times more people per capita than 
other developed countries; at the same time, starting in 1990, a whole new form of 
civil commitment developed which mirrored the 19th century masturbation panic in 
terms of its psychiatric rationale and its cultural resonance.377 Paradoxically what 
drove the expansion of the prison system and the emergence of new forms of civil 
commitment, according to Lancaster, was not a professional psychiatric movement, 
as in the 19th century, or the government’s attempt to consolidate its police powers, 
but a populist social movement: the victim’s rights movement, based upon the 
model of “leftist social movements – civil rights, the women’s movement, gay 
liberation.”378  
By 2008, twenty states had adopted sexual violent predator (SVP) laws and 
the United States Congress had passed a civil commitment provision as part of the 
Adam Walsh Act. As of 2006, there were 3646 people held in indefinite civil 
commitment as SVPs at an average cost of $97,000 per person per year.379 Of the 
over 3000 individuals detained since 1990, just fifty have been released because 
psychiatrists determined that they were rehabilitated and no longer posed a risk to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 Roger N. Lancaster, Sex Panic and the Punitive State (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2011), pp. 142. See also the full chapter “Zero Tolerance Crime and Punishment in 
the Punitive State”, pp. 141-166.  
378 Lancaster, pg. 194.  
379 Eric S. Janus and Robert A. Prentky, "Sexual Predator Laws: A Two-Decade 
Retrospective," Federal Sentencing Reporter 21, no. 2 (December 2008): pg. 91. The term 
“SVP” includes a number of paraphilias, including sadism, rape and exhibitionism. I was 
unable to find the percentage of pedophiles currently held in civil commitment and listed in 
sex offender registries under the designation SVP, but I think it is safe to assert that the 
pedophile is symbolically regarded as the quintessential SVP.  
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the community.380 From the start, sex offender registries have been advanced as a 
more popular and less costly alternative to civil commitment. The number of people 
on sex offender registries in the United States in 2010 was 228 per 100,000 and 
Human Rights Watch reported that the total number of people on the registries in 
the United States in 2011 (the last year for which there are complete statistics) was 
740,000.381  
The US Supreme Court, in its 1997 Kansas v. Henricks decision, soundly 
rejected the idea that the SVP laws did not satisfy a key prerequisite of civil 
commitment, proof of a “mental disorder.”382 This has not caused the controversy 
to disappear, however. The question at issue is whether a “mental abnormality” 
constitutes a real pathology or if it is simply, as Davidson argues in a 2008 
Philoctetes Roundtable discussion, a term that designates a type of sexual behaviour 
that is considered morally reprehensible. 383  The principle measure of sexual 
deviance is “phallometric testing” using the notorious penile plethysmograph (which 
measures penile circumference and volume in response to a variety of pictures, 
scenes, clips, and audio dialogue). From these measurements, psychiatrists are able 
to determine an individual’s “pedophile index,” which is used to evaluate the danger 
of re-offense.384 What the penile plethysmograph measures, however, is not a well-
understood mental pathology affecting volition and resulting in bad behaviour, but 
desire itself. As Holly A. Miller et al. observe:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 John L. Schwab, "DUE PROCESS AND "THE WORST OF THE WORST": 
MENTAL COMPETENCE IN SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR CIVIL 
COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS," Columbia Law Review 112, no. 4 (May 2012): pg. 917. 	  
381 Lancaster, pg. 235. See also "US: More Harm Than Good," May 1, 2013, accessed 
August 08, 2014, doi:Human Rights Watch.  
382 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).  
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There is no empirical proof that an individual diagnosed with a personality 
disorder or paraphilia actually has a neuropsychological abnormality, or, if 
present, the degree to which that abnormality may impair behavioural 
control.385  
 
The distinction is crucial because if people are being placed in civil commitment not 
because they have an underlying pathology, but because of their bad behaviour, 
then the intervention would be punitive and not justified as a form of rehabilitation. 
Even more troubling, Davidson observes, if civil commitment is based upon a 
deviance from sexual “function” as opposed to underlying mental pathology, then 
there is no meaningful medical distinction between 19th century diagnoses of 
hysteria and masturbatory insanity and a current diagnosis of SVP.386  
Anna Schaffner argues that our cultural obsession with pedophiles is merely 
a sign that the “law has taken the place of psychiatry.”387 Schaffner writes:  
. . . it is the law which ‘makes a distinction between permissible ‘paraphiles’ 
and social ‘paraphiles’ whose acts make them liable to criminal proceedings, 
namely rapists, paedophiles, mad killers, sex criminals, exhibitionists, grave 
robbers, and stalkers’.388  
In the same breath, Schaffner quotes Elisabeth Roudinesco, who contends that 
“paedophilia has replaced inversion as the incarnation of the most hateful 
perversion . . . because it attacks childhood and therefore the future of humanity.”389 
Ironically, this line of argumentation derives directly from Aquinas and his 
teleological view of sexual acts. Aquinas, we will recall, regarded sexual perversion 
as an attack on the “species” – and, therefore, as an insult not only to God, but an 
attempt to murder humanity’s future. Schaffner’s language converts the pedophile 
into a figure who isn’t merely committing a crime – a subject of the “law” –  but one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385 Miller et al., pg. 42.  
386 Davidson, Paraphelias Roundtable Discussion.  
387 Anna Katharina. Schaffner, Modernism and Perversion (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011), pg. 263. 
388 Ibid. pg. 263.  
389 Ibid. pg. 264. Quoted from Elisabeth Roudinesco and David Macey, Our Dark Side: A 
History of Perversion (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2009), pg. 142.  
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that is committing a metaphysical assault on the future.  
 The trouble with this rhetoric is not that it is wrong to assert an important 
distinction between the sexual “difference” that was punished in the 19th and early 
to mid 20th centuries (and has been, in the past decades, frequently celebrated) and 
the sexual crimes against the vulnerable that are prosecuted today, but that such a 
distinction does not mean that one has banished the moral and metaphysical 
categories of the 19th century.390 A metaphysical view of pedophilia removes it from 
the realm of law and order into the Thomistic realm of infinite justice, the 
psychiatric realm of conversion therapy and the imaginative realm of “the scarlet 
letter.” A view that justifies unlimited punishment on the basis not of criminal 
behavior, but on a form of deviant sexual desire makes all sexual minorities 
vulnerable.391 It also has a powerful cultural impact that, as I have shown, is 
intimately connected to literary representations of perverse sexuality.  
As I have argued throughout this thesis, Shakespeare’s plays unearth and 
dramatize a perverse sexuality that cannot be accommodated by psychiatric 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390 Schaffner writes, “Whilst the majority of nineteenth-century sexologists were interested 
in establishing firm parameters for what is healthy and normal ex negativo” . . . “modernist 
writers” . . . “began to revalorize conceptions of the perversions at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, paving the way for a shift from the notion of sexual deviance to that of 
sexual difference.” Modernism and Perversion, pg. 4.  
 
Foucault, on the other hand, argues, in his famous 1979 interview with Guy Hocquenghem, 
that the liberation of “sexual difference” merely created new, more aggressive forms of 
disciplinary power: “what is emerging is a new penal system, a new legislative system, whose 
function is not so much to punish offenses against these general laws concerning decency, as 
to protect populations and parts of populations regarded as particularly vulnerable. In other 
words, the legislator will not justify the measures that he is proposing by saying: the 
universal decency of mankind must be defended. What he will say is: there are people for 
whom others’ sexuality may become a permanent danger.” Lawrence D. Kritzman, Michel 
Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture (London: Routledge, 1988), pg. 276.  	  
391 For a succinct summary of the controversy among psychologists over the term 
“paraphilia” (consistent with my treatment here) in the most recent DSM-5 (The Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) see Michelle A. McManus et al., "Paraphilias: 
Definition, Diagnosis and Treatment," US National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of 
Health 5 (2013).  
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categories or cultural narratives. Hawthorne, employing the psychiatric categories 
for the diseased imagination, derived from Lockean psychology, attempted to 
extricate himself from Macbeth’s tragic ontology by presenting Dimmesdale as a 
sexual pervert who ultimately saves America’s middle class values by converting his 
sin into repentance. Hawthorne, though, was haunted, by the ghost of incest in 
Hamlet, and transferred this onto the strange relationship between Dimmesdale and 
Pearl. Ultimately, Dimmesdale’s apparent self-sacrifice through his public confession 
and subsequent death succeeds in converting Pearl to the very restrictions of 
antebellum womanhood that her anarchic childhood promised to free her from. T. 
Walter Herbert argues persuasively that there is a link between Pearl and 
Hawthorne’s own delivery of his anarchic and non-conformist daughter, Una, into 
the hands of quack doctors, who employed an early experimental form of electro-
shock therapy to treat her for what psychiatrists regarded as a disease. Even in his 
personal life, Hawthorne may never have escaped from the ironies of the 
perverse.392 
Melville and Dickinson, on the other hand, read Shakespeare more violently 
and disturbingly. It is my contention that they learned from Shakespeare how to 
animate the void that Augustine describes as non-being and that Lee Edelman, 
evoking Freud, describes as the Death Drive. The gripping and inescapable 
complicity that Melville produces in his “Whiteness” chapter and Dickinson 
produces everywhere as a dramatic sexual politics, gives us a path towards a 
dangerous and experimental American Shakespeare criticism in the present, to 
counter the reactionary Shakespeare under the banner of American progress. For, 
as Ewan Fernie has observed in his chapter on Angelo, Shakespeare leads us into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 T. Walter Herbert, “Una Hawthorne and The Scarlet Letter,” in The Scarlet Letter and Other 
Writings, ed. Leland S. Person (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2005), pp. 522-540.  
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uncomfortable and dangerous identifications.393 What person, as Melville points 
out, “in his own proper character,” could admit an identification with sexual 
criminals, the abject outcasts of society? 
Arthur Lindley has argued, forcefully, that the “very doctrine of general 
depravity . . . licenses dissent” by making everyone equally guilty.394 This abject 
sense of complicity is certainly what Shakespeare’s perverse reading evokes. 
However, Shakespeare also does something different than that. He dramatically 
produces the void, tears at the roots of unconscious energies, and makes them into a 
present, experiential, inescapable confrontation. Such a dramatic process is not 
merely critical. It to some extent runs the risk of reproducing those violent forces 
that society condemns. This leads to a radical openness, as Fernie points out, and, as 
I have observed, led, in part, to the shattering between reality and theater, practiced 
with consummate skill by Junius Booth and reproduced by his son John Wilkes 
Booth, in the tragic assassination of Abraham Lincoln.  
Shakespeare’s influence on each of the American authors in my study makes 
it clear that perverse identifications do counterbalance the structuring forces of the 
perverse jeremiad. These anarchic identifications cannot be domesticated. To use 
Leo Bersani’s phrase, that is a positive “value.”395 Sex cannot be redeemed, but its 
anarchic energies can be claimed.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393 Fernie, pp. 191-200.  
394 Lindley evokes the concept of “carnival,” in his description of Augustinian non-being, 
which is also theatrical. Arthur Lindley, Hyperion and the Hobbyhorse: Studies in Carnivalesque 
Subversion (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1996), pg. 36. 
395 “Gays and women must of course fight the violence directed against them, and I am 
certainly not arguing for a complicity with misogynist and homophobic fantasies. I am, 
however, arguing against that form of complicity that consists in accepting, even finding 
new ways to defend, our culture’s lies about sexuality” . . . “But what if we said, for 
example, not that it is wrong to think of so-called passive sex as ‘demeaning,’ but rather that 
the value of sexuality itself is to demean the seriousness of efforts to redeem it?” Leo Bersani, "Is the 
Rectum a Grave?," AIDS: Cultural Analysis / Cultural Activism 43 (Winter 1987): pg. 222.  
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